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Abstract 
This thesis examines the non-equity entry mode decisions of international hotel 
organisations. To date, relatively few studies have examined entry mode choice in the 
context of the service sector as compared with that of the manufacturing sector, and fewer 
still have considered it in the context of the hotel industry. Moreover, studies focused on 
the choice between equity and non-equity entry modes by far outnumber studies focused 
on the choice between different non-equity modes. This gap needs to be filled because the 
majority of the entry modes used in the international hotel industry are non-equity in 
nature.  
This thesis presents empirical research based on the theoretical foundation of new 
institutional economics on the choice between non-equity entry modes in the hotel 
industry – specifically on the choice between franchising and management contracts, 
known as asset-light modes by practitioners. Moreover, to the knowledge of the author, 
this is the first thesis to gather both qualitative and quantitative primary data from hotel 
executives who are at the strategic level as opposed to from hotel general managers or 
other operational-level employees in the hotel industry.  
This thesis comprises two studies, each with its own literature review. Study 1 is 
qualitative in nature, with in-depth semi-structured interviews conducted with eight hotel 
executives. The primary objective of this study was to empirically examine which of the 
predominant theories of new institutional economics are the most appropriate for 
examining the specific choice between franchising and management contracts when 
internationalising a hotel or hotel chain. Transaction cost economics and the resource-
based view emerged as the most appropriate theories, according to the executives 
interviewed. Specifically, the executives suggested that the considerations of asset 
specificity from transaction cost economics and imperfect imitability from the resource-
based view are important in the decision. Moreover, several other considerations were 
suggested, including the size of the organisation, the importance of intangible assets and 
the level of investment into these assets. Finally, host country factors, such as legal and 
political risk, as well as the availability of capable local partners, were suggested as 
important considerations. 
Study 2 is quantitative in nature, with a self-selected dual scenario-based online survey (a 
franchise scenario and a management contract scenario) of 109 hotel executives. The 
primary objective of this study was to develop and test hypotheses through the combined 
theoretical lenses of transaction cost economics and the resource-based view as well as 
iii 
the findings from Study 1. These hypotheses were tested by initially examining whether 
the two groups of respondents differ in their opinion of the importance they attached to 
the independent variables in their entry mode decision through analyses of variance 
(ANOVAs) and a multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA). This was followed by a 
discriminant function analysis to see if the variables allowed the prediction of group 
membership. These analyses were chosen because of their complementary and inter-
confirmatory nature. The findings show that intangible assets and resources are one of the 
most important considerations in deciding between franchising and management 
contracts when internationalising a hotel or hotel chain, and that they prompt 
management contracts. Moreover, it was also found that uncertainties in the host market 
may lead hotel executives to choose franchising over management contracts, and finally, 
that asset specificity may prompt the use of management contracts over franchising.  
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Introduction 
This chapter begins by outlining the background in which this thesis is set, briefly 
explaining entry modes and highlighting that non-equity entry modes have become 
increasingly popular in the service sector and in the hotel industry specifically. The 
purpose and significance of the thesis is then explained; it is shown that there is merit in 
building on the literature in this field, as non-equity entry mode research is under-
represented relative to its use in the industry. This is followed by a brief outline of the 
research process, that is, a timeline of the thesis, highlighting the major milestones 
reached over the past three years. Finally, this chapter provides an overview of the 
approach and structure of the thesis. 
1.2 Background 
The mode used to enter a foreign market is a central consideration in the 
internationalisation process of multinational corporations (MNCs) (Quer, Claver, & 
Andreu, 2007). It determines the future of the operations in the host country and 
constitutes one of the most critical factors for success (Anderson & Gatignon, 1986). The 
importance of this decision is reflected in the literature, where considerable attention is 
paid to the phenomenon by scholars in the field (Agarwal & Ramaswami, 1992; Anderson 
& Gatignon, 1986; Brouthers & Brouthers, 2003; Brouthers, Brouthers, & Werner, 2008; 
Brouthers & Hennart, 2007; Canabal & White, 2008; Werner, 2002). Entry modes have 
been classified in the literature in two ways. The first is on a continuum of increasing 
control and consequent risk, starting at one end with exporting/contractual agreements, 
moving to joint ventures (JVs) in the middle, and ending with wholly owned subsidiaries 
(WOSs) (Anderson & Gatignon, 1986; Erramilli & Rao, 1990). The second is to classify 
entry modes as ‘non-equity entry modes versus equity entry modes’ in a hierarchical 
model (Pan & Tse, 2000). Non-equity entry modes, also referred to as asset-light modes, 
are defined as “modes that do not entail equity investment by a foreign entrant” (Erramilli, 
Agarwal, & Dev, 2002, p. 223) and refer to exporting and contractual agreements. Equity 
entry modes are defined as “[entailing equity ownership,] a high investment and 
consequently high risk/return alternative that also provides a high degree of control to 
the investing firm” (Agarwal & Ramaswami, 1992, p. 3) and refer to JVs and WOSs. 
Non-equity entry modes have become increasingly popular among service firms (Brown, 
Dev, & Zhou, 2003; Contractor & Kundu, 1998a, 1998b; Cunill & Forteza, 2010; Dev, 
Erramilli, & Agarwal, 2002; Erramilli et al., 2002; Sanchez-Peinado & Pla-Barber, 2006a, 
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2006b; Sanchez-Peinado, Pla-Barber, & Hebert, 2007), and hotel chains specifically have 
been suggested in the literature as preferring non-equity modes (Contractor & Kundu, 
1998b; Erramilli et al., 2002). The hotel industry is characterised as being capital intensive 
in regard to the ownership of physical assets such as real estate. It is therefore common to 
separate industry knowledge and managerial expertise from the ownership of these 
physical assets in the form of non-equity entry modes (Brown et al., 2003; Contractor & 
Kundu, 1998a; Cunill & Forteza, 2010; Rodrı́guez, 2002). According to Cunill and Forteza 
(2010), Erramilli and Rao (1990) and Pla-Barber et al. (2010), control does not necessarily 
need to be sacrificed when non-equity entry modes are used, despite the fact that the 
investment commitment is generally lower in such modes. This allows firms to expand 
more rapidly and allows for market concentration (Cunill & Forteza, 2010). It is likely that 
for these reasons Contractor and Kundu (1998b) found that hotel properties that have 
used non-equity entry modes constitute 65.4% of all multinational hotel organisations 
worldwide – a trend that has increased greatly since the publication of Contractor and 
Kundu’s study (Alon, Ni, & Wang, 2012; 1998b; Cunill & Forteza, 2010). 
The most commonly used non-equity modes in the hotel industry are franchising and 
management service contracts or branded management contracts (management 
contracts) (Contractor & Kundu, 1998a, 1998b; Pla & Leon, 2002; Sandman, 2003; Zeng, 
2010). The key difference between the two is that, although both are collaborative modes, 
franchising has been defined as a quasi-market transaction, that is, an inter-firm 
transaction that crosses firm boundaries. Management contracts, conversely, have been 
defined as quasi-internalised transactions, that is, intra-firm transactions that remain 
within firm boundaries (Contractor & Kundu, 1998a; Dev et al., 2002; Erramilli et al., 
2002; Fladmoe-Lindquist & Jacque, 1995). While the management contract offers more 
strategic and operational control for the entering firm than franchising, it entails a larger 
resource commitment from the firm (Contractor & Kundu, 1998a, 1998b; Erramilli et al., 
2002; Pla & Leon, 2002).  
It is surprising to find in the literature that the idiosyncrasies of different non-equity entry 
modes in the hotel industry seem to have been generally overlooked or understated by 
many researchers, apart from some notable exceptions (see Chapter 2). There are several 
forms of non-equity entry modes, ranging from exporting to various types of contractual 
agreements, including licensing, franchising and management contracts, all of which have 
their own idiosyncrasies (Anderson & Gatignon, 1986; Erramilli & Rao, 1990; Pan & Tse, 
2000). However, the majority of publications consider all non-equity modes as one 
category and compare them against equity entry modes as a second category (see Chapter 
2). By doing so, these authors disregard the complexity, heterogeneity and relationships 
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between non-equity modes (Contractor & Kundu, 1998b; Villar, Pla-Barber, & Leon-
Darder, 2012). Moreover, as highlighted in Chapter 2, to consider franchising and 
management contracts together and treat them equally as ‘non-equity entry modes’ is an 
oversimplification and does not allow for in-depth analysis. As franchising and 
management contracts constitute the vast majority of entry modes used in the hotel 
industry, the consideration between equity and non-equity modes is not as critical as the 
consideration between different non-equity modes. Accordingly, there is an imperative 
need to conduct further research on franchising and management contracts in the hotel 
industry, to examine the determinants for choosing between these non-equity modes. 
1.3 Problem Statement 
Non-equity entry modes have become increasingly popular for large hotel organisations 
seeking to internationalise. When examining Appendix 1, “The Proportion of Equity vs. 
Non-Equity Entry Modes Used in the 10 Largest Hotel Organisations Globally”, it can be 
seen that there is a striking difference between the use of non-equity modes and the use of 
equity modes by the 10 largest hotel organisations in the world. From a total of 35,003 
hotels controlled by these organisations, only 2,845 operate under an ownership or lease 
model, with a majority of 91.9% operating under management contracts or franchises.  
This preference for non-equity modes in the hotel sector is well documented in the 
literature. However, when examining Appendix 2, “The Proportion of Equity vs. Non-
Equity Oriented Hotel Entry Mode Research”, which is derived from an extensive 
systematic literature review, it can be seen that the vast majority of articles, including the 
most recent, tend to focus on the choice between equity and non-equity modes as opposed 
to the choice between different non-equity modes. In fact, of the 57 articles included in the 
review, only five publications focused on either franchising or management contracts only, 
or the choice between the two.  
This is critical when considering two points. Firstly, there is a continual trend of mergers 
and acquisitions in the hotel sector, which results in organisational concentration, 
increasingly leading to a small number of large organisations controlling the majority of 
the market. Secondly, the largest hotel organisations globally have continually intensified 
their non-equity hotel portfolio over the past decade while at the same time divesting 
their equity hotel portfolio. This trend is expected to continue over the next decade. 
This is particularly intriguing when considering that there appear to be some 
contradictions in the literature. While much of the recent literature contends that high 
control can be obtained through some non-equity modes, these studies still apply the 
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rationale of grouping non-equity modes together and comparing them as a group to equity 
modes, the rationale being that equity assures control. Clearly, the question of equity 
versus non-equity in the hotel sector appears to have been answered; however, what need 
to be established now are the factors affecting the choice between different non-equity 
modes. 
In order to address this disparity in the literature and examine the factors that influence 
the non-equity choices of hotel executives, a deductive two-study examination was 
conducted. The first study is qualitative in nature, using interviews, and the second is 
quantitative in nature, with a scenario-based online survey. The aim of the former study 
was to examine the major theories used in entry literature founded in new institutional 
economics (NIE), and the aim of the latter study was to examine which factors impact on 
the choice between franchising and management contracts based on transaction cost 
economics (TCE) and the resource-based view (RBV) and the findings of Study 1. 
1.4 Research Questions and Research Objectives 
Considering the points outlined above in the problem statement, the research questions 
and research objectives of the thesis are presented below: 
1) How are the predominant theories of entry mode literature perceived by high-
level hotel executives? 
2) Which of the predominant theories of entry mode literature is the most effective in 
explaining the specific decision made between franchising and management 
contracts? 
3) What independent variables can be identified to predict the preference of hotel 
executives when choosing between franchising and management contracts in the 
hotel industry? 
Derived from the research questions, the research objectives were developed to inform 
the initial research undertaken, and are as follows: 
1) To examine and analyse non-equity entry modes in the hotel sector independently 
from equity entry modes; 
2) To evaluate which of the predominant theories, or which combination of theories 
in the entry mode literature, is the most effective in the context of choosing 
between franchising and management contracts in the hotel industry; 
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3) To identify, analyse and test the key factors associated with the choice between 
franchising and management contracts. 
1.5 Contribution 
The contribution of this thesis is threefold. Firstly, this thesis fills a gap in the entry mode 
literature by building on non-equity entry mode research, which, as outlined above, is 
vastly under-represented in the literature in relation to how extensively non-equity 
modes are used in the industry. Secondly, the contribution of this thesis lies in the calibre 
of the research sample, which in this thesis consists of high-level hotel executives, that is, 
the individuals at the strategic level as opposed to hotel general managers, who are at the 
operational level. Finally, this thesis provides desperately sought empirical evidence on 
decisive factors in the choice between management contracts and franchising.  
1.6 Approach to the Study 
In this thesis, the methodology and the methods are presented separately. Here, only the 
methodology for the overall thesis will be outlined. The methods used for Study 1 and 
Study 2 will be detailed with the findings in their respective chapters. In this section, the 
research paradigm is first briefly explained, before the methodology and the research 
design for the thesis are presented. 
1.6.1 Research Paradigm 
Research paradigms are defined as “a basic set of beliefs that guides action, whether of the 
everyday garden variety or action taken in connection with a disciplined inquiry” (Guba, 
1990, p. 17). According to Guba (1990), paradigms are categorised by their proponents’ 
responses to three basic questions: the ontological, epistemological and methodological 
questions. 
This thesis adopts a post-positivist paradigm. Post-positivism, unlike positivism, assumes 
that while the world is perceived as being organised by universal truths and laws, they can 
only be imperfectly known or understood by humans. Therefore, the ontology of this study 
is critical realism, which emphasises that reality can only be imperfectly comprehended 
(Jennings, 2001). In terms of the epistemology, this study therefore aims to be objective 
and to capture reality as closely as possible. In terms of the methodology, this study 
combines qualitative research and quantitative research in a sequential mixed-methods 
approach. Initially, a qualitative research round (Study 1) was undertaken with semi-
structured interviews with hotel executives. These findings were then used to inform the 
following quantitative research round (Study 2), in which a scenario-based online survey 
was conducted with hotel executives. 
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This thesis adopts this perspective because the aim of the research was to generalise the 
determinants of choosing between franchising and management contracts in the hotel 
industry. Therefore, a statistical approach was deemed appropriate, and the advantage of 
a prior qualitative research round is that it lends credence to the validity of the items used 
in Study 2. As highlighted by Patton (1990), when a phenomenon is researched from 
different angles in terms of the theories and methods, and the data is collected in phases, 
this serves as triangulation and increases the validity of the findings. 
1.6.2 Research Methodology 
A methodology is a research strategy that “translates ontological and epistemological 
principles into guidelines that show how research is to be conducted” (Sarantakos, 2005, 
p. 30). In this thesis, the initial qualitative research round, that is, Study 1, informed a 
further quantitative research round, Study 2. Quantitative research methods have 
dominated the social sciences (Walle, 1997) and still comprise the majority of studies 
published in international business (IB) and management literature (Werner, 2002) and 
entry mode literature (Morschett, Schramm-Klein, & Swoboda, 2010). However, it is 
suggested by Walle (1997) that quantitative methods limit the area of inquiry and may 
oversimplify the nature of reality. Accordingly, qualitative methods have gained 
momentum in mainstream literature in recent years (Phillimore & Goodson, 2004). In the 
literature, while both qualitative and quantitative methods have their own objectives and 
shortcomings, both are seen as valid and as complementing each other (Ryan, 1995). In 
terms of this thesis, Study 1 allowed for more flexibility in terms of exploring the non-
equity entry mode choices of hotel executives, which have not been as widely examined in 
the literature (as highlighted in Chapter 2), and Study 2 allowed for testing the factors that 
affect the decision. Moreover, Study 1 was used to aid in the formation of Study 2 by 
highlighting the most appropriate theories on which to base the study. 
1.6.3 Research Design 
As outlined above, this thesis adopts a sequential mixed-methods approach, which 
includes the collection and analysis of both qualitative and quantitative data. Over the past 
two decades, mixed methods have become increasingly popular, as it is believed that they 
can generate a more complete picture of the topic being researched than if qualitative and 
quantitative methods are used independently (Jennings, 2001; Oppenheim, 1992). 
In terms of the type of research that informs this thesis, three main types have been 
proposed in the literature (D. C. Miller & Salkind, 2002): 
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1) Exploratory research – research that attempts to explore a social phenomenon or a 
concept of which the researcher has little knowledge 
2) Descriptive research – research that attempts to describe a social phenomenon or 
a concept or research of which the researcher has some knowledge and aims to 
describe the observation 
3) Explanatory research – research that attempts to explain a social phenomenon or a 
concept through deriving hypotheses and testing them 
This research is both exploratory and explanatory in nature because Study 1 aimed to 
solicit knowledge on the applicability and suitability of the theories being examined and 
because Study 2 is based on hypothesis development and testing. The research designs for 
Study 1 and Study 2 are presented separately, along with the rest of the methods, in their 
respective sections: Section 3.2 for Study 1 and Section 4.2 for Study 2. 
1.7 Definition of Terms 
Several definitions are not included here but rather are included in the text where 
appropriate. However, the terms hotel, hotel chain, hotel group and, more broadly, hotel 
organisation are mentioned extensively throughout the thesis, and thus it is vital to 
establish a common understanding of what is meant by these terms in the context of this 
thesis. 
1) Hotel 
A hotel is defined in this thesis as: 
a traditional, commercially run form of accommodation in which one, as a tourist 
(interpreted in the widest sense) can find shelter, even if food and drink are not 
available on the premises. Hotels are differentiated according to class (from simple 
to luxury) and to type of guest accommodated, the latter being either business 
people or residents. These service establishments must offer a minimum of 
comfort, and must be hygienic if they are to respect the conditions necessary for 
official recognition. (De Groote, 1987, p. 327) 
2) Hotel Chain 
A hotel chain is defined in this thesis as “either a hotel organisation that operates under 
only one brand name globally or a chain of a larger ‘hotel group’” (Kruesi & Zamborsky, in 
press). 
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3) Hotel Group 
A hotel group is defined in this thesis as “an organisation, which operates more than one 
hotel chain globally” (Kruesi & Zamborsky, in press). 
4) Hotel Organisation 
Hotel organisation is the most wildly used term in this thesis. It refers to both hotel chains 
and hotel groups. 
1.8 Thesis Overview 
This thesis comprises five chapters in total. A brief overview of each chapter is provided 
here. 
Chapter 1 – Introduction 
This chapter begins by summarising the background of the thesis and then presenting the 
problem statement, which highlights the importance of non-equity entry modes, 
specifically franchising and management contracts, as judged by the literature and the 
proportion of franchising and management contracts used by the largest organisations in 
the hotel industry compared with their use of equity modes. Following the problem 
statement, the objectives and research questions that informed the research are 
presented. The contribution of the thesis is then briefly highlighted before a brief 
overview of the chapters in this thesis is provided. Finally, the three-year research process 
is briefly summarised. 
Chapter 2 – Literature Review Background 
This chapter is split into three sections. These sections provide general background 
literature on entry mode research and the hotel industry. The literature reviews for Study 
1 and 2 are presented in their respective chapters.  
Section 1 – Entry Mode Overview 
This section provides an overview of the entry mode literature, beginning with an 
explanation of how entry modes are classified in the literature, where it is highlighted that 
the classification used in this thesis is that of a hierarchical model, that is, equity vs. non-
equity modes. The differences between manufacturing firm entry mode research and 
service firm research are then outlined as well as those of soft and hard services. The 
propensity service firms and hotel organisations specifically have for non-equity entry 
modes is then explained before franchising and management contracts, the most 
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commonly used entry modes in the hotel industry and the entry modes under 
investigation in this thesis, are more closely reviewed. 
Section 2 – The Hotel Industry – Past, Present and Future 
This section outlines the evolution and the characteristics of the hotel industry and the 
major organisations operating within it. Initially, some definitions are provided before the 
historical development of hotels and hotel chains and their industry structures are briefly 
summarised. The largest hotel organisations in the world currently are then presented, 
and it is shown that there has been little change in the top 10 organisations over the past 
decade. The reasons why hotel organisations internationalise are then explained before an 
overview is provided of the geographical distribution of the largest hotel organisations 
globally, highlighting that US firms dominate the market. 
Section 3 – Hotel Entry Mode Research 
This section provides a chronological overview of all the hotel entry mode studies 
identified in the AUT online library through specific keyword searches. The articles central 
to this thesis are then further reviewed, as this is the research stream that this thesis 
builds on. Finally, an increasing trend of internationalisation to China is noted in the 
studies, with studies set in China far outnumbering those in any other particular region. 
This is then linked to the previous section, where it is noted that the predominant growth 
region for the largest organisations globally is clearly Asia and specifically China. 
Chapter 3 – Study 1, An Assessment of Entry Mode Theories from an Industry 
Perspective 
In this chapter, Study 1 is outlined by initially presenting the literature review that 
informs this study, followed by the methods that were used. The findings are then 
presented, followed by a discussion of the findings. The literature review for this study is 
based on NIE. NIE and the predominant theories that are founded within this paradigm, 
that is, TCE, agency theory, internalisation theory, Dunning’s eclectic paradigm 
(ownership, location, internalisation [OLI]) and the RBV are reviewed. The development, 
interrelationships, similarities and differences of the predominant entry mode theories of 
NIE are reviewed, as well as their origins, their rationales and the constructs that underpin 
them. Finally, the research questions that underpin Study 1 are presented. The 
methodology for Study 1 is then outlined, starting with the research design, followed by 
the instrumentation used and a description of the participants, and ending with a brief 
explanation of how the data was analysed. Following the methods section, the findings of 
Study 1 are presented. Initially, the perceptions and opinions of the respondents on the 
theories examined are shown through extracts from the interviews. It is found in this 
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study that the theories most appropriate for the context of this thesis are TCE, in 
particular, assets specificity and the RBV, and more specifically, imperfect imitability. 
Moreover, there were some other unexpected factors put forward by the respondents as 
important, both at the firm level (e.g. the size of the organisation and the organisation’s 
investment pattern) and at the environment level (e.g. the availability of capable partners 
in the host country). Finally, some respondents also criticised the rationales of the 
theories, highlighting that they may not always be applicable in the real world. Following 
this, a discussion of the findings is presented linking them back to the literature, before the 
chapter is concluded. 
Chapter 4 – Study 2, Non-Equity Entry Mode Choice in the Hotel Sector: An 
Examination Based on Transaction Cost Economics and the Resource-Based View 
This chapter outlines Study 2 by initially reviewing the literature that the study is based 
on and then explaining the methods used. The results are then presented, followed by a 
discussion of the results. In the literature review, an in-depth analysis of TCE and the RBV 
is presented, and the hypotheses derived from the review are outlined. Initially, asset 
specificity and imperfect imitability are reviewed before the compatibility of TCE and the 
RBV is highlighted. Following this, the hypotheses are built up throughout the text based 
on the qualitative findings and the literature. The modal choice assumptions based on 
asset specificity and imperfect imitability are then compared and applied to franchising 
and management contracts. This is followed by an examination of the firm-level factors 
and environment-level factors proposed in Study 1 and the literature as being central, 
through the modal choice ‘lenses’ of TCE and the RBV. Finally, the hypotheses are 
presented. The methods for the study are then outlined, starting with the research design, 
followed by the instrumentation used, and an outline of how the participants were 
selected and recruited. A brief summary is then provided on the way in which the data 
was analysed with the main statistical tests, analyses of variance (ANOVAs), a multivariate 
analysis of variance (MANOVA) and a discriminant function analysis. Following this, it is 
highlighted that the respondents are indeed of a very high level by presenting their 
demographics. The descriptive statistics are then presented and it is initially highlighted 
that all of the independent variables have inter-item validity. This is followed by a 
presentation of the respondent profiles, clearly highlighting the contribution of the thesis 
as well as summarising the other descriptive statistics. The results of the multivariate 
analyses are then outlined before a discussion on how these results relate to the existing 
literature is presented and the chapter is concluded.  
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Chapter 5 – Conclusion 
In this chapter, a summary of the key findings of both Study 1 and Study 2 is initially 
presented. It is highlighted that while none of the theories were infallible, the hotel 
executives interviewed put forward the considerations of TCE and the RBV as the most 
appropriate in the context of choosing between franchising and management contracts in 
the hotel industry. It is also highlighted that there was strong empirical evidence found for 
the intangible assets and resources variable (INTANGASR), which strongly ‘discriminated’ 
between group preference as well as asset specificity (AS) and the factors relating to the 
host country (HOSTCNTR). The practical implications are then briefly stated and the 
limitations of the research are outlined. Finally, possible directions for future research are 
suggested. 
1.9 PhD Research Process 
A brief outline of the research process taken over the three years of this thesis is provided 
here and summarised in Appendix 4. During the first six months, an initial literature 
review was conducted and the full proposal was written and presented. Confirmation of 
candidature was achieved on 5 August 2012. The second six months comprised designing 
Study 1, identifying potential participants and finally contacting them with research 
invitations. At the start of the second year, the qualitative data collection was conducted at 
the International Hotel Investment Forum (IHIF) in Berlin, Germany, from 4 to 7 March 
2013. The rest of this six-month period was spent transcribing, sorting, coding and 
analysing the data obtained. In the following six months, a second literature review was 
conducted based on the findings of Study 1, and Study 2 was designed. In the period March 
to August 2014, the survey was refined before the pilot study of the survey was launched. 
After the final adjustments, the survey was launched online on 1 August 2014 and the data 
collection lasted two months, to 1 October. After the data from the survey was analysed 
and the results written up, the final six months were spent putting together the first draft 
of the thesis and then editing it to produce the final thesis. 
1.10 Conclusion 
In this chapter, the thesis was introduced by presenting a general outline of entry modes 
in the hotel industry and the research stream to which this thesis contributes. Initially, it 
was highlighted that while non-equity entry modes have become increasingly popular in 
the internationalisation of hotels and hotel chains, there is limited literature focusing 
exclusively on such entry modes. Therefore, the objectives and research question 
developed aimed to inform the research to contribute to the literature by filling this 
significant gap. The philosophical considerations and mixed-methods methodology 
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adopted in this thesis were briefly outlined before the pragmatic stance taken was 
explained. Some key hotel-related definitions were then provided before the chapters of 
this thesis were summarised and a brief chronological overview provided of the research 
process over the course of completing the thesis. 
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CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW BACKGROUND 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides an overview of the background literature that informs this thesis. 
The chapter is split into three sections. Initially, a review of entry mode research is 
presented followed by an overview of the hotel industry. Finally, hotel entry mode 
literature as well as international hotel industry trends are reviewed.  
2.2 Entry Mode Research Review 
Since the inception of IB research, entry mode choice has been considered one of the most 
critical decisions in the internationalisation process (Anderson & Gatignon, 1986; 
Brouthers & Hennart, 2007; Hill, Hwang, & Kim, 1990; Quer et al., 2007; Wind & 
Perlmutter, 1977). Entry mode directly relates to the international activity of firms and is 
defined as:  
a structural agreement that allows a firm to implement its product market strategy 
in a host country either by carrying out only the marketing operations (i.e., via 
export modes), or both production and marketing operations there by itself or in 
partnership with others (contractual modes, joint ventures, wholly owned 
operations). (Sharma & Erramilli, 2004, p. 2) 
The literature on international entry modes is vast, as can be seen in the reviews 
conducted by Brouthers and Hennart (2007), Canabal and White (2008)  Sarkar and 
Cavusgil (1996) and literature meta-analyses conducted by Morschett et al. (2010), 
Tihanyi, Griffith and Russell (2005) and Zhao, Luo and Taewon (2004). This vast body of 
literature has come about because of the importance of entry mode decisions in the 
internationalisation process arising from the effect they have on the performance of the 
entering firm (Brouthers, 2002). Moreover, the entry mode choice is critical because, as 
pointed out by Brouthers and Hennart (2007), it is challenging, and perhaps even 
impossible, to change it once a firm has entered a foreign market. This has significant long-
term consequences for the entering firm. However, from an industry perspective, there is 
still confusion as to what entry mode works best (Barnes, 2012), and according to 
Morschett et al. (2010), while there has been substantial research done on international 
entry modes over the past decades, there is still no clear consensus from empirical studies 
regarding the effect of the variables commonly put forward to determine entry mode 
choice (this will be explained further later in this chapter). 
In this chapter, the different classifications of entry modes are explored, followed by an 
outline of the differences between manufacturing firm entry mode choices and service 
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firm entry mode choices. The propensity service firms have for choosing non-equity entry 
modes is then highlighted before franchising and management contracts, the entry modes 
under investigation in this thesis, are reviewed.  
2.2.1 Entry Mode Classification 
The mode used to enter a foreign market is a central consideration in the 
internationalisation process of MNCs (Quer et al., 2007). It determines the future of the 
operations in the host country and constitutes one of the most critical factors for success 
(Anderson & Gatignon, 1986). The importance of this decision is reflected in the literature, 
where considerable attention is paid to the phenomenon by scholars in the field (Agarwal 
& Ramaswami, 1992; Anderson & Gatignon, 1986; Brouthers & Brouthers, 2003; 
Brouthers et al., 2008; Brouthers & Hennart, 2007; Canabal & White, 2008; Werner, 2002). 
Entry modes are commonly classified into three generic groups (Brouthers & Hennart, 
2007; Quer et al., 2007; Zeng, 2010). These are as follows:  
 Exporting – “supplying foreign markets through commercial transactions” (Quer et 
al., 2007, p. 363) 
 Contractual agreements – “transferring knowledge to the destination country 
through a contractual agreement” (Quer et al., 2007, p. 363) 
 Foreign direct investment (FDI) – “moving productive or commercial capabilities, 
providing capital through foreign direct investment” (Quer et al., 2007, p. 363) 
(FDI can be achieved either in partnership through a JV or independently through 
a WOS) 
The most common view held by researchers in the field is to see entry modes on a 
continuum based on control and risk levels, starting at one end with exporting or 
contractual agreements, then JVs in the middle, and ending with WOSs (see Figure 2.1).  
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Figure 2.1: Entry Mode Continuum of Control 
 
Adapted from Erramilli and Rao (1990) and Anderson and Gatignon (1986) 
In this view, the modes are seen as having a linear relationship of increasing control and 
consequent risk, with JVs being the middle step between exporting or contractual 
agreements and WOSs (Anderson & Gatignon, 1986; Erramilli & Rao, 1990). Another way 
of classifying entry modes is as ‘non-equity entry modes versus equity entry modes’ in a 
hierarchical model (Pan & Tse, 2000). Non-equity entry modes are defined as “modes that 
do not entail equity investment by a foreign entrant” (Erramilli et al., 2002, p. 223) and 
refer to exporting and contractual agreements. Equity entry modes are defined as 
“[entailing equity ownership,] a high investment and consequently high risk/return 
alternative that also provides a high degree of control to the investing firm” (Agarwal & 
Ramaswami, 1992, p. 3) and refer to JVs and WOSs (see Figure 2.2). 
Figure 2.2: Equity versus Non-Equity Hierarchy 
 
Adapted from Pan and Tse (2000) 
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2.2.2 Manufacturing Firm vs. Service Firm Entry Mode Research 
In comparison with studies focused on the entry mode of manufacturing firms, service 
firm focused studies are under-represented in the literature (Bouquet, Hébert, & Delios, 
2004; Brouthers & Brouthers, 2003; Canabal & White, 2008; Pla-Barber et al., 2010; 
Werner, 2002). It was shown in a review by Brouthers and Hennart (2007) that 
approximately 42% of all published articles focused on manufacturing firms and 33% 
focused on a combination of manufacturing firms and service firms; however, only 25% 
focused on service firms exclusively. According to Leon-Darder et al. (2011), the service 
sector has become a driving force in the global economy and is currently the most 
dynamic sector in international commerce. Yet, despite the growing importance of the 
service sector, relatively few studies have empirically focused exclusively on the service 
sector (Sanchez-Peinado & Pla-Barber, 2006a). In fact, it is recognised in the literature that 
most research has tended to focus on manufacturing firms (Brouthers & Brouthers, 2003; 
Ekeledo & Sivakumar, 2004).  
Recently, researchers in the field have pointed out that there is merit in adding to the body 
of entry mode literature with service firm oriented research (Bouquet et al., 2004; 
Brouthers & Brouthers, 2003; Leon-Darder et al., 2011; Pla-Barber et al., 2010). This is 
because manufacturing firm oriented entry mode literature cannot be effectively 
transferred to service firms (Brouthers & Brouthers, 2003; Leon-Darder et al., 2011; Pla-
Barber et al., 2010). Generally, there is a consensus among the authors of these studies 
that theories that aim to explain the entry mode decisions of service firms and 
manufacturing firms in unison are too superficial to be effective (Brouthers & Brouthers, 
2003; Leon-Darder et al., 2011; Pla-Barber et al., 2010). Arguments of storage, 
transportation and real estate, for example, which are often factors considered in 
manufacturing firm oriented entry mode research, do not apply equally to service firms 
(Erramilli & Rao, 1990). However, there is one factor in particular that clearly 
distinguishes manufacturing firms from service firms and therefore has a major 
implication for service firm entry mode decisions and on theory building around the 
phenomenon – a factor, moreover, that prompts the use of non-equity modes in the 
service sector, as will be further elaborated on later in this chapter. This factor is the level 
of financial commitment and the consequent risk for the entering firm. Manufacturing 
firms generally require a significant financial investment for the establishment or 
acquisition of manufacturing plants or other types of subsidiaries, for example (Erramilli 
& Rao, 1993). Consequently, there are also high switching costs in such foreign market 
entries (Erramilli & Rao, 1993). High investment considerations would therefore be a 
critical determinant in the entry mode decision and would need to be included in the 
theories constructed from that research. However, this factor would have limited 
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applicability to theories focused on service firm entry mode decisions and the hotel 
industry in particular. This is because, for service firms, control can be obtained with 
significantly lower investment than it can for manufacturing firms because, for service 
firms, ownership does not necessarily mean a high financial commitment (Erramilli & Rao, 
1990, 1993; Murray & Kotabe, 1999). The assumption made by many researchers in the 
past that high control automatically means high resource commitment stems from the 
early research focus on manufacturing firms. As pointed out in a study conducted by Pla-
Barber et al. (2010), there is a distinction between commitment and control in service 
firms. Furthermore, according to Cunill and Forteza (2010), Erramilli and Rao (1990) and 
Pla-Barber et al. (2010), in non-equity entry modes, where the investment commitment is 
also generally low compared with that of equity modes, control does not necessarily need 
to be sacrificed by service firms. 
Although manufacturing firms have been the main focus of earlier studies in the field 
(Brouthers & Hennart, 2007), there has been a growing number of studies analysing how 
different types of service firms choose between entry modes (Brouthers & Brouthers, 
2003; Cunill & Forteza, 2010; Dev, Brown, & Zhengzhou, 2007; Erramilli & Rao, 1990, 
1993; Fladmoe-Lindquist & Jacque, 1995; Sanchez-Peinado & Pla-Barber, 2006a, 2006b; 
Sanchez-Peinado et al., 2007). Furthermore, there have been several entry mode related 
publications specifically focused on the hotel industry (Alon et al., 2012; Altinay, 2005, 
2007; Brown et al., 2003; Cho, 2004, 2005; Contractor & Kundu, 1998a, 1998b; Cunill & 
Forteza, 2010; Dev et al., 2007; Dev et al., 2002; Erramilli et al., 2002; Espino-Rodriguez, 
Lai, & Baum, 2008; Espino-Rodriguez & Padron, 2005; Lamminmaki, 2005; Leon-Darder et 
al., 2011; Pla & Leon, 2002; Quer et al., 2007; Rodrı́guez, 2002; Xiao, O’Neill, & Wang, 2008; 
Zeng, 2010), showing that there is real and current growth in this field with several recent 
publications. 
2.2.3 Soft Service Firms vs. Hard Service Firms 
The service sector as a whole is very heterogeneous (Erramilli & Rao, 1990; Leon-Darder 
et al., 2011; Sanchez-Peinado et al., 2007). Therefore, to be more specific, a further 
distinction has to be drawn between soft service industries and hard service industries. 
This distinction between soft and hard services has been reiterated often throughout the 
literature (Blomstermo, Sharma, & Sallis, 2006; Ekeledo & Sivakumar, 2004; Erramilli & 
Rao, 1990; Leon-Darder et al., 2011). Hard services are characterised by the ability to 
separate production and consumption of the service. Examples of hard service industries 
are engineering, architecture and information technology (IT) industries. Soft services, on 
the other hand, are characterised by the inseparability of production and consumption 
and perishability of the service (Erramilli & Rao, 1990; Habib & Victor, 1991; Sanchez-
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Peinado et al., 2007). Examples of soft services include the hospitality, banking, retail 
distribution and consulting industries. When referring to ‘service firms’ or ‘service 
industries’ henceforth, soft service firms will be implied unless specified otherwise. 
Owing to the heterogeneity of the industries, strategies and business models of the MNCs 
operating in today’s dynamic world market, theories need to be tailored to different 
segments. Service firm entry mode research therefore requires theory building that is 
tailored specifically to its unique characteristics of being more people intensive and 
centred on resources that are tacit and intangible (Bouquet et al., 2004; Bowen & Jones, 
1986; Erramilli & Rao, 1990, 1993).  
2.2.4 Service Firms and the Propensity for Non-Equity Entry Modes 
Traditionally, in entry mode literature, ownership was seen as being equal to control 
(Agarwal & Ramaswami, 1992). Therefore, as highlighted in Figure 2.1, it was assumed 
that there is a linear relationship between increasing ownership and control in MNCs. 
However, several relatively recent studies have concluded that non-equity entry modes 
have become increasingly popular among service firms (Brown et al., 2003; Contractor & 
Kundu, 1998a; Cunill & Forteza, 2010; Dev et al., 2002; Erramilli et al., 2002; Sanchez-
Peinado & Pla-Barber, 2006a, 2006b; Sanchez-Peinado et al., 2007). The reason for this is 
the distinction between ‘de jure’ control and ‘de facto’ control (Erramilli et al., 2002). As 
will be seen later in this chapter, de facto control can be achieved through non-equity 
modes, but at varying degrees. Moreover, Alon et al. (2012) and Contractor and Kundu 
(1998a) state that owing to cost efficiency concerns, hotel organisations specifically prefer 
the use of non-equity entry modes. Hyatt was among the first to realise the advantages of 
separating ownership from control in the late 1970s, establishing one company to manage 
the hotels and another to manage the real estate. This model grew in popularity, with 
other US hotel organisations selling off their assets and using the money to grow faster 
and to be able to operate in superior properties (Gee, Singh, & American Hotel & Lodging 
Educational Institute, 2012). This strategy is now the most popular in the international 
hotel industry. In fact, non-equity entry modes constitute 65.4% of all the entry modes 
used by hotel organisations to internationalise (Contractor & Kundu, 1998a) – a trend that 
has been increasing over the past two decades (Alon et al., 2012; Contractor & Kundu, 
1998b; Cunill & Forteza, 2010). Furthermore, according to Cunill and Forteza (2010), the 
current growth strategy of most international hotel chains is franchising. This has resulted 
largely from the hospitality industry’s capital-intensive nature in regard to the ownership 
of physical assets such as real estate. More simply put, it is very common to separate 
industry knowledge and managerial expertise from the ownership of physical assets, in 
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particular, real estate (Brown et al., 2003; Contractor & Kundu, 1998a; Cunill & Forteza, 
2010; Rodrı́guez, 2002) – a practice called the ‘split of bricks and brains’ in the industry.  
2.2.5 Non-Equity Entry Modes in the Hotel Industry 
This study focuses on the two most commonly used non-equity entry modes in the 
hospitality industry: franchising and management service contracts, or branded 
management contracts (management contracts) (Contractor & Kundu, 1998a, 1998b; Pla 
& Leon, 2002; Sandman, 2003; Zeng, 2010). Industry practitioners refer to these two entry 
modes as ‘asset-light’ modes. Leasing is not included in the analysis because, although it is 
non-equity in nature, it is not asset light, as will be explained further in Section 2.2.5.3. The 
key difference between franchising and management contracts is that although both are 
collaborative modes, franchising is a quasi-market transaction, that is, an inter-firm 
transaction that crosses firm boundaries. Management contracts, conversely, are a quasi-
internalised transaction, that is, an intra-firm transaction that remains within the firm 
boundaries (Contractor & Kundu, 1998a; Dev et al., 2002; Erramilli et al., 2002; Fladmoe-
Lindquist & Jacque, 1995). Therefore, franchising, while having lower levels of resource 
commitment, also has a lower level of control for the foreign entrant. The degree to which 
the control is shared between the parties involved in the contract is referred to as the 
governance structure (Brouthers & Brouthers, 2003; Contractor & Kundu, 1998a; Dev et 
al., 2002; Erramilli et al., 2002; Erramilli & Rao, 1993; Madhok, 1996; Williamson, 1979, 
1996), defined as an “institutional framework in which the integrity of a transaction or 
related set of transactions is decided” (Williamson, 1996, p. 11). Although both franchising 
and management contracts are non-equity modes, the management contract offers more 
strategic and operational control for the entering firm than franchising, but at the cost of 
being more resource intensive (Contractor & Kundu, 1998a, 1998b; Pla & Leon, 2002).  
2.2.5.1 Franchising 
In franchising, the franchisor (the hotel organisation) has very little involvement in the 
day-to-day operation of the hotel, leaving it up the franchisee (local partner or hotel 
owner) to control (Gee et al., 2012; Rushmore, 2002; Sandman, 2003). The franchisor 
provides only the brand name and marketing and technical advice (Barnes, 2012; 
Contractor & Kundu, 1998a; Sandman, 2003). There are two broader categories within 
franchising: (1) product or trade franchising and (2) business format franchising. While in 
product or trade franchising the franchisee enters into a contract with a supplier 
(franchisor) to sell their products or product lines (Castrogiovanni, Bennett, & Combs, 
1995). In business format franchising, the franchisee’s responsibilities go further to also 
encompass all the other business operations, that is, recreating the whole business model, 
as well as providing plans for strategic business growth. Therefore, franchising in the hotel 
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sector is always business format franchising, as it is in most other businesses in the 
service industry. When referring to franchising henceforth, business format franchising 
will be implied. 
Franchising allows the owner (franchisee) to make use of the hotel organisation’s 
(franchisor) brand and services, for which the owner pays the hotel organisation a royalty 
fee. The hotel organisation has no ownership or financial interest in the hotel and is also 
not responsible for the economic success of the hotel. In cases where the owner does not 
operate the property personally under the franchisor’s brand, a non-branded manager 
runs the property (Gee et al., 2012; Sandman, 2003). 
Franchising allows for rapid internationalisation (Alon et al., 2012) and is relatively 
inexpensive for the franchising firm because it does not require investment in the 
development of the property (Barnes, 2012; Gee et al., 2012). In addition to cost 
advantages, franchising does not require extensive management structure from the hotel 
organisation, and it allows strong and rapid customer recognition. Moreover, having 
hotels across the globe under the hotel organisation’s brand acts as another form of 
advertising to potential future customers (Gee et al., 2012). Finally, franchising is 
profitable for the hotel organisation because the franchisee pays initial fees when joining 
the franchise group, and then ongoing royalties and payments for additional services such 
as marketing, reservations and training (Rushmore, 2002).  
While franchising has several upsides for the hotel organisation (franchisor), there are 
also risks associated with it. The biggest problem is the loss of control over the daily 
operations of the hotel and the risk of eroding the reputation of the brand through 
inefficient or low-quality service delivery (Altinay, 2007; Cho, 2004, 2005; Contractor & 
Kundu, 1998a; Espino-Rodriguez et al., 2008; Espino-Rodriguez & Padron, 2005; 
Sandman, 2003). Furthermore, in cases where the hotel organisation is unsatisfied with 
the franchisee’s performance, it can be difficult and time consuming to terminate the 
contract (Gee et al., 2012). In addition, the hotel organisation and the hotel owner may 
have differing objectives related to turnover and profit (Barnes, 2012). In these instances, 
the franchisee may resent the control exerted by the franchisor, and the relationship 
between the franchisor and franchisee may become strained. If, for whatever reason, the 
hotel organisation wants to terminate the partnership before the end of the contract, the 
hotel organisation generally has to buy out the franchisee. Finally, pricing can also be an 
area of dispute, as the hotel organisation may have difficulties maintaining uniform room 
rates or policies of pricing across different country sectors and currencies (Gee et al., 
2012). 
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From the franchisee’s (hotel owner’s) perspective, the franchise agreement has several 
advantages. Reputable franchising hotel chains have proven and tested business models, 
and support and guidance are received from the franchisor in the form of technical and 
operational expertise. Moreover, advertising is provided for the entire chain, and the 
owner has the use of the hotel organisation’s global distribution system (GDS) and the cost 
advantages of group purchasing. However, there are also disadvantages for the franchisee. 
Firstly, the hotel organisation has no financial stake in the business, and therefore, the 
profitability of the hotel is the responsibility of the owner. Moreover, if the franchisee 
desires to sell the hotel, it may be difficult to transfer the franchise along with the hotel. In 
addition, as franchisors desire uniformity among the hotels of the same chain, the 
franchisee may have restricted operational freedom and ability to cater to local needs 
(Barnes, 2012; Gee et al., 2012). 
2.2.5.2 Management Contracts 
In management contracts, the entering firm not only provides the brand name to the host 
country collaborator but also secures a contract to manage the daily operations of the 
foreign business unit (Barnes, 2012; Dev et al., 2002; Erramilli et al., 2002; Pan & Tse, 
2000; Sandman, 2003) – a phenomenon rather unique to the hotel sector (Sandman, 
2003). The hotel organisation not only provides an established brand; it also operates the 
hotel in accordance with the standards associated with that brand (Sandman, 2003). The 
hotel owner has no involvement in the day-to-day operation but may be responsible for 
other costs such as operating expenses and working capital (Gee et al., 2012). The hotel 
organisation receives basic fees based on total revenue and incentive fees for operating 
profits for its services; the owner receives the residual income after expenses (Barnes, 
2012). 
Within the hotel sector, there are two types of management companies: branded 
managers and non-branded managers (Sandman, 2003), also referred to as first-tier 
management companies and second-tier management companies (Rushmore, 2002). 
Second-tier (non-branded) managers operate the hotel and daily operation, but they do 
not have an established brand name. First-tier management companies also operate the 
hotel for a third party while providing brand recognition as well (Rushmore, 2002; 
Sandman, 2003). As hotel brands are critical determinants of the entry mode choice, 
second-tier management companies are not a focus of this thesis. 
There are several advantages to management contracts for hotel organisations. Firstly, 
they require relatively low levels of investment, with the owner required to contribute to 
working capital or some good-faith investments (Rushmore, 2002). Moreover, there is 
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very little financial exposure for the hotel company because it is able to cover expenses 
and a small profit from the basic management fee and larger profits from performance 
incentive fees if successful. The biggest advantage, however, is that the owner has no 
involvement in the operation of the hotel, allowing the hotel organisation to ensure 
consistent service levels and the protection of the brand name (Rushmore, 2002; 
Sandman, 2003). 
There are also some disadvantages for the hotel organisation, however. Compared with 
franchising, management contracts carry more financial risk, and although in both cases 
the company receives ‘fees’, management contract fees are more volatile. In franchising, 
the franchisor gets a percentage of the total revenue; in a management contract, 
conversely, the compensation comes from the incentive fee and basic fee, as mentioned, 
and the volatility of the incentive fee makes it difficult to predict and thus financially 
riskier. Moreover, if there is value rise in the hotel property through the successful 
management by the hotel organisation, the owner is the one to receive those advantages 
when the hotel is refinanced or sold (Barnes, 2012; Gee et al., 2012).  
From the owner’s point of view, there are several advantages. The hotel owner receives 
operational expertise for establishing long-term profitability in their investment while 
retaining the benefits of ownership embodied in depreciation deductions, tax benefits and 
general value enhancement. Finally, it provides immediate identification through the 
brand, making it easier to obtain loans. The disadvantages are that the owner has 
relatively little control and is not able to unilaterally terminate the contracts for poor 
performance on the part of the hotel organisation, thus increasing the owner’s financial 
exposure. In addition, even if the contract can be terminated, the delay in finding a 
replacement management company incurs costs and harms the hotel’s reputation (Barnes, 
2012; Gee et al., 2012). 
2.2.5.3 Leasing 
In leasing, the hotel organisation basically rents a building and runs the entire operation 
independently. Therefore, by not owning the building, it is also by definition a non-equity 
mode. However, leases are not a focus of this study. Firstly, leases are not very popular in 
the hotel industry because they are risky and costly. Secondly, while leases are technically 
non-equity modes, they are closer to the ownership model and therefore are an ‘asset-
heavy’ way to develop. Besides the risk, the reason leases are not as popular as 
management contracts and franchising is that companies cannot develop a large number 
of properties with lease agreements because the balance sheet would become too heavy. 
In other words, while leases are technically not owned by the hotel organisation, the lease 
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payments or ‘rent’ for the property becomes a continual fixed expense, regardless of the 
profit or loss the hotel organisation experiences. The adverse effects of this were 
highlighted in the last financial crisis, when hotel organisations heavily leveraged with 
leases had significant loses while still having to pay the rent (Barnes, 2012). 
2.2.6 Section Conclusion 
It was highlighted in this chapter that entry modes are a critical component of IB research 
because the entry mode choice has long-term consequences and a direct impact on the 
performance of the entering firm. After highlighting the different classifications of entry 
modes in the literature, the differences between manufacturing firm research and service 
firm entry mode research were explored.  
It was then highlighted that service firms, and hotel organisations in particular, have a 
propensity for using non-equity entry modes. Moreover, in the case of the hotel industry, 
this increasing trend is due to the ability to separate management of a hotel management 
from the ownership of said hotel. Finally, the advantages and disadvantages of franchising 
and management contracts were reviewed, and it was explained that leases, the third type 
of contractual non-equity entry mode, are not a focus of this thesis. 
2.3 The Hotel Industry and Entry Mode Decisions 
In this section, the hotel industry and hotel entry mode literature is reviewed. The review 
of the hotel industry begins with the historical development of hotels and hotel chains, 
followed by an outline of the hotel industry structure. The largest hotel organisations in 
the world are then examined before their geographical distribution is explained and their 
portfolio of owned, franchised and managed hotels is presented. Finally, the most recent 
expansion trends of these large organisations are reviewed as well as how these will 
continue over the following decade. Following the industry analysis, the literature on hotel 
entry modes/hotel internationalisation is briefly chronologically reviewed, before the 
studies most closely related to this thesis are reviewed in more detail. 
2.3.1 The Historical Development of Hotels and Hotel Chains 
The history of hotels and the hospitality industry can be traced back to times of the 
Graeco-Roman world, with examples being thermal bath facilities in villages designed for 
rest and recreation in Greece and accommodation facilities for Roman government 
business officials (Levy-Bonvin, 2003). However, over the past centuries, the hospitality 
industry has remained structured as privately owned, independently operated hotel 
properties. It was in the late nineteenth century that hotelier Cesar Ritz first separated the 
ownership and management of his hotels. However, the concept of the hotel chain is 
 24 
attributed to Conrad Hilton, who founded Hilton Hotels in the early twentieth century. 
These men were among the first to realise the advantages of centralised purchasing, cost 
control and marketing for several hotel properties under the same ‘flag’. Thus, the concept 
of the management contract was born. Franchising in the hotel industry followed later, 
pioneered by Holiday Inn, which was the first hotel organisation to franchise a hotel brand 
and create a nationwide reservations system (Rushmore, 2002). 
InterContinental Hotels and Hilton Hotels were the first to internationalise the hotel chain 
concept, in the 1950s and 1960s. In the second half of the twentieth century, the lodging 
industry began to internationalise; initially pioneered by American companies, the trend 
has grown drastically, with hotel organisations increasingly looking for opportunities to 
cater to an international consumer base (Gee et al., 2012). 
Initially, hotel organisations moved into developed countries, but by the 1970s, hotel 
organisations had started to expand into developing countries also (Gee et al., 2012). 
According to Dunning and McQueen (1982), this shift of focus towards developing 
countries arose mainly because of market saturation, increasing improvement in the 
infrastructure of developing nations, as well as their increasing desire to attract foreign 
investment. 
During the 1980s, the international hotel industry and the international economy in 
general experienced a period of turbulence arising from inflation, recession and a 
generally volatile international economy, causing numerous hotel organisations to engage 
in mergers and acquisitions in the late 1980s (Rushmore, 2002). This resulted in the 
consolidation of several organisations into ‘mega-chains’ and smaller chains grouping into 
partnerships or marketing consortia to compete. As highlighted by Das and De Groote 
(2008), a small number of international hotel organisations have come to control most of 
the international hotel brands globally. 
2.3.2 Industry Structure 
According to Gee et al. (2012), hotel organisations operating in the international hotel 
industry fall into three categories, as follows: 
1) Voluntary associations 
Voluntary associations are consortia of independently owned and operated hotels that 
join under a single brand mainly for marketing purposes, such as Preferred Hotel Group 
and Leading Hotels of the World. 
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2) Corporate hotel chains 
Corporate hotel chains are hotel companies that have one brand that can be managed by 
the corporate chain itself or by a conglomerate, prime examples being Sheraton, which 
was acquired by Starwood in 1998, and Kimpton Hotels and Restaurants, which was 
acquired by InterContinental Hotels Group in December 2014. 
3) Conglomerates 
Conglomerates are companies that control several corporate brands or independently 
owned unbranded hotels, the prime examples being the largest hotel organisations in the 
world reviewed in the following sections. 
There have been successful examples of voluntary associations such as the ones 
mentioned above. However, it is the corporate hotel chains and conglomerates that are 
dominating the market place and are becoming increasingly competitive through ongoing 
mergers and acquisitions, as mentioned previously, resulting in the continual 
‘concentration’ that has been observed in the hotel industry (Gee et al., 2012). These large 
hotel corporations have different brands at different levels of luxury, and therefore, 
smaller and newer hotel organisations are increasingly struggling to remain competitive. 
It is expected that a few large international hotel corporations are likely to prevail and 
continue to increase their market dominance, only getting sustained competition from 
very upscale hotels/hotel chains or hotels/hotel chains that cater for certain specialised 
niches. 
2.3.3 The Largest Hotel Organisations Globally 
The largest hotel organisations globally in 2013 as judged by the number of rooms 
controlled by these organisations is shown in Table 2.1. The largest hotel organisation 
globally is InterContinental Hotels Group (IHG) with 675,982 rooms spread over 4,602 
hotels. Their most famous brand internationally is Holiday Inn (MKG Consulting database, 
2007). The second largest hotel organisation is Hilton Hotels & Resorts with 3,992 hotels 
and 652,378 rooms. Hilton’s largest brand by far is Hampton Inn & Suites (GHGBA, n.d.). 
Marriott International, operating mainly in the upper market segment is the third largest 
hotel organisation with 3,672 hotels and 638,793 rooms. Marriott International’s most 
famous brands are Marriott Hotels & Resorts and Courtyard (Das & De Groote, 2008). 
Wyndham (formerly Cendant Group, number one a decade ago) has dropped in the 
rankings over the past decade, as will be elaborated on later in this section, and is now in 
fifth place. The organisation controls the largest number of hotels (7,324); however, it has 
only 627,437 rooms, which is an indication that Wyndham Group prefers smaller hotel 
properties in contrast to the preference of the current leader, IHG. Choice Hotels with 
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6,198 hotels and 497,023 rooms are in the fifth position. Choice Hotels franchise all of 
their brands and have had a stable position in the top 10 over the past decade. The French 
hotel organisation Accor takes sixth place with 3,515 hotels and 450,199 rooms. Accor has 
chosen to diversify its hotel brand portfolio and has established a competitive network of 
brands in all segments of the hotel market, from budget to luxury. Starwood, an owner, 
operator and franchisor, has several well-established brands, including Westin Hotels and 
Sheraton, which were acquired in the late 1990s (Starwood Hotels and Resorts, 2013). 
While Starwood is a relatively new company, Sheraton, its most famous brand, is well 
established, operating for approximately 75 years (Starwood Hotels and Resorts, 2013). 
Best Western International is in eighth position with 4,024 hotels and 311,611 rooms. 
Unlike the other corporations in this list, Best Western International has grown to this size 
through a network of independently owned hotels under the same banner, known as a 
voluntary association, as explained earlier. Home Inns is the new entrant to the top 10 and 
the only Asian hotel company currently on the list, with 1,772 hotels and 214,070 hotel 
rooms. Finally, the Carlson Rezidor Group takes the last place in the top 10 with 1,077 
hotels and 166,245. 
Table 2.1: Top 10 Hotel Organisations by Number of Rooms 2013 
Rank Hotel organisation Home country Hotels Rooms 
1 InterContinental Hotels Group  England 4,602 675,982 
2 Hilton Hotels & Resorts USA 3,992 652,378 
3 Marriott International USA 3,672 638,793 
4 Wyndham Hotel Group USA 7,342 627,437 
5 Choice USA 6,198 497,023 
6 Accor France 3,515 450,199 
7 Starwood Hotels & Resorts  USA 1,121 328,055 
8 Best Western International USA 4,024 311,611 
9 Home Inns  China 1,772 214,070 
10 Carlson Rezidor Group USA 1,077 166,245 
(HospitalityNet, 2013a) 
When examining Tables 2.1 and 2.2, it can be seen that there has been little change in the 
major players of the hotel industry over the past decade, with the top five hotel 
organisations controlling 67.7% of the hotel rooms in the top 10 in 2001 and 67.8 % in 
2013. In terms of the top players, IHG (formerly Six Continents) moved from second place 
to first place, while Wyndham Group (formerly Cendant) dropped from first to third place 
after the conglomerate split into four separate companies (Wyndham Worldwide 
Corporation, 2013). Hilton International and Hilton Corporation merged in late 2005, and 
therefore, Hilton Hotels is now in second place. Accor dropped from fourth to sixth place 
with Choice Hotels remaining in the fifth position. Starwood moved up one place from 
eighth to seventh, overtaking Best Western, which dropped to eighth place. Carlson 
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Hospitality merged with the Rezidor Group to become Carlson Rezidor, remaining in the 
top 10 but dropping from ninth to tenth place (Carlson, 2013). Finally, the new addition to 
the top 10 is the Chinese company Home Inns (HospitalityNet, 2013b). Home Inns is 
breaking the mould in some ways, with a higher growth rate over the period 2012–2013 
than the other nine organisations of the top 10 combined. Home Inns achieved 21.2% 
growth in this period, in contrast to the average growth of the other hotel organisations in 
that period of 0.5% (pulled down largely because of Accor’s 15.3% decline). Best Western 
reported the second highest growth rates, with 5.5% (HospitalityNet, 2013b).  
Table 2.2: Top 10 Hotel Organisations 2001 
Rank Hotel organisation Home country Hotels Rooms 
1 Cendant Corp  USA 6,624 553,771 
2 Six Continents  England 3,274 511,072 
3 Marriott International USA 2,398 435,983 
4 Accor  France 3,654 415,774 
5 Choice International Hotels USA 4,545 362,549 
6 Hilton Hotels Corp USA 1,986 327,487 
7 Best Western International USA 4,052 306,851 
8 Starwood Hotels & Resorts USA 743 224,467 
9 Carlson Hospitality Worldwide  USA 788 135,066 
10 Hilton Group PLC England 384 92,778 
(Hotels Special Report, 2002, June) 
It can be expected that in the following years these mega-corporations will continue to 
dominate the market; however, Home Inns will likely continue to climb the top 10 
(HospitalityNet, 2013b). This will be further explained later in this chapter.  
2.3.4 International Corporate Development of Hotel Chains 
Hotel organisations that choose to expand a chain can do so in three ways: (1) expand 
within the home market, (2) expand through specialisation and targeting niche markets, 
and (3) develop new markets internationally (Gee et al., 2012). Of the organisations 
outlined above, most have done all of these or a combination of them throughout their 
development. As the focus of this thesis is international entry modes, option 3, 
internationalisation, will now be examined further. 
According to Tse and West (1992), the major driving force for hotel organisations to 
expand abroad is the motive to increase profits and growth. Once a market is saturated, 
hotel organisations will choose to expand where there is a less developed hotel industry. 
Another reason for expansion is brand recognition and global distribution. As the 
geographical dispersion of hotel brands increases, so will the familiarity and consequently 
the loyalty, both in the existing markets and in the potential markets (Bell, 1993). This is 
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largely because people travelling abroad have the tendency to stay with hotel brands they 
know because of the service standards they have come to enjoy and expect. Well-
established brands also provide reassurance and security for tourists new to a certain 
location (Gee et al., 2012). 
Moreover, internationalisation enables the geographic diversification of operations, 
allowing for profits in prosperous locations while at the same time hedging against 
economic downturns in less prosperous locations. Global companies are therefore less 
affected by changing circumstances in any one country (Gee et al., 2012). 
International corporate development does have its disadvantages, however. 
Internationalisation is very rarely an immediately successful strategy for hotel 
organisations. This is especially the case when comparing their foreign hotels’ 
performance with the performance of established hotels in the home country. The 
problems of dealing with multiple political, economic and legal issues and having to 
overcome communication difficulties further complicate internationalisation (Gee et al., 
2012). Moreover, there can be issues with financial accounting control, quality control, 
dealing with conflicts and the government policies on the repatriation of profits and 
royalties. Finally, evaluating the present and future competition over a geographically 
dispersed hotel portfolio is more difficult. Moreover, as well as planning, the marketing 
and economic factors become more difficult across different country and culture contexts 
(Morschett et al., 2010). 
2.3.5 Geographical Concentrations 
Up to the 1980s, US companies were the only competitive players in the global corporate 
hotel market. As can be observed in Table 2.1 and Table 2.2, there has been little change in 
this US dominance, with eight out of the top 10 hotel organisations founded and 
headquartered in the US. Over the past decades, however, through extensive mergers and 
acquisitions, there have been new entrants from Europe, including British IHG and French 
Accor, Groupe du Louvre and Club Méditerranée. In addition, there has been growth in the 
number of hotel organisations from the Asia-Pacific region, with Shangri-La, Nikko, 
Peninsula, Regent International, Mandarin Oriental and Pan Pacific Hotels and Home Inns 
gaining notice past the region (Hotel-Mule, 2010). 
In an aim to create a clearer picture of the geographical origins of the largest hotel 
organisations operating globally, the home countries of the 100 largest hotel organisations 
(by room number) were split into four regions: North America, Europe, Asian and Other, 
as can be seen in Figure 2.3.  
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Figure 2.3: Distribution of the World's 100 Largest Hotel Organisations 
 
(Hotel-Mule, 2010) 
While there is significant representation from Europe in particular and partly from Asia, 
when considering only sovereign states, Europe’s largest is Spain, with 12 hotel 
organisations in the top 100, and Asia’s are jointly China and Japan, with nine hotel 
organisations each in contrast to 38 organisations in the United States.  
In terms of the expansion patterns of these organisations, US organisations have generally 
expanded in North and South America, the Caribbean and Asia. French organisations have 
expanded mainly in Europe and French-speaking African countries. Japanese and Chinese 
organisations have built up a strong portfolio in Asia, North America and Australia. There 
are several reasons for choosing these markets, including geographical proximity, cultural 
similarity and lower levels of relative competition . 
2.3.6 Franchising and Management Contracts in the Largest Hotel Organisations 
Franchising and management contracts are the entry modes under investigation in this 
thesis, and therefore, a brief overview is provided here on the proportion of franchising 
and management contracts used in the hotel industry among the 10 largest hotel 
organisations in the world (Best Western is not included in this list owing to it being a 
marketing co-operative, which is more akin to a voluntary association than a corporate 
chain or conglomerate, as explained above. Instead, the 11th largest organisation, Hyatt 
Hotels Corporation, takes the 10th place). This information was obtained from the latest 
annual reports of these hotel organisations, which were publicly available. As can be seen 
when examining Table 2.3, there is a striking difference between the use of non-equity 
modes and that of equity modes (leases are classed as equity in this table; the reason for 
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this will be further explained in the following chapter). From a total of 35,003 hotels, only 
2,845 operate under an ownership or lease model, with 91.9% operating under 
management contracts or franchising.  
Table 2.3: Entry Mode Overview of the Largest Hotel Organisations 
Brand owner Number of 
hotels 
Hotel 
brands 
Equity/ 
lease/ 
operator 
Non-
equity 
Franchised Mgmt 
contracts 
Wyndham Hotel Group 7,340  15 2 7,338 7,293 45 
Choice Hotels 
International 
6,158  11 0 6,158 6,158 0 
InterContinental Hotels 
Group 
4,697 10 9 4,688 3,977 711 
Hilton Hotels Corp. 4,115  10 155 3,960 3,420 540 
Marriott International 3,924 12 78 3,846 2,115 1,731 
Accor 3,600 11 1,478 2,124 972 1,152 
Home Inns 2,180 3 872  1,308 1,308 0 
Carlson Rezidor 1,282 6 200 1,082 540 542 
Starwood Hotels & 
Resorts Worldwide 
1,134 8 54 1,068 521 547 
Hyatt Hotels Corp. 573 10 97 451 185 266 
(Accor, 2013; Choice Hotels International, 2013; Hilton Worldwide, 2013; Hyatt Hotels Corporation, 
2014; InterContinental Hotels Group, 2013; Marriott International, 2013; Starwood Hotels and 
Resorts, 2013; Wyndham Worldwide Corporation, 2013) 
2.3.7 Current and Future Trends of the Largest Hotel Organisations Globally 
The increasing use of asset-light models is a relatively recent trend and is likely to 
continue over the decade to come. IHG, for instance, has increased the share of its rooms 
under franchised or managed operations from about 93% to over 99% in the past 11 
years, with the profit share of franchised or managed operations increasing from 67% to 
over 88% between 2001 and 2013. Interestingly, over 50% of IHG’s global new room 
pipeline is management contracts, while in 2013 managed contracts constituted 26% of 
rooms in contrast to 19% in 2001 (InterContinental Hotels Group, 2013).  
Hilton does have a relatively large portfolio of owned hotels; however, the company is not 
building this portfolio nearly as much as it is building its asset-light portfolio. The 
organisation plans to expand with as little capital as possible, aiming to achieve higher 
returns on overall investment. As of the year ending 2013, Hilton had 1,123 hotels in their 
development pipeline, with 99% of the rooms under construction being either franchises 
or management contracts and only one hotel property being owned. 
Marriott reported the fastest growing development pipeline in the industry globally, 
signing 387 hotels in 2013, that is, over one hotel a day. At the end of 2013, the Marriott’s 
pipeline consisted of 1,165 hotels. It is not stated explicitly how much of this pipeline will 
be asset light in nature. However, the organisation prominently operates under franchises 
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and management contracts; with only 2% of its hotels being owned, it can be drawn that 
the majority of these 1,165 hotels will therefore operate under asset-light models. 
A similar trend towards non-equity entry modes can be observed at Accor, which has been 
actively disposing of its owned properties. The strategy employed by Accor is that, after 
the sale, the hotel remains in the Accor network under a management contract or 
franchise agreement. In 2012, 57% of new openings were under management contracts 
and 28% under franchise agreements comprising a portfolio of 43% owned or leased, 
25% franchised and 32% managed hotels. By 2016, Accor has committed that 80% of their 
hotels will operate on a non-equity basis, aiming for a portfolio of 20% owned or leased, 
40% franchised and 40% managed hotels (Accor, 2013).  
Hyatt has been engaging in similar divestment strategies. As the organisation primarily 
derives its profits from its franchised and managed operations, Hyatt announced in early 
2014 that it sold a further 38 hotels, all of which have now become franchisees of the 
organisation retaining the original branding. In terms of Hyatt’s pipeline, it is larger than it 
has ever been, at 200 managed and franchised hotels as of the year ending 2013 (Hyatt 
Hotels Corporation, 2014; TOPHOTELPROJECTS, 2014). 
Starwood, moreover, while also operating with a varied portfolio of leased, owned 
franchised and managed hotels, has reported a similar strategy, reducing their 
investments in owner real estate in favour of building on their asset-light expansion 
model. In the period 2006 to 2013, Starwood sold 73 of its owned hotels.  
Choice Hotels, being a pure franchisor, clearly derives all its revenue from non-equity 
modes. The hotel development pipeline for Choice was at 476 hotels at the end of the 2013 
financial year (Choice Hotels International, 2013). 
Carlson Rezidor also has a balanced portfolio of owned, leased, franchised and owned 
hotels and is currently also expanding mainly through asset-light international 
development, in particular, in developing markets, with an aim of reaching 1,500 hotels by 
2015, predominantly also under franchise and management contract models 
(HospitalityNet, 2014).  
Wyndham started as a pure franchisor (while it was still branded as Cendent 
Corporation). Over the past decade, however, the company has diversified and added both 
managed and owned hotels to its portfolio. However, according to the current and long-
standing (16 years) chief executive officer (CEO) of Wyndham, Stephen P. Holmes, at the 
company’s fourth quarter earnings call in 2012, while the company seeks to maintain 
control for some strategic hotel properties and turning the land around them into time-
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shares, the company is actively favouring non-equity modes: “We’re trying to keep things 
asset light. We’re trying to keep the cash as long as we can [as this would be a] more 
efficient use of Wyndham’s capital” (as quoted in (A. S. Turner, 2013). Therefore, while it is 
not explicitly stated in their annual report (as with Marriott), it can be inferred that of the 
930 hotels in their development pipeline at the start of 2013 (Wyndham Worldwide 
Corporation, 2013), the majority will be franchises or management contracts.  
Home Inns is the new major player in the top 10 largest hotel organisations in the world 
and has grown the fastest by far. Over the decade from 2003 to the end of 2013, Home 
Inns grew from a company with 10 hotel properties to ownership of a staggering 2,180 
hotels and a further 161 hotels contracted or under construction. Home Inns has been able to 
reach this size in such a sort time through its exclusive use of non-equity modes; however, 
unlike the other hotel organisations examined here, Home Inns favours leases over management 
contracts (this may be due to the unique characteristics of China’s formal and informal 
institutions; however, that is outside the scope of this thesis). Currently, Home Inns operates 
only in China, with hotels in all the major metropolitan areas, and while it plans to further 
expand geographically within China, it has no immediate plans for internationalisation (Home 
Inns & Hotel Management, 2013). 
2.3.8 Major Growth Regions 
When examining the corporate reports of the largest hotel organisations in the world, it 
can be seen that their international expansion has increasingly focused on the Asia-Pacific 
region and, in particular, China. Accor’s hotel development pipeline highlights this trend 
quite clearly. While Accor’s home base of Europe still has the largest share of the 
organisation’s hotel portfolio with 61%, there are only 31,000 rooms in the pipeline for 
the region. In contrast, the Asia-Pacific region, which with 24% of the hotel portfolio has 
the second largest share, has 67,000 rooms in the pipeline (49% of their total pipeline). 
Within the Asia-Pacific region, the country with the most planned hotel properties for 
Accor is China with 27,000 rooms in the pipeline (Accor, 2013). Starwood also focuses the 
majority of its expansion in the Asia-Pacific region with 60% as of the year starting 2013. 
Moreover, 44% of their planned expansion in the region is China (Starwood Hotels and 
Resorts, 2013). For Marriot, the trend is similar with one hotel opening expected every 
week over 10 of its brands to double its presence in the region and to a size of 96,000 
rooms over 330 hotels by 2016. As with the other organisations, China is the main focus of 
expansion, with Marriott aiming to reach more than 150 hotels in the country by 2016 
(Marriott International, 2013). IHG, which groups Asia, the Middle East and Africa in one 
region, has 18% of its global new room pipeline focused in it, while in 2013 it only 
constituted 9% of its room count. Moreover, 30% of the organisation’s pipeline is focused 
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on China, which constituted only 10% of its IHG room count in 2013. Therefore, with over 
200 open hotels and 170 hotels in the pipeline, IHG currently leads the market in terms of 
system size and hotel signings in Greater China over all the other foreign competitors 
(InterContinental Hotels Group, 2013). For Hilton, while Asia-Pacific is not the main 
growth region, the organisation has greatly increased its presence in China. In 2007, 
Hilton had only six hotels in China. By the end of 2013, this number had grown to 43, with 
another 141 hotels in the pipeline for Greater China (Hilton Worldwide, 2013). Hyatt is 
also not focusing more heavily on the Asia-Pacific region; however, the organisation still 
had approximately 50 Hyatt hotels open or under development in China at the end of 2012 
(Hyatt Hotels Corporation, 2014). Finally, Home Inns as a domestic Chinese organisation 
will be expanding all of its 161 hotel pipeline in the Greater China region (Home Inns & 
Hotel Management, 2013). Conversely, Carlson Rezidor, while also significantly expanding 
in the Asia-Pacific region, with 91 hotels in operation, 93 hotels under development and 
29 signings in 2013, the majority (50% approx.) of the new signings were in India with 
only about 20% in China (Carlson, 2013). 
2.3.9 Section Conclusion 
In this section, the historical development of hotels and hotel chains was reviewed before 
the major industry structures in the hotel industry were summarised. The largest hotel 
organisations globally were then examined, before the advantages and disadvantages of 
internationalisation in the hotel industry were outlined. The geographic concentration of 
the largest hotel chains was then presented and the proportion of franchising and 
management contracts (non-equity or asset-light models) used by the largest hotel 
organisation in the world was outlined. Finally, the current and future trends of the largest 
hotel organisations were outlined.  
2.4 Hotel Entry Mode Studies 
Following the review of the evolution and trends in the hotel industry, the academic 
literature on the subject is now reviewed. In order to evaluate the state of the hotel entry 
mode literature, all of the studies, both empirical and theoretical, focused on entry modes 
in the hotel industry identified on the Hospitality and Tourism Complete database were 
chronologically listed and segmented by year, purpose, theory and methodology, as shown 
in Appendix 5. The keywords used in the searches were as follows: hotel, international 
expansion, entry mode, management contract and franchising. As can be seen in Appendix 
5, entry mode research in the hotel industry began in the early 1980s and continued 
through the 1990s; however, it was not until the turn of the millennium that the literature 
began to gain momentum. Moving past 2010, moreover, it can be seen that the rate of 
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publications has not decreased and that studies are moving into different niche foci and 
examining a wide variety of different theories.  
2.4.1 Closely Related Studies  
Of the studies included in Appendix 5, some studies in particular are closely related to this 
thesis and represent the research stream that this thesis aims to build on.  
One of the pioneering studies in the research stream, that of Dunning and McQueen (1982) 
based on their data originally published in Dunning & McQueen, 1981), is important in the 
context of this thesis because it was among the first to propose that ownership and control 
in the hotel industry are not necessarily correlated with each other. Moreover, the article 
pinpoints the different motives by which international hotel chains will favour expansions 
through equity or non-equity entry modes.  
A decade and a half later, Contractor and Kundu (1998b) were the first to apply the so-
called synergetic theory, combining TCE, agency theory, corporate knowledge theory and 
the organisational capability perspective (OCP) (in this thesis, RBV), to examine entry 
mode choice in the hotel industry. The findings of the study indicate that a solid entry 
mode theory in the hotel industry must necessarily be syncretic and must bear in mind 
corporate factors of a strategic and control-related nature.  
After the turn of the millennium, Rodrı́guez (2002) also employed the syncretic theory to 
explain entry modes used in the Spanish hotel industry, highlighting the factors that have 
allowed Spanish hotel organisations to expand internationally through non-equity growth 
strategies. 
In the same year, an empirical study by Erramilli et al. (2002) was the first to focus 
exclusively on the choice between non-equity modes, and as such, their study represents 
the origins of the specific research stream this thesis aims to contribute to. The study 
highlighted that there are differences between franchising and management contracts and 
that imperfect imitability, among other variables is a determinant prompting the use of 
management contracts. 
Three years later, Chen and Dimou (2005) set up a theoretical framework of the factors 
that could influence the entry mode choices of hotel organisations, and their findings 
highlighted that while franchising and management contracts are similar in some ways, 
the differences in control over the operations and tacit knowledge of the firm justify a 
different treatment and evaluation of these non-equity modes. 
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Two years later, Quer et al. (2007) contributed further empirical research to this stream, 
highlighting that entry modes in the hotel industry need to be examined from a complete 
theoretical framework that examines both environment-level and firm-level factors. 
In 2010, Cunill and Forteza (2010) further built on the hotel franchise literature. The 
findings of their study were that franchising has become the most widely used entry mode 
in the hotel industry and that the franchise strategy allows hotel organisations to achieve 
increasing market concentrations. 
Further building on the franchise literature, Alon et al. (2012) showed in their research 
how critical the number of franchises and the experience an organisation has in 
franchising is in influencing the time it takes to expand internationally through 
franchising.  
In the same year, Martorell-Cunill, Gil-Lafuente, Salvà, and Forteza (2012) found that non-
equity entry modes have become by far the most popular entry modes in the hotel 
industry compared with equity and leasing modes. They highlight, from a forgotten effects 
matrix, that in the internationalisation of hotel organisations, the majority of cases prompt 
non-equity modes. Moreover, they state that a non-equity strategy allows rapid and 
significant growth while retaining control over the operation. 
Finally, that year, Villar et al. (2012) highlighted the compatibility of TCE and the OCP in 
determining the entry mode choice. The authors argued that while both theories are 
different, their approach leads to similar managerial implications. They exemplify this by 
suggesting that if the nature of the firm’s knowledge is tacit, complex or difficult to teach, 
or intangible (imperfect imitability), internal modes are more appropriate. From TCE 
reasoning, it is exactly in these cases that contracting becomes more complex and 
problematic, thus increasing the transaction cost and prompting internalisation.  
The following year, Martorell, Mulet, and Otero (2013) and Cunill, Forteza, and Gil-
Lafuente (2013) confirmed that the choice of foreign market entry mode cannot rely solely 
on host-specific factors, but must also rely on the principles of syncretic theory, proposed 
initially by Contractor and Kundu (1998b). The authors found that both factors specific to 
the host country and those specific to the firm had an effect on Spanish firms expanding 
into the Caribbean region. 
2.4.2 Geographical Trends in Hotel Entry Mode Research  
As highlighted above, the Chinese hotel industry and Chinese hotel organisations have 
become the fastest growing in the world. This trend can also be observed in the literature, 
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with the majority of country-specific hotel entry mode studies published over the past 15 
years focused on China. Initially, Wu, Costa, and Teare (1998) found that because of the 
increasing uncertainty and complexity of the international hotel industry, international 
hotel organisations and their managers need to be aware of the business environment 
trends when deciding on their entry mode. Pine et al. (2000) showed in their review that 
there are continuously increasing changes in the tourism and hotel industries in China, 
which provides growth opportunities for both franchised hotel operations and local hotel 
chains. Pine and Qi (2004) identified and discussed economic and political systems, hotel 
ownership, hotel management capability and resources and competition between local 
and foreign firms, which the authors suggested are the main categories of barriers to the 
development of hotel chains. Heung et al. (2008) found that the majority of state-owned 
hotels (independent hotels, not chains) intend to join an international franchise operation 
within the next five years. Moreover, the paper identifies profit improvement, market 
expansion, product or service standardisation, professionalism of staff, information 
sharing and resources integration as the major factors affecting the franchising of Chinese 
state-owned hotels. Xiao et al. (2008) found that the level of work experience and 
education of Chinese hotel operators may impact on their preferences in regard to 
franchising, and the level of brand awareness, support from a centralised reservations 
system, returns on investment and franchise fees will determine how attractive franchises 
are for potential Chinese franchisees. Finally, Zeng (2010) concluded that hotel chains can 
be grouped into four strategic groups – (1) strategically concentrated group, (2) close 
function group, (3) widespread alliance group and (4) loose union group – based on the 
two dimensions of unification management function scope and the unification 
management degree. Finally, they highlighted that hotel chains have three expansions 
paths: (1) stability path, (2) growth path and (3) undulation path). 
2.4.3 Section Conclusion 
In this section, all the articles published, both empirical and theoretical, focused on entry 
modes in the hotel industry identified on the Hospitality and Tourism Complete database 
were chronologically listed and segmented by year, purpose, theory and methodology (see 
Appendix 5). The findings of the articles that are most closely related to this thesis were 
then more closely reviewed, highlighting the research stream this thesis builds on, before 
highlighting that the country that has received the most attention in the hotel entry mode 
literature is China, which is likely because it has also become the major focus for 
expansion for large international hotel organisations. 
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CHAPTER 3 STUDY 1 
An Assessment of Entry Mode Theories from an Industry 
Perspective 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter details Study 1, a qualitative examination of the theories of NIE in the context 
of choosing between franchising and management contracts in the international hotel 
industry. The first objective of this study was to examine which theories of NIE would best 
explain the decisions made between franchising and management contracts in the hotel 
industry from the perspective of individuals who actually make these decisions, that is, 
high-level hotel executives. The second objective was to use these findings to inform 
further quantitative analysis based on the theories found most effective in this context. 
The chapter is split into four sections. Initially, the literature on which the study is based is 
reviewed, before the methods used in this study are explained. This is followed by an 
outline of the findings, and finally, a conclusion of the findings is presented. 
3.2 Literature Review 
This section serves as an overview of the theories that constitute NIE, the theoretical 
paradigm that informed Study 1. The theories will be individually reviewed, compared and 
contrasted, and the research questions for Study 1 will also be presented. 
3.2.1 Entry Mode Research 
International entry mode research is a relatively young field that commenced with 
Hymer’s (1960) seminal insights in deconstructing the complexity of the 
internationalisation phenomenon into several comprehensive concepts. The foundations 
of this literature were further laid by Stopford and Wells (1972), who examined the 
different types of entry modes used by MNCs. However, no theoretical explanations were 
given in these publications for the various modal choices of MNCs. Theory-based entry 
mode literature gained momentum in the late 1980s and early 1990s with fundamental 
studies, including those of Anderson and Gatignon (1986), Gatignon and Anderson (1988), 
Gomes-Casseres (1989) and Hennart (1991). These articles were both theoretical and 
empirical in nature, and all used TCE as their theoretical foundation. Since then, several 
theories have been proposed through which to examine the entry mode choice of MNCs 
(Brouthers & Hennart, 2007; Canabal & White, 2008). However, a consensus has not been 
reached in the literature as to which theoretical perspective, or which combination of 
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them, is the most effective in explaining the entry mode choices of MNCs (Sanchez-
Peinado et al., 2007).  
3.2.2 The Conventional Theory of the Firm: Neoclassical Economics 
The traditional view of the firm or ‘the theory of the firm’ arises from neoclassical 
economics. From this perspective, firms are seen as production units (P. G. Klein, 2000). In 
other words, neoclassical economics views the firm as a production function or as 
production possibilities. This view of the firm is referred to as the ‘black box model’, in 
which firms are seen more as ‘plant’ in which inputs create direct outputs. From the 
production perspective, management decisions are relatively quantifiable, revolving 
around input levels and employment levels and how they relate to the firm’s output levels, 
considering economies of scale and scope (Spulber, 1989). This view of the firm has 
brought about several insights on pricing and output decisions through analysing factors 
such as input prices, demand schedules and technology in order to maximise firm profits 
(Spulber, 1989). However, the arguments of this school of thought are more appropriate 
when the firm is seen as a single actor; that is, there is little insight in this paradigm about 
the boundaries of the firm, which is a central consideration in this thesis and entry mode 
research more generally. 
3.2.3 New Institutional Economics 
NIE has its roots in the work of Coase (1937) which was the first study to examine the 
boundaries of the firm, and the reason why this school of thought is also referred to as the 
Coasian view of the firm. From the Coasian perspective, firms are seen as legal entities and 
as governance structures. The work of Coase (1937) highlighted that theory needs to focus 
not only on production but also on the cost of transacting business. These ideas were then 
expanded and further developed, most notably by Williamson (1975, 1985), B. Klein, 
Crawford, and Alchian (1978), Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore (1990), and 
thus NIE came into being, the term coined by Williamson (1975). NIE is fundamentally 
concerned with the ‘make or buy decision’ – the question of whether to organise 
transactions hierarchically (within the firm) or through market mechanisms (external 
from the firm). In other words, it is concerned with governance structure, that is, the level 
of vertical integration (Grossman & Hart, 1986; Williamson, 1975, 1985). Market 
mechanisms entail costs such as those of negotiating and enforcing contracts. 
Hierarchically, these transaction costs can be reduced. However, internal operations bring 
about other transaction costs such as problems of information flow, incentives for 
monitoring performance and a substantial resource commitment. NIE dictates that the 
relative costs of internal and external routes must therefore be evaluated and the 
governance structure, that is, the degree of vertical integration, then be decided based on 
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the relative costs of the governance structure alternatives. NIE has grown in popularity 
owing to the complex nature of firms. According to Buckley and Casson (1991), firms are 
not only producers of goods (as viewed from the traditional theory of the firm and the 
neoclassical perspective); they also contract, research and develop, train employees, 
procure financial assets and sell intermediate products within the multinational 
framework, using administrative fiat via transfer pricing, that is, through orders issued 
with executive authority (Williams, 1997). It needs to be noted, however, that NIE is not a 
stand-alone paradigm but rather seeks to build on neoclassical institutional economics. 
For example, NIE draws heavily from the goal of seeking optimisation. As stated by Hira 
and Hira (2000), “rather than seeking to replace neoclassical economics, the new 
institutionalists wish only to modify the rational choice, utility-based neoclassical model 
by relaxing some of its assumptions. The new institutionalism focuses on the central 
assumption of zero transactions costs in neoclassical economic models as the main gap to 
be filled” (p. 269). 
3.2.4 The Predominant Theories of Entry Mode Research 
The major theories used to analyse the entry mode decisions in IB and management 
literature (Werner, 2002) all stem to some extent from the NIE paradigm. Consequently, 
there are several similarities and overlaps in these theories as well as significant 
differences. These theories will now be individually reviewed before their similarities and 
differences are briefly outlined and the research questions for Study 1 are presented. The 
differences and similarities of the theories are summarised in Table 3.1. The research 
questions are summarised in Table 3.2. 
3.2.5 Transaction Cost Economics 
The transaction cost theory, or TCE, views firms as governance structures and is 
fundamentally concerned with the ‘make or buy’ decision, that is, evaluating the 
governance structure that will incur the least amount of transaction costs based on the 
assumptions of bounded rationality and opportunism and underpinned by asset 
specificity, uncertainty and frequency. The theory is defined as follows: 
As compared with other approaches to the study of economic organization, 
transaction cost economics (1) is more microanalytic, (2) is more self-conscious 
about its behavioral assumptions, (3) introduces and develops the economic 
importance of asset specificity, (4) relies more on comparative institutional 
analysis, (5) regards the business firm as a governance structure rather than a 
production function, and (6) place greater weight on the ex post institutions of 
contract, with special emphasis on private ordering (as compared with court 
ordering) (Williamson, 1985, pp. 17–18).  
 40 
TCE has its roots in the work of Coase (1937), however, while discussing variables related 
to TCE and identifying firms as governance structures with differing transaction costs he 
did not coin the term. The term and broader theory, TCE, was established by the works of 
Williamson (1975, 1979, 1985, 1991), incorporating Coase’s (1937) considerations in a 
theory of organisational economics. It has been recognised that TCE is a major theory of 
entry mode research (Leon-Darder et al., 2011), and despite some criticisms laid against it, 
it is the predominant theory for explaining entry mode decisions of MNCs (Brouthers et 
al., 2008).  
TCE weighs up the cost of market procurement over the cost of internalisation, that is, the 
make or buy decision (Williamson, 1985). It involves the comparative assessment of 
planning, monitoring, enforcing and adapting the costs involved in a transaction and the 
alternative organisational forms available. More simply, TCE dictates that there is always a 
comparison made between different organisational forms, that is, governance structures 
(Williamson, 1985). According to the rationale of the theory, however, these alternatives 
have to be considered in terms of their feasibility, which can be determined through two 
behavioural assumptions: (1) opportunism and (2) bounded rationality.  
3.2.5.1 Opportunism 
Opportunism is defined as “self-interest seeking with guile" (Williamson, 1985, p. 47) and 
is a key assumption of TCE. The assumption relates to the possible negative actions of 
economic agents, which take the form of lying, cheating, violating agreements and not 
fulfilling promises on the part of economic actors involved in the transaction (Williamson, 
1985). In cases where firms expect high opportunism, internal governance becomes more 
advantageous than market mechanisms. 
3.2.5.2 Bounded Rationality 
Bounded rationality is defined as “[economic actors being] intendedly rational but only 
limited so” (Simon, 1961, p. xxiv) and is the second key assumption of TCE. While the 
economic actor may intend to behave rationally, the assumption is that people inherently 
lack the ability to foresee all the knowledge and skills that will be needed in a transaction. 
In other words, economic actors make rational decisions based on the information they 
have; however, as not all possible information is available, their rationality is bounded. In 
cases where firms expect high bounded rationality, internal governance becomes more 
advantageous than market mechanisms. 
As mentioned above, TCE evaluates the transaction costs of alternative governance 
structures in a transaction. To analyse transaction costs, TCE has three further 
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considerations or constructs, which are (1) asset specificity, (2) uncertainty and (3) 
frequency.  
3.2.5.3 Asset Specificity 
Asset specificity refers to the degree to which assets, both physical and human, are locked 
into a particular use and the consequent difficulty of redeploying these assets for another 
use without affecting the productive value of the asset (Williamson, 1985). In other words, 
it is an asset that is specific to a certain type of transaction and loses value if control is lost. 
When considering the assumptions of opportunism and bounded rationality, asset 
specificity becomes a critical consideration owing to the bilateral dependency the 
principal has with the economic agent to protect the asset (Williamson, 1996).  
3.2.5.4 Uncertainty 
The uncertainty construct is often split into environmental uncertainty and behavioural 
uncertainty. Environmental uncertainty arises from unpredictability of the business 
environment in the host country and the inherent risks revolving around the nature of the 
economic, fiscal and political conditions in the country as well as cultural and geographic 
distance (Gatignon & Anderson, 1988; Lopez-Duarte & Vidal-Suarez, 2010; K. D. Miller, 
1993; Sanchez-Peinado & Pla-Barber, 2006b; Villar et al., 2012; Williamson, 1985, 1991). 
Behavioural uncertainty arises from the inherent risk of dealing with the economic agents. 
It revolves around the transaction cost of monitoring and enforcing contracts and legal 
agreements as well as controlling the actions of the agent (Cho, 2005); therefore, 
behavioural uncertainty is closely linked with opportunism. Considering the points 
outlined above, uncertainty is a particularly important consideration in cases where 
bilateral dependency exists, especially in cases of high asset specificity.  
3.2.5.5 Frequency 
Frequency refers to the degree and reoccurrence of transactions. This construct is 
considered in TCE because the costs associated with complicated governance structures 
become more profitable as the number of transactions increase (Williamson, 1985). 
3.2.5.6 Transaction Cost Research Question 
TCE was the pioneering theory to emerge out of the Coasian view of the firm and to 
theoretically ground the NIE (P. G. Klein, 2000; Williamson, 1975). TCE is fundamentally 
concerned with the ‘make or buy’ decision, that is, evaluating the governance structure 
that will incur the least amount of transaction costs based on the assumptions of bounded 
rationality and opportunism and underpinned by asset specificity, uncertainty and 
frequency. The unit of analysis in this theory is the transaction.  
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RQ1: How salient are the assumptions, constructs and focus of transaction cost 
economics in a hotel executive’s choice between franchising and management 
contracts? 
3.2.6 Agency Theory 
Agency theory focuses on contractual agreements between two or more parties whereby 
the ‘agent’ acts on behalf of the ‘principal’. Moreover, the principal has decision-making 
authority over the agent. The theory is defined as follows: 
Agency theory is concerned with resolving two problems that can occur in agency 
relationships. The first is the agency problem that arises when (a) the desires or 
goals of the principal and agent conflict and (b) it is difficult or expensive for the 
principal to verify what the agent is actually doing. The problem here is that the 
principal cannot verify that the agent has behaved appropriately. The second is the 
problem of risk sharing that arises when the principal and agent have different 
attitudes toward risk. The problem here is that the principal and the agent may 
prefer different actions because of the different risk preferences. (Eisenhardt, 
1989, p. 58)  
The basic model of conflict between shareholders and managers, what is now called the 
principal–agent problem, can be traced back to Berle and Means’s (1932) identification of 
the ‘separation of ownership and control’. According to Berle and Means (1932), modern 
corporations are not run by the owners but by managers who are paid by salary (as 
opposed to a percentage of the profits) and may therefore have differing goals than the 
owners; that is, they may not be as concerned with the overall profitability of the firm as 
they are with personal gains. 
Agency theory was formally developed through the works of Jensen and Mecklin (1976), 
Fama (1980), Fama and Jensen (1983) and Jensen (1986). Two research streams have 
evolved in agency theory literature: (1) ‘positivist agency’ theory and (2) the ‘principal–
agent’ research stream. 
3.2.6.1 Positivist Agency Theory 
Positive agency theory is focused mainly on the relationship between owners and 
managers of larger corporations (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). More specifically, it focuses on 
the situations of adverse selection and moral hazard. More often than not, research based 
on agency theory focuses on this research stream, that is, the effects of adverse selection 
(precontractual information asymmetry (bounded rationality)) (Akerlof, 1970) and moral 
hazard (the lack of effort from agents or the temptation to act inefficiently or provide 
distorted information due to nonalignment of the principals’ and agents’ goals 
(opportunism). Two mechanisms are proposed in the literature for the principal to 
mitigate these problems arising from the agency relationship: (1) outcome-based 
contracts and (2) the use of information systems. 
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Outcome-Based Contracts 
Outcome-based contracts for the agents in theory decrease managerial opportunism as 
both the agent and the principal profit from an alignment of interests (Jensen & Meckling, 
1976). 
Information Systems 
Information systems are proposed in the theory as an alternative when it is difficult to 
align the interests of the principal and the agent. Information systems allow for the 
monitoring of agents’ behaviour and therefore lessen the opportunistic tendencies of 
agents because they know they are being monitored (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). 
It is also suggested in the literature that the use of several agents can help in evaluating 
whether the agents are acting in the interests of the principal as the relative performance 
of the agents can be evaluated (Sappington, 1991). In other words, the use of additional 
agents can allow for the evaluation of any specific agent. 
3.2.6.2 Principal–Agent Research 
Principal–agent research is concerned with risk sharing and is a consideration when the 
agent and principal have different attitudes towards risk. It is assumed that both the 
principal and the agent are risk averse to some extent. The problem that arises is that the 
principal and agent may prefer different actions because of their different risk preferences 
(Eisenhardt, 1989). 
This stream focuses on choosing the optimal contract based on the trade-off between the 
cost of measuring the agent’s performance and the outcomes of transferring the risk to the 
agent. In other words, the degree of risk aversion of the agent is positively related to 
preferring behaviour-based contracts to outcome-based contracts. The less risk averse the 
principal is the more likely he or she is to shift the risk to the agent through an outcome-
based contract, which implies the opposite if the principal is more risk averse; that is, risk 
aversion of the principal is positively associated with outcome-based contracts and 
negatively associated with behaviour-based contracts. Finally, a further distinction from 
positivist agency theory is that principal–agent research is concerned with a broader 
range of principal–agent relationships than the positivist stream of research; it includes 
not only owner–manager relationships but also buyer–supplier and consultant–client 
relationships (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
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3.2.6.3 Agency Theory Research Question 
Agency theory, like TCE, is concerned with governance structure decisions (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976; B. Klein et al., 1978; Williamson, 1985); however, agency theory focuses 
more on ex-ante considerations, whereas TCE is concerned more with ex-post 
considerations (P. G. Klein, 2000). Moreover, TCE and agency theory are both part of what 
Williamson (1996) referred to as a managerial discretion set-up, which means that both 
theories are underpinned by the assumptions of opportunism and bounded rationality. 
However, they use different terms, with moral hazard or agency costs referring to 
opportunism (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Both TCE and agency theory view the firm as a 
legal entity; however, while TCE views the firm as a governance structure, agency theory 
sees the firm as a ‘nexus of contracts’ (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Moreover, while TCE 
grew from a focus on vertical integration, agency theory grew from a focus on corporate 
control (P. G. Klein, 2000). Finally, TCE and agency theory have differing units of analysis, 
with agency theory’s unit of analysis being the individual agent. However, it is suggested 
by some scholars that these differences are overstated, as the theories are quite similar 
(Contractor & Kundu, 1998a).  
RQ2: How salient are the assumptions, constructs and focus of agency theory in a 
hotel executive’s choice between franchising and management contracts? 
3.2.7 Internalisation Theory 
Internalisation theory posits that the entry mode decision of firms will be incremental and 
time dependent; that is, firms gradually intensify their activities in foreign markets from 
external modes to internalised modes. Internalisation is defined as follows: 
Internalization is a general principle that explains the boundaries of organizations; 
its application to the MNE is just one of its many spin-offs. It is a highly specialized 
principle, targeted specifically on explaining where boundaries lie, and how they 
shift in response to changing circumstances. (Buckley & Casson, 2009) 
Internalisation theory has its origins in the works of Hymer (1960, 1976), Kindleberger 
(1969) and Caves (1971), that is, market imperfection theory or the Hymer-Kindleberger 
hypothesis. It is suggested from this perspective that MNCs exist because of market 
imperfections (i.e. anything that interferes with trade or the smooth operation of the 
business). In other words, by firms seeking efficiency, market imperfections are vehicles 
that lead to FDI. According to Hymer (1960), FDI is not a function for the transfer of capital 
as this could be supplied to the host country collaborator using other forms of 
international financing. Rather, the theory suggests that FDI is a function for transferring 
business techniques, personnel and assets, both tangible and intangible. Moreover, it is 
suggested from this perspective that firms that have to compete in a foreign market are at 
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a disadvantage owing to the costs and complications arising from competing in that 
foreign environment. Therefore, the firm has to have some ownership advantages over its 
local competitors if they are to engage in international production. The degree of market 
imperfection existing in the foreign market and potential for monopolistic advantage for 
the entering firm determines the motivation for FDI. 
Buckley and Casson (1976) used the Hymer-Kindleberger hypothesis to transform the 
concept of internalisation into a full-fledged theory through incorporating it in the Coasian 
view of the firm (Castro, 2000). Based on the profit maximisation and growth principles of 
firms (TCE/Coasian view of the firm), Buckley and Cason (1976) argued that because of 
market imperfections in intermediate products, notably knowledge, firms will create an 
internal market (internalise the external market) in order to increase profits and avoid 
certain costs (the Hymer-Kindleberger hypothesis). It was the assertion of Buckley and 
Casson (1976) that MNCs are typically both horizontally and vertically integrated that 
founded their model centred on the relationship between firm knowledge, market 
imperfections and internalising the market for intermediate goods. The internal market 
avoids the imperfections of the external market but at the cost of being more resource 
intensive. The costs of internalisation are exemplified in higher communication costs, 
higher resource costs and the potential for costs incurred from increased political 
interference in the host country. According to Rugman (1981), it is market failure in 
relation to knowledge that prompts internalisation. The internalisation of intermediate 
products is central to the operation of MNCs; therefore, information and knowledge are 
critical intermediate products, and through internalising information flow within an 
internal market, the firm is able to recoup the costs of generating the information. 
Moreover, through internal information flow, the firm is able to create a product that is 
specific to the firm (this is akin to TCE/asset specificity reasoning). In addition, it allows 
control of products and avoids dissemination of its information advantages. Finally, in 
cases where there are high tariffs, taxation differences or capital flow restrictions, firms 
will choose to create an internal market.  
Buckley and Casson 1998) suggest that internalisation theory has two implications: (1) 
firms will choose the lowest cost location for any activity and (2) firms will prefer growth 
through internalisation until the costs of internalisation are equal to its benefits. When 
applied to entry mode choice in the context of this thesis, internalisation theory suggests 
that firms initially enter a foreign market through low resource commitment modes such 
as exporting, thus minimising the risk and cost of international activity. As the firm gains 
experience in and knowledge of the host country, it will shift to higher resource 
commitment (more internalised) modes (initially through JVs and then through WOSs). 
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3.2.7.1 Internalisation Research Question 
Internalisation theory is based partly on TCE and, more broadly, on the Coasian view of 
the firm and market imperfection theory. The theory retains the Coasian aim for profit 
maximisation and the assumption of doing so under the conditions of underlying market 
failure. In both theories, the governance structure is determined through the motive of 
cost minimisation in transactions. The fundamental grounding of both theories is that 
market inefficiencies prompt firms to internalise their operations. Consequently, 
internalisation views MNCs as extensions of the Coasian firm. Moreover, internalisation is 
based on the premise that the risk of losing specific knowledge prompts firms to 
internalise the transaction, influencing the commitment preferences of the firm (Buckley 
& Casson, 1976). The theories are distinct, however, in that TCE focuses on single 
transactions while in internalisation theory the unit of analysis is the firm. Moreover, 
internalisation theory suggests that internal modes are favoured as market know-how 
increases, whereas TCE suggests that this is due to micro-level transaction characteristics, 
for example, asset specificity. Apart from TCE, internalisation theory is also based on the 
assumptions of market imperfections. Hymer’s (1960) seminal insights were developed 
into a paradigm focused on market imperfections through the works of Hymer (1960, 
1976), Kindleberger (1969) and Caves  (1971) and is referred to as market imperfection 
theory or the Hymer-Kindleberger hypothesis. The Hymer-Kindleberger hypothesis 
suggests that the degree of market imperfection existing in the foreign market and 
potential for monopolistic advantage for the entering firm determine the motivation for 
FDI.  
RQ3: How salient are the assumptions, constructs and focus of internalisation 
theory in a hotel executive’s choice between franchising and management 
contracts? 
3.2.8 Dunning’s Eclectic Theory 
Dunning’s eclectic paradigm (or OLI theory), explains outward FDI by suggesting that it is 
dependent on the existence or lack of ownership advantages, location advantages and 
internalisation advantages (Dunning, 1980, 1981, 1988, 1992). The paradigm views 
ownership advantages, internalisation advantages and location advantages as interrelated 
and as prerequisites for FDI. The theory is defined as follows: 
The eclectic paradigm has been developed by John Dunning in a series of 
publications (Dunning, 1980, 1981, 1988, 1992). There are three factors that 
determine the international activities of multinational enterprises (MNEs). These 
are ownership (O) advantages, location (L) advantages, and internalization (I) 
advantages. (Rugman, 2010, p. 2) 
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The theory is a combination of industrial organisation theory, internalisation theory and 
location theory. All of which are proposed by Dunning (1980, 1981, 1988, 1992) to be 
important considerations in investment decisions. These ‘advantages’ are now elaborated 
on. 
3.2.8.1 Ownership Advantages 
According to the paradigm, ownership advantages are determined by three factors: (1) 
access to materials, (2) access to the endowments of the parent company at low cost and 
(3) advantages arising from being international, allowing for control of unique host 
country factors such as product differentiation, innovation, experience, favoured access to 
inputs and use of specific assets. There are two types of assets that, according to the 
theory, embody the ownership advantages: (1) the firm’s intangible assets such as brands, 
knowledge, management skills and organisational routines (asset ownership advantages) 
and (2) country factors such as favourable natural factor endowments, natural resources 
and the cultural, institutional and legal environment. In addition, access to and control 
over host country resources fall into this category (transactional ownership advantages).  
3.2.8.2 Location Advantages 
Location advantages include the size of the market, natural resources, aspects of the 
infrastructure, the education system and political or governmental activity. It is important 
to note that it is only the existence of these factors that creates the advantage. If, for 
example, an MNC was given access to these advantages over another MNC, for example, by 
gaining access to natural resources, it becomes an ownership advantage.  
3.2.8.3 Internalisation Advantages 
Internalisation derives from Hymer’s market imperfection theory, the Coasian view of the 
firm and TCE. Following TCE logic, it is suggested that internalisation should be sought in 
three instances: (1) in cases of perceived risk and uncertainty, (2) as a result of economies 
of scale in an imperfect market and (3) in cases of the market not pricing externalities to 
transactions. The distinction between ownership advantages and internalisation 
advantages can only exist within NIE where ownership and control are not synonymous. 
In other words, a firm must have some ownership advantages to internalise. 
In short, the theory suggests that ownership advantages must be present before market 
failure leads to internalisation and location factors will dictate the site of investment. 
Moreover, internalisation factors when combined with location factors determine the 
organisational form. Dunning views internalisation and ownership advantages as distinct 
and argues that market failure leads to internalisation, while it is the ownership of a 
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particular asset or a set of assets that explains why firms are multinational or domestic. 
Finally, location advantages relate to both the home country of the MNC and the host 
country. According to Dunning (1988), they are interdependent with ownership 
advantages, and internalisation advantages include input prices, barriers to trade, tax 
regimes, institutional arrangements, and prospects of the economy and socio-political 
situations. These factors dictate why MNCs choose FDI in particular locations rather than 
exporting or licensing. 
3.2.8.4 Dunning’s Eclectic Paradigm Research Question 
Dunning’s eclectic paradigm draws from TCE and, more broadly, from the traditional 
Coasian model (i.e. the focus on governance structures) but expands it by adding three 
factors: ownership advantages, location advantages and internalisation advantages 
(Dunning, 1980, 1981, 1988, 1992). The similarities between TCE and OLI are further 
embodied in these advantages, specifically ownership advantages, referred to as firm-
specific variables, as well as location advantages, referred to as market or environment 
specific variables in TCE jargon. Moreover, the eclectic paradigm also draws on 
internalisation theory (the theory outlined above). The unit of analysis in this theory is the 
firm. 
RQ4: How salient are the assumptions, constructs and focus of Dunning’s eclectic 
paradigm in a hotel executive’s choice between franchising and management 
contracts? 
3.2.9 Institutional Theory 
Institutional theory in the context of IB suggests that the institutional environment of the 
host country or market determines the entry mode decision of MNCs. There is no unified 
definition of institutions in the IB literature and how institutions influence the behaviour 
of MNCs (Hotho & Pedersen, 2012). The pioneers of the two main research streams 
defined institutions as follows: 
Institutions are the rules of the game in a society or, more formally, are the 
humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction. In consequence they 
structure incentives in human exchange, whether political, social, or economic. 
Institutional change shapes the way societies evolve through time and hence is the 
key to understanding historical change. (North, 1990, p. 3) 
Institutions are social structures that have attained a high degree of resilience. 
(Scott, 1995, p. 33) 
Institutional theory in IB examines how firms enter and operate in an institutional context 
defined by certain rules, norms and values (Davis, Desai, & Francis, 2000; Meyer & 
Nguyen, 2005). From this perspective, firms are therefore seen as passive agents 
operating within the broader frames of reference resulting from institutions. A key tenet 
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of institutional theory is isomorphism (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Embedded isomorphic 
pressures can have a significant influence on the entry mode choice of MNCs (Brouthers, 
2002). For example, institutional theory suggests that firms entering a new market will 
mimic local host country firm actions or competitor actions in order to legitimise their 
operations and their market presence (Davis et al., 2000; Kostova, Roth, & Dacin, 2008). 
There are two research streams that have evolved in the literature on institutional theory 
in IB; these are the sociological perspective and the economic perspective. 
3.2.9.1 The Sociological Perspective 
The sociological perspective examines the interactions between organisations and 
institutions through the differing perspectives of the ‘actors’ of the institutions , that is, 
individuals, organisations and sovereign states, to examine the behaviour of organisations 
and their impact on the society (Scott, 1995). Scott’s (1995) analogy of institutional theory 
consists of three ‘pillars’, which are as follows: 
1) The regulative pillar – consisting of the formal rules, laws and regulations that 
exist in a state  
2) The normative pillar – including professional societal bodies that outline the rules 
and expectations for certain groups  
3) The cultural-cognitive pillar – the accepted beliefs and values shared among 
individuals through social interactions that guide behaviour  
3.2.9.2 The Economic Perspective 
The economic perspective of institutional theory in IB was put forward by North (1990, 
1991) and is based on the assumptions of TCE and founded in NIE. One key notion put 
forward in this theory is the analogy of the ‘game’. The rules of the game are dictated by 
two different institutional contexts: (1) the formal institutional context and (2) the 
informal institutional context.  
Formal Institutions 
Formal institutions take the form of laws, property rights and sanctions, at both federal 
and regional levels. Formal institutions can be changed relatively swiftly as a result of 
changes in regulations that are enforced by the government (Chavance, 2008; Lauth, 2004; 
North, 1990). 
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Informal Institutions 
Informal institutions take the form of taboos, values, customs and traditions, and 
networks. Networks facilitate intra- and interorganisational operations (Peng, 2003) and 
are often used within political circles and MNCs to facilitate policy creation (Lawton et al., 
2013). Unlike formal institutions, informal institutions are more resistant to change 
because they are the shared beliefs and norms of the society (Chavance, 2008; Lauth, 
2004; North, 1990). 
Formal and informal institutions have both been suggested as influencing the entry mode 
choices of MNCs (Meyer & Nguyen, 2005). Where regional governments are not allowed or 
are unable to exercise their law-making powers (formal institutions), they utilise informal 
institutions to facilitate transactions. MNCs have to weigh up the incentives provided by 
both the federal and the regional governments. Location factors are context specific and 
influence the entry mode choice of MNCs (Agarwal & Ramaswami, 1992). Moreover, the 
entry mode choice also depends on whether institutions facilitate access to scarce 
resources or not. Where the federal or regional governments facilitate this access, foreign 
MNCs prefer JVs with the local firms (Meyer & Nguyen, 2005). However, the governments 
also have the power to impose restrictions on JVs in particular sectors. As a result, the 
national institutional framework is a vital determinant in the strategic internationalisation 
decisions of MNCs. Furthermore, the regional and federal governments play different roles 
in facilitating FDI activities. This area has, however, received very little attention in the IB 
literature (Meyer & Nguyen, 2005; Wang, Hong, Kafouros, & Wright, 2012).  
It is noted in the literature that the level of development in a country has a relationship 
with the preference for either formal or informal institutions. Continual changes in the 
formal institutional environment experiences, particularly in emerging economies, 
encourages the development and strengthening of informal institutions, which MNCs from 
emerging economies rely on heavily (Marinova, Child, & Marinov, 2012). Conversely, more 
developed countries are likely to have more established and well-enforced formal 
institutions and therefore prefer them. 
Government officials as well as MNCs use informal institutions such as networks to 
facilitate their own interests (Grzymala-Busse, 2010; Levitsky & Murillo, 2009). The 
interplay between formal and informal institutions is vital in the operations of MNCs 
(Chavance, 2008; Mudambi & Navarra, 2002); however, research remains scarce on this 
issue also. The use of both institutions is evident at all the levels of business–government 
interactions. 
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The key assumptions and insights from the economic and sociological perspectives have 
enabled IB scholars to add depth to organisational analyses. Institutional theory enables 
better understanding of more complex aspects of social structure (Scott, 2008), where 
formal and informal institutions are utilised in order to enable MNCs to operate in these 
complex environments (North, 1990). In this thesis, the focus will be on North’s 
institutional theory because of its foundation in NIE. 
3.2.9.3 Institutional Theory Research Question 
North’s institutional theory is founded in NIE; however, unlike the other theories 
reviewed here, the focus of the theory is not on the firm but rather on the environment. 
Specifically, it considers the effect of formal and informal institutions and how they 
influence the governance structure choices of MNCs as opposed to considering how factors 
within the firm influence these choices. The unit of analysis of this theory is the 
institutional environment of the host country. 
RQ5: How salient are the assumptions, constructs and focus of institutional theory 
in a hotel executive’s choice between franchising and management contracts? 
3.2.10 Resource-Based View 
From the RBV, the basis of every firm’s competitive advantage rests in its heterogeneous 
resources or capabilities. A resource can be thought of as an asset that is tangible or 
intangible, such as capital or machinery and brand names or production knowledge 
respectively (Barney, 1991; Fahy, 1996; Lado & Zhang, 1998). Moreover, it can be human 
or non-human (Lado & Zhang, 1998). The theory is defined as follows: 
The resource-based view of the firm substitutes two alternate assumptions in 
analyzing sources of competitive advantage. First, this model assumes that firms 
within an industry (or group) may be heterogeneous with respect to the strategic 
resources they control. Second, this model assumes that these resources may not 
be perfectly mobile across firms, and thus heterogeneity can be long lasting. 
(Barney, 1991, p. 101) 
Aspects of the RBV have been theorised over for some time, before these concepts were 
formally combined into an academic theory by Wernerfelt (1984). This publication was 
followed by Barney (1986a, 1986b), who articulated similar lines of reasoning and 
terminology. Other notable publications at this early stage, such as Conner (1991), Grant 
(1991), Mahoney and Pandian (1992) and Peteraf (1993) also helped to establish the 
theory in the literature. The RBV has been criticised for being unclear in its terminology. 
According to Foss (1997), the literature on the RBV is a ‘terminological soup’, referring to 
the non-homogeneous use of terms such as resources, capabilities, competencies and 
assets, which complicates the concept and hinders the usability of the theory due to 
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tautology. In this study, when discussing the RBV, all knowledge-based and organisational 
capability, competency or core competency theories will also be referred to, as done in 
Brouthers and Hennart (2007). However, a short outline of the dynamic capability 
perspective is provided at the end of this section due to its increasing popularity in the 
literature. 
From the RBV, when these resources and capabilities are bundled up, they embody the 
firm’s competitive advantage (Barney, 1991; Collis & Montgomery, 1995; Dev et al., 2007; 
Madhok, 1997, 1998). The RBV determines the entry mode decision through the efficiency 
of transferring the resources and capabilities of the firm to the host country (Barney, 
1991; Madhok, 1998). Rather than being focused on control and risk, as is the case for 
TCE, this line of reasoning posits that it is the resources of the firm and their transfer that 
determines the entry mode decision (Agarwal & Ramaswami, 1992; Ainuddin, Beamish, 
Hulland, & Rouse, 2007; Collis, 1991; Lado & Zhang, 1998). The easiest way to transfer 
these resources across country borders in a way that retains the firm’s competitive 
advantage will be chosen (Luo, 2002; Madhok, 1997).  
The RBV suggests four characteristics that relate to the resources or capabilities 
controlled by the organisation. It is proposed by Barney (1991) that for resources to 
provide a long-term competitive advantage, they must be ‘VRIN’: valuable, rare, inimitable 
and substitutable (Ainuddin et al., 2007; Barney, 1991; W. C. Kim & Hwang, 1992; Lavie, 
2006; Luo, 2002; Madhok, 1997, 1998). These four constructs will now be elaborated on. 
3.2.10.1 Value of Resources 
The resources of a firm that are characterised as valuable are those that create a 
competitive advantage that is sustainable over a long period. From the RBV, resources are 
also valuable when they allow a firm to implement incentives and strategies that improve 
the efficiency and effectiveness of resource transfer across country borders. Finally, the 
resource is deemed valuable if it aids in neutralising external threats and fosters possible 
opportunities for the firm (Ainuddin et al., 2007; Barney, 1991; Fahy, 1996; Lado & Zhang, 
1998). 
3.2.10.2 Rarity of Resources 
A resource must be rare to be valuable. By definition, value is lost as rarity decreases. 
From the RBV, if several competing firms possess the same resource then that resource 
will no longer be a source of sustained competitive advantage. Therefore, even if firm 
resources are valuable, they will not be a source of competitive advantage if they are not 
rare (Ainuddin et al., 2007; Barney, 1991; Fahy, 1996; W. C. Kim & Hwang, 1992). 
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3.2.10.3 Non-substitutability of Resources 
Non-substitutability is the last requirement for a sustained competitive advantage. Even if 
the resources of a firm are valuable and rare, an equally important consideration is 
whether they are non-substitutable. If a competitor can provide a similar product or 
service as a substitute then the competitive advantage is lost (Ainuddin et al., 2007; 
Barney, 1991; Fahy, 1996; W. C. Kim & Hwang, 1992; Lavie, 2006). 
3.2.10.4 Imperfect Imitability 
The term imperfect imitability has its roots in the RBV and was initially developed by 
Lippman and Rumelt (1982) and then further refined by Barney (1986a, 1986b). These 
scholars suggest that for a sustained competitive advantage to be achieved, a firm must 
have a bundle of firm-specific resources that in combination are imperfectly imitable. In 
other words, it should not be possible for competitors to perfectly imitate these resources. 
Over time, firms develop resource-based advantages (Barney, 1991); if the capabilities 
that arise through these resources are imperfectly imitable then it means that they are 
highly embedded in the firm’s organisational routines (Ainuddin et al., 2007; Brown et al., 
2003; Fahy, 1996; W. C. Kim & Hwang, 1992; Lam, 1997; Lavie, 2006). In other words, if 
the managerial skills, the knowledge of the industry, the training or the organisational 
routines of a hotel organisation have been developed over time and cannot be or are not 
held by one person per se, then the capabilities of that firm would be embedded (Dev et al., 
2007; Kogut & Zander, 1993; Lam, 1997; Luo, 2001).  
3.2.10.5 The Dynamic Capability Perspective 
The dynamic capability perspective builds on the assumptions and considerations of the 
RBV. The RBV has been shown as an effective theoretical perspective in static 
environments, however, it is arguably less effective in dynamic environments (Teece, 
Pisano, & Shuen, 1997), as it fails to explain the sustainment of competitive advantage of 
firms in environments and regimes of dynamism. The initial intention of the dynamic 
capability framework therefore was to provide an explanation for this (Teece & Pisano, 
1994; Teece et al., 1997). In other words, the dynamic capability perspective focuses on 
the ability of continual change and adaption of a firm’s capabilities i.e. resources. It is 
therefore regarded as an extension of the resource-based view (Eisenhardt & Martin, 
2000; Helfat et al., 2007; Zollo & Winter, 2002). 
The dynamic capability perspective has received increasing attention since the seminal 
work of Teece et al. (1997). According to Di Stefano, Peteraf, and Verona (2014), the 
number of publications founded on the dynamic capability perspective have increased 
yearly. However, it has been suggested that the organisational capability perspective is 
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still relatively young and not yet fully developed (Helfat et al., 2007), which is highlighted 
by the lack of coherence in literature on the theory. Firstly, the field is negatively impacted 
by confusion over the concept itself (Di Stefano et al., 2014; Wilden, Devinney, & Dowling, 
2013). Some authors have argued that capabilities are an idiosyncratic ability (Teece et al., 
1997), while others argue that dynamic capability is a best-practice process that can be 
found in various organisations (Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000). Moreover, it is argued by 
some authors that managers are key agents for dynamic capabilities (Adner & Helfat, 
2003; Martin, 2011), while others have argued that dynamic capabilities should be 
implemented as the modus operandi (Zollo & Winter, 2002). Finally, some authors regard 
dynamic capabilities as an adjustment mechanism (Kale & Singh, 2007; Santos & 
Eisenhardt, 2005), whereas other authors have emphasised the creation of something new 
(Katkalo, Pitelis, & Teece, 2010; Teece, 2007). 
Considering these points, it is therefore not surprising that various scholars have criticised 
the concept of dynamic capabilities for its lack of coherent theoretical foundations and the 
fragmented nature of the literature (Arend & Bromiley, 2009; Argyres, Felin, Foss, & 
Zenger, 2012). It is for these reasons, that this thesis focuses only on the traditional RBV, 
which as mentioned at the start of this section suffers itself from terminological confusion 
(Foss, 1997). 
3.2.10.6 The Resource-Based View Research Question 
Like TCE, the RBV is concerned with the governance structure of firms; moreover, a 
central role is given to bounded rationality (Barney, 1991). However, if excluding 
institutional theory, this theory is perhaps the most different from TCE when compared 
with those listed above (Madhok, 1996, 1997, 1998). While TCE is concerned with 
lessening transaction costs, the RBV is concerned with the development and exploitation 
of the firm’s resources and capabilities. Moreover, from the RBV, TCE is not 
comprehensive enough to explain the existence of firms or to be a theory of economic 
organisation more generally, as it ignores the fact that firms are a hub of research and of 
resources and capabilities (Erramilli et al., 2002; Madhok, 1998), that is, TCE does not 
examine all the processes that take place within the firm. The unit of analysis in the RBV is 
the firm. 
RQ6: How salient are the assumptions, constructs and focus of the resource-based 
view in a hotel executive’s choice between franchising and management contracts? 
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Table 3.1: Theories on New Institutional Economics – Comparisons 
Considerations TCE Agency theory Internalisation theory OLI Institutional theory RBV 
Unit of analysis Transactions The agent The firm The firm Institutional 
environment 
The firm 
Primary focus Transaction 
characteristics 
Contract between the 
principal and the 
agent 
Gradual internalisation 
of market imperfections 
The OLI 
advantages 
Regulatory, normative 
and cognitive 
environments 
Firm resources and 
capabilities 
Key theoretical/ 
behavioural 
assumptions  
Opportunism and 
bounded rationality 
Moral hazard and 
agency cost 
Internal markets are the 
most efficient 
All OLI 
advantages are 
prerequisites of 
FDI 
The three pillars and 
the formal and 
informal institutions 
Bounded 
rationality 
Key market 
assumptions 
Markets can fail Markets are efficient Markets can fail/are 
imperfect 
Markets can fail Institutions exist in 
larger ecologies (social 
and economic) 
Markets are not 
efficient 
Primary 
management 
consideration 
Cost minimisation Choosing the optimal 
contract 
Cost minimisation Cost 
minimisation 
Optimal interactions 
with the institutional 
environment 
Development and 
exploitation of firm 
resources and 
capabilities 
Primary firm 
consideration 
Transaction cost 
minimisation to 
establish the best 
governance structure 
Principal–agent 
relationships should 
reflect efficient 
structure of 
organisation and 
risk-bearing costs 
There is a direct 
relationship between 
increasing experience/ 
know-how and 
increasing firm’s 
resource commitment 
Evaluating the 
best governance 
structure as 
dictated by the 
OLI advantages 
Evaluating the best 
governance structure 
by evaluating the 
optimal interaction 
with institutions 
Contributions 
towards and 
demands placed on 
firm resources and 
capabilities 
(Buckley & Casson, 1976; Dunning, 1988; Eisenhardt, 1989; P. G. Klein, 2000; Madhok, 1997; North, 1990; Scott, 1995; Williamson, 1996)  
 
 
 
 56 
Table 3.2: Summary of the Research Questions for Study 1 
RQ1 How salient are the assumptions, constructs and focus of transaction cost 
economics in a hotel executive’s choice between franchising and management 
contracts? 
RQ2 How salient are the assumptions, constructs and focus of agency theory in a hotel 
executive’s choice between franchising and management contracts? 
RQ3 How salient are the assumptions, constructs and focus of internalisation theory in a 
hotel executive’s choice between franchising and management contracts? 
RQ4 How salient are the assumptions, constructs and focus of Dunning’s eclectic 
paradigm in a hotel executive’s choice between franchising and management 
contracts? 
RQ5 How salient are the assumptions, constructs and focus of institutional theory in a 
hotel executive’s choice between franchising and management contracts? 
RQ6 How salient are the assumptions, constructs and focus of the resource-based view 
in a hotel executive’s choice between franchising and management contracts? 
3.2.11 Section Conclusions 
In this section, the shift from neoclassical economics to NIE in IB research was outlined. It 
was highlighted that neoclassical economics with its view of firms as production units 
does not account for the complexity of modern firms and the institutional context within 
which MNCs operate today. It is suggested in the literature that the theories of NIE 
conversely are more suited to examinations of today’s international market place owing to 
its focus on the boundaries of the firm. TCE, agency theory, internalisation theory, 
Dunning’s OLI and the RBV, all founded in NIE, are the major theories of entry mode 
research. These theories were individually reviewed: their origins, development, 
underlying constructs and assumptions were outlined and their similarities and 
differences were briefly reviewed before presenting the research questions.  
3.3 Methods 
The purpose of this section is to outline the methods that were used in this study. Initially, 
the research design for the study is outlined, followed by an explanation of how the 
instrument (interview questions) was developed and then a listing of the actual questions 
asked. Finally, the research sample is shown, and it is briefly explained how the data was 
analysed.  
3.3.1 Research Design 
For this study, a qualitative approach was taken with key informant interviews, however, 
while this study is qualitative in nature, allowing for more in-depth analysis, the study 
uses a deductive approach.  Although qualitative research is generally seen as inductive, 
especially in the case of grounded theory research (Bruce, 2007), qualitative research can 
also take a deductive approach when guided by a rigorous theoretical foundation (O'Reilly 
& Parker, 2012). This approach was adopted to examine and deduce which theories of NIE 
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would best explain the decision between franchising and management contracts in the 
hotel industry, and then use these findings to inform further quantitative analysis. This 
approach also fits best with the overall post-positive paradigm of the thesis, which aims to 
be as objective as possible. 
The advantage of this methodology is that it is structured but still exploratory in nature, 
by allowing the interviewees to answer in their own words. This was emphasised in this 
research by directly quoting the respondents to capture their insights more directly. 
Moreover, it can be seen in the literature that the majority of entry mode research has 
been quantitative in nature (Canabal & White, 2008; Sarkar & Cavusgil, 1996), and there 
has been a growing stream of studies examining entry modes through qualitative methods 
for service firms (Czinkota, Grossman, Javalgi, & Nugent, 2009), retail firms (Doherty, 
2000; Picot-Coupey, 2006) and hotel firms (Altinay, 2005, 2007; Kruesi & Zamborsky, in 
press; Lamminmaki, 2005).  
3.3.2 Instrumentation and Data Collection 
In qualitative research, relatively little structured instrumentation is used. In fact, it is 
proposed that the researcher is essentially the main ‘instrument’ (Miles, Huberman, & 
Saldaña, 2013). Moreover, it is pointed out by Miles et al. (2013) that researchers are 
generally affected by pre-existing knowledge and perceptions that influence the 
interpretation of the responses. N. Lee and Lings (2008) suggest that a clear line of 
questioning or a conceptual framework as a structure allows researchers to shape their 
analysis in a way that focuses on the problem being investigated; however, it should be 
noted that the researchers must ‘let the data speak for itself’. 
According to Punch (2013), questions are useful in qualitative research to guide the 
interview; however, only general open-ended questions should be set up in advance 
because before empirical research is carried out, it is not possible (or, if possible, not 
sensible) to identify overly specific research questions. The factors for closer examination 
will become clear only as the research unfolds, and as a specific focus for the work is 
developed. In qualitative research methods, the data is usually unstructured at the point of 
collection (Punch, 2013). No pre-established categories or codes are used. The structure of 
the data, the categories and the codes emerge from the data during the analysis. This point 
about data has implications for instrumentation in qualitative data collection.  
The instruments used in qualitative research have a major influence on the data collected. 
If only a few prepared instruments are used (i.e. interview questions, observation 
logbooks and schedules etc.), there is a risk of not being able to differentiate between 
useful data and irrelevant data. However, if there is too much structure, it can leave 
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researchers blind to the situational context and overly influenced by previous models. N. 
Lee and Lings (2008) recommend that it is usually best to settle somewhere in the middle; 
the more exploratory the study, the less instrumentation is used. If the aim of the research 
is to compare multiple cases or situations, however, instrumentation will be of 
considerable help (N. Lee & Lings, 2008), as is the case in this thesis. 
For this study, the instruments were designed to be flexible and to be used more as 
guidance than as a structured template to follow. This approach was chosen to answer the 
research questions developed for this study most effectively. Specifically, the particulars of 
the theories, as outlined in Section 3.2, had to be explained to some respondents during 
the interviews to ensure that the questions asked were fully understood by the 
respondents. 
As was explored in the previous section, the theories under investigation for this study 
have evolved out of NIE and TCE. Therefore, many theories have similar management 
concerns and behavioural and market assumptions. These factors were probed only once 
(mainly in the TCE section) and not again for the following theories. Instead, the questions 
for the following theories probed the characteristics that distinguish these theories from 
TCE. Specifically, Question 1, on the motive of cost minimisation and profit maximisation, 
is also relevant to internalisation theory, agency theory and OLI. Question 2, on 
opportunism, is also relevant to internalisation theory, OLI and the RBV, and this question 
also probes the importance of the behavioural uncertainty construct of TCE. Question 3, on 
bounded rationality, is also relevant to internalisation theory, OLI and the RBV; this 
question also probes the importance of the behavioural uncertainty construct of TCE. 
Question 4, on asset specificity, also relates to internalisation theory and OLI. Finally, 
Questions 9 and 10, on internalisation theory, also relate to OLI. 
Interview Questions 
Transaction Cost Economics 
1) How important is the motive of transaction cost minimisation / profit 
maximisation, in particular, ex-post cost minimisation, in deciding between 
franchising and management contracts? (INT/OLI/AT) 
2) How does the expectation of opportunism from the partner impact on the decision 
between franchising and management contracts? (BU)(INT/OLI/AT) 
3) How does bounded rationality in a transaction impact on the decision between 
franchising and management contracts? (EU)(OLI/INT/RBV) 
Asset Specificity 
4) How did the aim to protect and control your specific assets impact on the decision 
between franchising and management contracts? (OLI/INT) 
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Environmental Uncertainty 
5) How does environmental uncertainty impact on the decision between franchising 
and management contracts? 
Frequency 
6) Does the frequency of transactions impact on the decision between franchising 
and management contracts? 
Agency Theory 
7) How do the differing goals between the principal and agent impact on the decision 
between franchising and management contracts? 
8) How does the ease or difficulty of monitoring the performance of the agent impact 
on the decision between franchising and management contracts? 
9) How does the motive for risk sharing between the principal and agent impact on 
the decision between franchising and management contracts? 
Internalisation Theory 
10) How does the concept of gradually increasing control from low to high, i.e. 
internalising the external market, apply to franchising and management contracts? 
(OLI) 
11) How does the motive to internalise imperfect markets impact on the decision 
between franchising and management contracts? 
Dunning’s Eclectic Paradigm (OLI Theory) 
12) How do location advantages impact on the decision between franchising and 
management contracts? 
Institutional Theory 
13) How do formal institutions impact on the decision between franchising and 
management contracts? 
14) How do informal institutions impact on the decision between franchising and 
management contracts? 
Resource-Based View 
15) How important is the efficient transfer of resources and capabilities to the host 
country in the decision between franchising and management contracts? 
Imperfect Imitability 
16) How did the aim to protect and control your specific assets impact on the decision 
between franchising and management contracts? 
3.3.3 Pilot Study 
After having designed the interview, a two-stage pilot study was conducted before 
commencing the data collection. In the first stage of the pilot study, the interview was 
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conducted with the project supervisors. The researcher interviewed the supervisors 
jointly and the questions were modified for clarity. In the second stage, the researcher 
independently interviewed two further individuals, both senior lecturers. These 
individuals were chosen due to their relevant academic and industry knowledge. One of 
these individuals is an expert in service firm internationalisation as well as having specific 
knowledge of non-equity entry modes. The second individual is currently a lecturer in the 
field of hospitality and has significant hotel industry experience from before entering 
academia. The interviewees were asked to identify anything related to the flow of the 
interview or the construction of the wording that may pose problems or hinder 
understanding of the questions. Based on their feedback, the main change that was made 
to the interview was some minor rewording to remove questions that were essentially 
repetitive – a result of the similarities between some of the theories. These changes in the 
wording and a reduction in the number of questions improved the comprehension and 
flow of the interview.  
3.3.4 Research Sample 
The interviewees were specifically chosen for their expertise, that is, as key informants, to 
explore their views and expertise on non-equity entry modes in the hotel sector and the 
theories examined in this study. Table 3.3 summarises the profiles of the interviewees. 
The interviewees were chosen based on the purposive sampling method (Sangpikul & 
Kim, 2009). The aim was to select interviewees who are very high up in the information 
hierarchy, as proposed by Marschan-Piekkari and Welch (2004), and therefore, only top-
level hotel executives. To gain access to such high-level executives, who are dispersed 
across the globe, it was deemed appropriate by the research team to attend a major hotel 
conference. Consequently, the IHIF 2013 in Berlin was chosen.  
For networking purposes, the IHIF provides an ‘in-mail’ service, which is operational two 
months before commencement of the conference. This time was used to review the 1,312 
attendees and identify appropriate, knowledgeable and high-level potential respondents. 
A total of 108 potential interviewees were identified and research invitations and 
participant information sheets were sent to these individuals. Of these 108, 11 responded 
and were willing to meet; however, owing to time constraints and scheduling clashes, 
three of these potential interviewees were not able to meet. The final sample for the 
interviews was therefore eight, as seen in Table 3.3. The interviewees were all in high-
level management positions and had extensive experience in the hotel industry (a total of 
141 years between them). These executives, moreover, were based in different parts of 
the globe. As the conference was held in Germany, the majority came from the United 
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Kingdom; however, there was also one representative each from South Africa, the United 
Arab Emirates and the United States. 
The sample size of 8 executives could be considered a limitation of this study. As such, it 
could be argued that perhaps data saturation may not have been reached. However,it is 
suggested by O'Reilly and Parker (2012) that data saturation should not be viewed as a 
generic requirement that is to be applied to all types of qualitative research. Nor should 
data saturation be viewed as a quality criterion for all qualitative studies. As mentioned in 
Section 3.3.1, while qualitative research is generally viewed as inductive (Bruce, 2007), a 
deductive approach can also be taken (O'Reilly & Parker, 2012) as is used in this study. 
Although data saturation can be viewed as criterion applicable to truly inductive research, 
such as grounded theory research, a deductive approach is not necessarily guided by the 
types of revelations or ‘categories’ that may emerge from the data when collecting it. Study 
1 was deductive as it was guided by a rigorous theoretical foundation with a clear aim of 
deducing the most appropriate theories to use for Study 2. 
Table 3.3: Key Informants 
Respondent Position Years of experience Country  
1 CEO of a hotel asset 
management company 
12 United Kingdom 
2 CEO of a hotel 
organisation  
26 South Africa 
3 Regional president of a 
hotel organisation  
15 United Arab Emirates 
4 Senior vice-president of a 
hotel organisation  
10 United States of America 
5 Managing director of a 
hotel organisation  
44 United Kingdom 
6 Franchise development 
manager of a hotel 
organisation  
13 United Kingdom 
7 Hotel law firm partner  13 United Kingdom 
8 Hotel law firm partner 8 United Kingdom 
3.3.5 Data Analysis 
The qualitative data collected through the in-depth interviews was analysed by content 
and thematic analyses. By analysing the qualitative data, the factors and constraints that 
could possibly affect the choice between franchising and management contracts were 
identified. To carry out the qualitative data analysis, the interviews were transcribed and 
printed, and the themes were coded by colour. It is suggested by Veal (2006) that a 
sophisticated analysis of qualitative data could be regarded as less important, and to some 
extent, unnecessary when the purpose of an in-depth or informal interview is to help the 
formation of a formal survey questionnaire, which was one of the objectives of this initial 
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stage of the research. However, since in-depth interviews can help unveil underlying 
dynamics, which a questionnaire is not able to do, the text derived from those interviews 
and the analysis of that text may be regarded as a case study within the thesis. As 
previously noted, this analysis forms the subject matter of the next chapter. Specifically, 
the data collected was analysed through the four-step process suggested by Phillips 
(2010), which is as follows: 
Step 1: Observing and Searching 
Remain objective when reading through the data, keep an open mind and reserve any 
prior judgement. 
Step 2: Sorting and Coding 
Identify single words and short phrases, that is, meaningful units or segments of text 
(Hruschka et al., 2004), that were repeated. These units and segments were then coded.  
Step 3: Discovering and Coding 
Establish if any patterns arise and evaluate what the similarities and the differences are. 
Step 4: Reobserve and Reread 
Reobserve the data and evaluate if any new insights present themselves. 
3.4 Findings 
The purpose of this section is to present the findings of Study 1. The findings are 
structured in the same order as the questions were asked (see interview questions). The 
theories of NIE were all discussed with the respondents and their applicability to the 
decision between franchising and management contracts was explored. Moreover, as the 
interviews were semi-structured, there were findings were not expected and these are 
also outlined in this section as they impacted on the hypotheses development of the 
following round. 
3.4.1 Transaction Cost Economics 
Initially, the importance of the transaction cost minimisation rationale of TCE in deciding 
between franchising and management contracts was probed. It was highlighted by all of 
the participants that transaction costs, both ex-ante and ex-post, are important 
considerations.  
“If you are going to look at the tightest, best negotiated franchise agreement , you 
might as well make it a management contract. If you are going to protect your 
brand to that extent you might as well go and operate it yourself.” (Respondent 4) 
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“Yes in one sense it is more efficient go with a management agreement because 
you don’t have break-in costs, you don’t have re-entry cost, if you would lose the 
franchise agreement.” (Respondent 8) 
It was noted, however, by Respondent (7) that transaction costs, while a consideration, are 
far outweighed by the potential for profit.  
“I think that is a lesser consideration, there are more things to look at if you are 
just looking at the transaction costs, they may be higher one way or the other but 
no investor is solely driven by the cost or risk [aversion] they are driven by the 
return. So, OK, it may cost me more to do this than that but that is a lot more 
profitable, I am going to go that way and don’t mind taking on the cost and risk.” 
(Respondent 7) 
However, as profit maximisation is also central to TCE, this comment does not contradict 
TCE reasoning. The respondents were then asked about how the potential for 
opportunistic behaviour on the part of the host country partner impacts on the decision 
between franchising and management contracts. Overwhelmingly, the consensus among 
the respondents was that opportunism is a major consideration for hotel organisations in 
choosing between franchising and management contracts. Local partners potentially 
misusing the brand was a central consideration for several respondents, as highlighted by 
Respondents (1), (2) and (3). 
“If there are issues in regard to the execution of the brand standards and [the local 
partner] exposes you … you find the franchisor coming back and saying ‘well we 
won’t franchise anymore, we’ll do a management agreement’.” (Respondent 1) 
“In franchising all you have is your brand, if you choose the wrong partners and 
they tarnish your brand it will cost you, not just in that market but potentially in 
other markets also.” (Respondent 2) 
“If I felt there was any potential for brand misuse I would not consider a franchise 
depending on how desperate I would be to get into that market.” (Respondent 3) 
Respondents also highlighted that the hotel organisation’s appetite for risk dictates 
whether opportunistic behaviour affects the decision between franchising and 
management contracts, as summed up best by Respondents (6) and (8). 
“You would never put yourself in position where you feel as though you have 
overexposed your brand. So there is always a caution there actually … if it’s too 
high risk for your brand, you just wouldn’t do it.” (Respondent 6) 
“So I would think from an Accor perspective for example, a lot of it would be 
judged on a risk basis/ if its high risk they would want to do a management 
contract.” (Respondent 8) 
Distrust was also found to be a major characteristic of expected opportunistic behaviour, 
as highlighted by participants (2), (4) and (6). 
“In Africa the decision has been taken by lots of companies to use management 
contracts. For example in Mozambique if you work with a local operator you will 
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very quickly realise that they are often not operating ethically and would likely 
[act opportunistically].” (Respondent 2) 
“Not because they get more or earn more from management agreements, but 
because they don’t trust anybody [as they might] redeploy that brand for 
themselves.” (Respondent 2) 
“The general breakdown would be whether you would trust somebody with the 
processes you developed; that is absolutely critical to the success of the brand”. 
(Respondent 4) 
“You might find that there is just no third party manager that you will trust.” 
(Respondent 6) 
The impact of bounded rationality was examined next, and similarly to opportunism, the 
respondents highlighted that bounded rationality impacts significantly on the decision 
between franchising and management contracts by prompting the use of management 
contracts. It was highlighted by Respondent (2) that in cases of bounded rationality 
management contracts are preferred because generally hotel organisations have a longer-
term view of internationalisation than just their immediate profits. 
“If you do a franchise deal that in 10 years’ time falls apart, that cost you. So you 
need to be in the position where you have longevity.” (Respondent 2) 
It was further indicated that when hotel organisations move into a new market, the 
rationality is always bounded to some extent, and therefore, management contracts are 
generally always preferred when entering a new market. 
“I think with a new territory that can take years to understand and consequently 
the speed of growth would be slowed if you don’t fully understand it and put boots 
on the ground.” (Respondent 3) 
“In another market which is untested, such as for example moving into Warsaw 
where you don’t have a presence yet … you would probably try and get a feel for 
that market through a management contract before you pass it on.” (Respondent 
4) 
“So, in countries you don’t know much about, in some ways you would want to go 
with a managed operation.” (Respondent 8) 
3.4.1.1 Asset Specificity 
The impact of asset specificity was probed next and it was identified overwhelmingly by 
the respondents as being central in prompting hotel organisations to use management 
contracts. It was highlighted by Respondents (1), (6) and (7) that protection of the brand 
standards and knowledge is a critical consideration. 
“It is a central consideration, if you implicitly believe that [you cannot] ensure the 
brand protection and the brand standard delivery, then you’re more likely to say 
‘it’s just not worth it for a franchise fee, if I can’t do this through a management 
agreement I’m not going to do it at all’.” (Respondent 1) 
“If you can’t protect you brand you would need to rule out franchising” 
(Respondent 6) 
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“In terms of protecting your brand/brand image, your knowledge, you would use a 
management contract.” (Respondent 7) 
It was, moreover, suggested by the respondents that keeping control over assets is 
important and that, even where market modes are possible, hotel organisations generally 
prefer to remain in control. 
“Absolutely central I think that’s the fundamental decision. I mean clearly there are 
situations where even in an environment where it would be easy and reliable to 
pass on the information but brand owners always think ‘can I actually rely on and 
control my intellectual property under a franchise agreement or do I need to keep 
control of that’.” (Respondent 3) 
“I don’t know if I would feel comfortable losing too much control over 
[respondent’s brand] especially because it is [a luxury brand].” (Respondent 4) 
3.4.2 Environmental Uncertainty 
In terms of the effect environmental uncertainty has on the decision between franchising 
and management contracts, there were mixed responses. It was suggested that certain 
markets are characterised as being more established and developed, and therefore, there 
is less uncertainty and risk in those markets, leading firms to prefer franchising to 
management contracts, as highlighted by Respondents (6) and (8). 
“I think it is important to consider the region you are entering and how well 
developed the hotel operating standards are in that country … if it is well 
established … franchising is a suitable way of achieving growth in those markets 
but if they are not and you feel that the market is too underdeveloped and 
therefore too many uncertainties in the market, then management contracts are 
the better route.” (Respondent 6) 
“The environment does matter in that a market like the United States, which is 
well developed is much safer if you will for a franchisor than an undeveloped 
market which doesn’t have any safeguards and established industry standards.” 
(Respondent 8) 
It was also noted by Respondents (1) and (3) that hotel organisations have preconceived 
perceptions of different markets and if the organisation judges an area as ‘risky’, hotel 
organisations choose the security of management contracts.  
“The environment is important, in the sense that you make subjective decision 
about the environment very early on where you say ‘just not going to that region’ 
with franchise, just not going to that area with franchising.” (Respondent 1) 
“Franchise comes with more risk so you need to do it in the right markets.” 
(Respondent 3)  
Conversely, other respondents noted that the environment and any uncertainty around it 
would not be a central consideration. It was noted by Respondent (2) that when deciding 
between franchising and management contracts environmental factors are of lesser 
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concern because in either case the financial commitment in the market is not as large as if 
the organisation was to own the hotel in the foreign market. 
“Ultimately the asset can remain and I can leave the country if I had to, that’s the 
worst case scenario but it does change the investment criteria that you work with.” 
(Respondent 2) 
Moreover, it was highlighted by Respondent (4) that the brand concerns would be more 
central than environmental concerns. 
“Environmental uncertainty doesn’t really impact [choosing between franchising 
and management contracts] you are either going to franchise the InterContinental 
brand or you’re not. You’re not going to say ‘I’ll franchise it in London I won’t 
franchise it in Istanbul’.” (Respondent 4) 
3.4.2.1 Frequency 
As with the environmental uncertainty, the respondents had mixed opinions in regard to 
frequency and its impact on the decision between franchising and management contracts. 
The majority agreed that it is not as critical as brand and environmental decisions, with 
Respondent (1) noting: 
“Choosing between franchising and management contracts is not based on the 
number of different hotel properties you move to a new market or the number of 
times you do it.” (Respondent 1) 
Conversely, it was noted by some respondents that franchising can only be profitable if a 
minimum number of hotel properties are established. As explained by Respondent (3), the 
hotel organisation may not be able to establish several properties at once, owing to a 
limited market size or, for example, the organisation may prefer management contracts. 
“If you are going to a big deal of 10 or 15 properties in a country like Germany for 
example, you would just get on and franchise it … in smaller markets where you 
only intend to have a limited number of hotels, [you may be more likely] to 
franchise.” (Respondent 3) 
Moreover, it was noted by Respondent (6) that developing the franchise infrastructure in a 
foreign market is only worth it if there are several hotel properties planned because of the 
difficulty of being regulated in some markets.  
“There are other markets for example in some European jurisdictions where being 
a regulated franchisor has some obligations, which you find a pain in the backside! 
It might become a real regulating hassle. You might need to translate all of your 
documents into the local language, get it tested and regulated, have the trademarks 
filed with some office other than the patent office or with the trademarks office. 
That could be hassle if it’s a small market where you are intending to only do one 
or two deals.”(Respondent 6) 
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3.4.3 Agency Theory 
The differing goals between the principal and agent were explored, and it was noted by 
several respondents that it does impact on the decision between franchising and 
management contracts. As explained by Respondent (4), hotels are well aware of this 
issue. 
“That is always a consideration when we give it third party managers who are 
motivated solely by bottom line then they will cut corners and the luxury 
hospitality experience will be impaired. They cut the wrong corners and you will 
end up destroying the brand.” (Respondent 4) 
However, it was highlighted by most of the respondents that this was not such a major 
concern as there are well-established mechanisms in place to monitor the performance of 
the economic agents. Respondent (2) noted that: 
“If you’re the franchisor, you can quite easily create a dashboard of protection, 
where you can identify whether franchisees are behaving, as they should do. These 
can be anything from guest satisfaction feedback, through to specific hallmarks 
you expect to receive or experience within the service and then you send 
inspectors to check if these are done.” (Respondent 2) 
Similarly, Respondent (5) stated: 
“There are quite clear spectrums you can quite clearly identify who are good 
franchisee and who are not.” (Respondent 5) 
In addition, the motive for risk sharing between the principal and agent was probed to see 
how it impacts on the decision between franchising and management contracts. The 
majority of the respondents indicated that that would not be a concern because of the 
lower investment levels of both franchising and management contracts compared with 
equity modes, as highlighted by Respondent (3). 
“We would consider risk sharing a consideration more in [equity] joint ventures.” 
(Respondent 3) 
However as highlighted by Respondents (6) and (7), there can be some advantages to 
sharing risk with local partners in cases where there is a trusted local partner 
“[As long as] it’s a partner you have dealt with before or that you trust, then 
spreading the risk between you and them through franchising can have its 
advantages.” (Respondent 6) 
“It depends, we may have long-standing partners who propose we move into a 
new territory, if they present [a good business plan] we would be happy to support 
them with our brand.” (Respondent 7) 
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3.4.4 Internalisation Theory 
Exploring how the concept of gradually increasing control from low to high, that is, 
internalising the external market incrementally, and how it impacts on the decision 
between franchising and management contracts produced quite a clear trend. The theory 
suggests that firms internationalise from low resource commitment to high resource 
commitment; however, when choosing between franchising and management contracts in 
the context of the hotel industry, the participants unanimously noted it would be the exact 
opposite. Hotel organisations always enter markets through management contracts first 
and then follow this up by franchising, that is, moving from high control to low control, as 
exemplified by Respondents (1), (2) and (5). 
“I think you would only franchise once you have already established your own 
procedure and controls so I think it’s much more likely that it would be reverse of 
that. Let’s understand what our hotels are about, now we can actually record that 
and set up manuals and procedures and then we can transfer that responsibility to 
a third party. I don’t see it going the other way.” (Respondent 1) 
“When [hotel organisations internationalise] they go in with their own people first 
and then they franchise thereafter.” (Respondent 2) 
“What tends to happen in practice is if a brand has the ambition to franchise, they 
will establish first two or three properties out of their own resources so they will 
become owner–operators first.” (Respondent 5) 
How the motivation of hotel organisations to internalise imperfect markets impacts on the 
decision between franchising and management contracts was explored and it was found 
that the recent trend (over the past century) is that hotel organisations generally prefer 
lower control modes when at all possible, contradicting the rationale of this theory that 
the higher the ownership, and consequent control, the better. This trend is explained best 
by Respondents (1) and (4). 
“It really came about at the beginning of this century when hotel brands and 
operating companies were under heavy city pressure for the return on capital 
employed and actually owning the assets is very capital intensive. It also clearly 
limits their ability to expand a brand if they have to use equity to do so.” 
(Respondent 1) 
“I think the way that the industry has moved in recent years is to go asset light 
instead. To sell off the real estate to generate funds that they can then expand their 
portfolio through investing in what they retain or in a lot of cases where hotel 
companies have moved away from ownership all together, it’s to provide 
shareholder dividends. Where you can put money back into the pockets of the 
shareholders.”(Respondent 4) 
3.4.5 Dunning’s Eclectic Paradigm (OLI Theory) 
As Dunning’s OLI paradigm is ‘eclectic’, drawing from several research streams, as 
described in the literature review above, not only have the key market, management 
assumptions and characteristics already been probed through the internalisation theory 
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and agency theory questions but also ownership advantages and internalisation 
advantages were probed with the TCE questions and the internalisation theory questions 
respectively. Therefore, only the concept of location advantage was explored as 
determinants for choosing between franchising and management contracts to complete 
the OLI exploration. As with most of the feedback received on the theories and constructs 
examined, there were mixed results in regard to location advantages. It was suggested by 
Respondents (4) and (6) that location advantages matter and prompt the use of 
management contracts. 
“In terms of location advantages, let’s look at China. Everybody expects massive 
market growth, they expect the demographics to produce a customer segment 
which just grows and grows and grows and the proof in the pudding is that 
everyone has gone from management agreements.” (Respondent 4) 
“If you are going into a country where there is a perception that this country’s 
economy is going to grow and you want to be part of that growth with your brand 
then you may feel in the short term that going in to manage your own property is 
perhaps a more certain way of developing the business how you want to develop 
it. By franchising you are very reliant on engaging with hoteliers who already have 
their own way of doing things.” (Respondent 6) 
In addition, Respondent (5) indicated that in certain markets, there need to be location 
advantages in the form of some governmental support. 
“In term of the local aspect. If you take place like China, unless you team up with a 
local business you’re not going to do it. So it tends to be some kind of joint venture 
franchise that occurs, in India that was the only way historically that a brand could 
get into a country.” (Respondent 5) 
However, it was suggested by Respondents (1) and (3) that location advantages would be 
of little concern in the decision and that it is dictated instead by brand concerns. 
“I am not sure that location does. No I don’t think location does. As I mentioned 
earlier you are not going to franchise a brand you usually manage due to market 
differences. No I don’t think location is relevant.” (Respondent 1) 
“It depends on the organisational structure of the company, are they operations or 
brand lead, locational factors do not supersede that.” (Respondent 3) 
3.4.6 Institutional Theory 
The effect of the institutional environment proved to be quite influential in the decision 
between franchising and management contracts, highlighting the appropriateness of NIE 
in general as a valid theoretical grounding through which to explore non-equity entry 
mode choices of hotel organisations. Initially, the formal institutions were explored, and 
while all the participants noted that the institutional environment was a factor in the 
decision, their opinions differed as to the effect. Respondents (1) and (2) noted that for 
franchising to be considered, there must be a well-established and enforced legal system. 
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“In a franchise you need to be confident … that there’s a strong rule of law to 
protect your franchise … you need to do it in the right markets.” (Respondent 1) 
“If you feel that there is not sufficient legal precedent and process to safeguard 
your franchise you won’t do a franchise.” (Respondent 2) 
In addition, it was suggested by Respondent (8) that the political situation is also a 
consideration. 
“The stability of the government is also important, I wouldn’t franchise in a market 
where there was significant political instability.” (Respondent 8) 
Respondent (3) further indicated that the stability or instability of the formal institutions 
is a major determinant for choosing management contracts.  
“That has got to be a major concern for people. If they say ‘look franchise 
agreements in … pick a country, can be terminated by the franchisee with six 
months’ notice’. That’s the law. Then you think twice about putting the 
infrastructure in place to support that. There are places where that is a concern.” 
(Respondent 3) 
Respondent (8) indicated the opposite, stating that franchising would be preferred as the 
local partner is more easily able to navigate the local institutional environment. 
“Where I would need a local insider for is how to procure things how move things 
through the country how to make sure I am law abiding how to take advantage of 
government incentives, tariffs all those kinds of aspects. That’s where the local 
partner is absolutely key.” (Respondent 8) 
However, even in a well-established and enforceable legal framework, a hotel organisation 
may still prefer management contracts. Respondents (4) and (6) highlighted that, owing to 
the difficulty of being regulated as a franchisor in certain markets, management contracts 
may be preferred. 
“In some European jurisdictions, being a regulated franchisor has some obligations 
which you find a pain in the backside. You might need to translate all of your 
documents into the local language, get it tested and only then you get regulated.” 
(Respondent 4) 
“In the EU, some countries have been overzealous in how they implemented their 
local law, in terms of regulation, a good example is Belgium.” (6) 
The informal institutions were also found to be of importance, but again it was 
highlighted, by Respondents (2), (3) and (4), that these informal institutions have a mixed 
effect on the decision between franchising and management contracts. Respondents 
indicated that the less familiar hotel organisations are with the local institutional 
environment, the more likely they are to retain control. 
“Whether it’s been Accor in Africa, they came in they did it themselves, put boots 
on the ground, InterContinental has done the same, Radisson is doing the same, 
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Starwood is doing the same, Hilton is doing the same so in many respects because 
the way of doing business in Africa is so different from the western world [and 
therefore] organisations prefer [more] control.” (Respondent 2) 
“Say in terms ‘Guanxi’, I might have to shout my local partner and his mates a huge 
Chinese New Year’s dinner that would last three weeks and that would be the 
appropriate thing to do from their perspective, but from our perspective, that 
would just be bad business. Where there are institutional differences like that, 
there’s all the more reason to have tighter control on the management.” 
(Respondent 3) 
“If you look at the history of our company, we have gone into markets where there 
would just be night and day differences between the formal and informal 
parameters that prevail vis-à-vis the United States, we have gone in and owned 
and have owned very successfully and by owning so far you can, has really 
controlled the destiny of those hotels and have established them as the market 
leader and being the best hotels in town and our learning and experience over 40 
years of doing that would be that’s a good way to protect your brand.” 
(Respondent 4) 
Conversely, it was also explained by Respondents (5) and (6) that to succeed in an 
institutional market that is unknown, collaborating through a franchise is vital in order to 
succeed in navigating the informal institutions. 
“I think it could be central consideration, one example we could cite in Europe is 
the brands moving into Russia. Now Russia post-Soviet is a very difficult place to 
work. They have their own way of doing business. There is supposedly the Russian 
mafia, which tends to start with Mr Putin but don’t quote me on that one!” 
(Respondent 5) 
“In China, because of the nature of the country being so diverse, the way that 
things work in northern China are very different to way that thing work down 
south China and Hong Kong, Shanghai for example has its own set of rules, its own 
business practices and the only way to do business in China is to team up with a 
Chinese company. That’s the sensible way of doing it.” (Respondent 6) 
3.4.7 Resource-Based View 
The importance of efficient resource transfer to the host country was proposed by almost 
all of the respondents as being a motivation for hotel use management contracts. 
Respondents (1) and (3) indicated that owing to the nature of some services, hotel 
organisations might be concerned at how difficult it would be for the local partner to 
replicate the service in the host country. 
“You may not trust the ability of the local management to deliver a service level 
consistent with your brand standards or where the cost of doing so is particularly 
high in resource and cost terms, then you would not go the franchise route.” 
(Respondent 1) 
“By and large companies would be very reluctant to hand over the management of 
a luxury brand that they own to a third party so the reason why you won’t find too 
many Sofitel franchises is because Accor will say ‘there is just a certain way that 
Sofitel is run. The luxury touch that keeps the Sofitel guests coming back is 
something we only trust ourselves to do’.” (Respondent 3) 
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It was worded differently by Respondent (4), who simply stated: 
“In terms of franchising you would only do a franchise with people you know are 
capable of running it and in the case of [respondent’s organisation] there isn’t 
many. So that is one of the reasons why we have so few franchise agreements, we 
just don’t trust enough people to get on and do it like we do!” (4) 
3.4.7.1 Imperfect Imitability 
The imitability of the firm’s capabilities was explored and a clear trend was found that 
imperfect imitability prompted the use of management contracts, as highlighted by 
Respondent (8), who stated that a service can be very difficult to deliver correctly. 
“The design and the look of the hotel can be easily duplicated, the technology is 
easily duplicated, but that tacit knowledge and the expertise of the people who 
know your culture and establish that culture and the brand … you can lose those 
people of course, but it is in these cases that franchise would not allow this to be 
effectively duplicated.” (Respondent 8) 
In addition, Respondents (1) and (3) stated that if you have a specialised service, you need 
to be confident in your local partner’s ability to absorb and replicate it. 
“You may not trust the ability of the local management to imitate your brand or to 
deliver a service that is consistent with your brand standards or where the cost of 
controlling them and doing so is particularly high in resource and cost terms, then 
you would not go the franchise route.” (Respondent 1) 
“If you have a franchisee that cannot replicate your service then you wouldn’t want 
to deal with them, it’s your brand reputation, you can’t risk that.” (Respondent 3) 
Overall, the majority of the respondents agreed that it is the type of service you are 
offering that determines the choice, clearly supporting the rationale of imperfect 
imitability as explained by Respondents (4), (6) and (7). 
“When you have cookie cutter brand like a motel you have certain basic amenities 
and functions available to the guest … it’s much easier to replicate, it’s much easier 
to have manual that says ‘provided you do A,B,C and D, you’re good’. So it is far 
easier to franchise something that has fewer touch points and the other big 
element is the human element. Service differentiates the luxury experience 
predominantly and that comes from the human element, the number of people and 
the quality of people required to provide that service experience.” (Respondent 4) 
“If it’s a limited service hotel operation then the actual effect of the management is 
reduced and therefore providing a franchise is sufficient to maintain ethos. In 
other more upscale brands the actual service delivery is variable and a key 
component and therefore the management agreement is more appropriate.” 
(Respondent 6) 
“The more sophisticated the business process is, the more difficult it is to transfer 
it across borders or across business sites. So, as you get into more successful and 
complex organisations, hotels that really have assets that they build into such a 
complex web of organisational routines, secrets and ways of managing people and 
delivering the service, the more difficult it is to transfer. But the second part of it is, 
it’s not just the level of tacitness of knowledge or the imperfect imitability. Then 
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you’re mentioning here the second side, the absorptive capacity of the recipient.” 
(Respondent 7) 
3.4.8 Unexpected Findings 
The interviews were semi-structured in nature to allow participants to express their 
points of view on the theories that were examined and to allow them to go off into 
different tangents, as they desired. Because of this, the interviewees often discussed other 
factors that determine the choice between franchising and management contracts that 
were not explored in the direct questions asked. There were cases where some or several 
respondents made similar points. Firstly, the respondents indicated that the availability of 
capable managerial staff in the host country would be a critical determinant. Secondly, the 
level of investment into the resources and capabilities needs to be considered. Finally, the 
size of the organisation is important as it was proposed by several that firm size is critical 
for franchising to be possible. Although these points have been raised in previous 
literature, it was unexpected how important these particular factors were in the specific 
context of choosing between franchising and management contracts, according to the 
executives interviewed. 
3.4.8.1 Availability of Capable Management 
The majority of the participants made similar points about the availability of capable 
management staff in the host country. It was highlighted by Respondents (1), (2) and (8) 
that sometimes there is no capable management in a certain location as such and the 
organisations are forced to use management contracts.  
“In certain markets where there is maybe no expertise, there isn’t personnel or it’s 
an underdeveloped market, they would prefer to put a management contract.” 
(Respondent 1) 
“For example it is very difficult to enter a market like Africa under a franchise 
model to start with because you need to be convinced that there are individuals 
and companies in that country that can actually run a hotel to your accepted brand 
standards. So while generally using franchising everywhere else in the world they 
would use a management contract in the beginning [in Africa].” (Respondent 2) 
“So for example in China … I don’t know if anyone there would be the sort of pool 
of unbranded operators who could actually perform the task the same as the 
brand, so therefore you’re almost compelled both from an owner perspective but 
also from a brands perspective to go the management agreement route.” 
(Respondent 8) 
Moreover, respondents indicated that hotel organisations generally only deal with 
experienced local management, as explained by Respondent (3).  
“To get a foothold in a new territory we would engage with someone who already 
has 20–25 of their own hotels that they own and manage but without a brand and 
we could give them the licence to grow our brand.” (Respondent 3) 
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Similar lines of reasoning were voiced by Respondent (4). 
“Once you have got trusted operators you stick with them.” (Respondent 4) 
It was highlighted by Respondent (6) that in cases where there is available capable 
management, hotel organisations are likely to opt for franchising.  
“The availability of a trusted third party operator, knowledge of a certain market. 
You might find for example that you know the Berlin market intimately. You know 
the operator [the third party manager] that will be running that hotel and you feel 
confident that you know how it’s going to develop then you might just go with a 
franchise.” (Respondent 6) 
3.4.8.2 Size of the Organisation 
It was highlighted by several respondents that owing to the structure and size of 
organisations either franchising or management contracts would be preferred. Larger 
organisations are more likely to have the ability to franchise, whereas smaller hotel 
companies are less likely to, as explained by Respondents (2) and (4). 
“If I am in a position where I was able to do 50 easy hotels across the high growth 
destinations in Africa for example, OK, then I would be inclined to choose 
franchising but our organisation is not that large.” (Respondent 2) 
“It depends … franchising would become more profitable if you or your 
organisation has the capacity to open 20–30 properties in one swoop but that 
takes a certain firm size.” (Respondent 4) 
3.4.8.3 Investment Considerations 
It was suggested by some of the respondents that a determinant for choosing between 
franchising and management contracts is the amount of investment that has been made 
into their brand standards and management practices, as highlighted by Respondents (1) 
and (8). 
“You wouldn’t want to just share the information on your processes … you have 
spent money [developing this] and you don’t want the [local] guy gaining all the 
benefits from that investment.” (Respondent 1) 
“Of course you have to consider how much money you have spent establishing 
your brand. You wouldn’t want to risk that investment by the actions of [your local 
partner].” (Respondent 8) 
This can be explained from a TCE perspective, specifically through asset specificity 
reasoning. If there has been a substantial investment made into an asset such as a brand 
and its associated service standards, dissemination and possible opportunistic behaviour 
on the part of the local agent would be a major concern. Conversely, if the asset is not as 
specific and has already been franchised then this would be classed as ‘sunk costs’ and 
therefore investment would be a lesser factor. 
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3.4.8.4 NIE Reasoning Flaws 
Some respondents indicated that the overall reasoning behind the theories explored was 
not all encompassing. In other words, it was suggested that NIE does not capture a 
complete picture of the factors affecting entry mode choice in the hotel sector. The points 
suggested by some respondents that are not considered from the NIE perspective are 
presented below. 
Hotel Organisations Have Preferences 
As indicated by Respondent (5), the theories suggest that hotel organisations are 
constantly making this decision, when in fact some hotel organisations generally favour 
one mode over the others. 
“I think the decision comes before that [NIE reasoning]. You ask yourself, Do I 
want to run the hotel myself or do I want someone to run it for me and then once 
that decision has been taken then it’s who should I get to team up with me as a 
franchise or who should I approach as a manager.” (Respondent 5) 
Similar lines of reasoning were put forward by Respondents (3) and (6), that firms will 
likely be set up to enjoy the advantages of either franchising or management contracts but 
not both. 
“Fundamentally it comes down to if you are a brand or an operations lead 
organisation.” (Respondent 3) 
“Choice Hotels, you would take the franchise, much more difficult to see you taking 
them as a management company cos they are just not set up in that way.” 
(Respondent 6) 
The Owner Has the Bargaining Power 
Moreover, it was suggested by Respondent (5) that the theories falsely assume that it is 
the hotel organisation that can make this decision, when it is in fact the owner of the hotel 
who has the bargaining power. 
“For hotel chains where some hotels are franchised and others are managed, the 
decision is not taken by the hotel chain the decision is made by the investor 
because they are the one with the money.” (Respondent 5) 
This point was echoed by Respondents (7) and (8).  
“I think it’s in the business model of the investor, there are some investors who 
would never operate under a franchise.” (7) 
“The [hotel organisation] can say ‘no I will not franchise this with you because you 
don’t have the experience to maintain our brand’ but that person if he is set on 
being a franchisor is not just going to say ‘oh ok I’ll just have a management 
agreement instead’ … They will still want franchise and if the hotel organisation 
doesn’t like it the owner will simply choose another brand.” (8) 
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Hotel Organisations Are Ad Hoc in Their Decision Making 
It was also suggested by the respondents that hotel organisations are more ad hoc in their 
decision making, rather than strategic. They simply figure out what works best on a case-
by-case basis, as suggested by Respondent (5). 
“I take a more cynical view that a brand will look at a market and then will work 
out what it thinks is the best way to get into that market, ‘how do I get flags in this 
particular jurisdiction. On map of the world there are some white pins where I am 
not present and now how do I get there’ and the rest follows after that … I think it 
is far more ad hoc in my view.” (Respondent 5) 
Respondents (4) and (8) indicated similar lines of reasoning. 
“I think the theories are valid. Although it doesn’t always happen in practice, that 
doesn’t mean that the theories are wrong it’s just that we have to be dynamic and 
adaptable if we want to be competitive.” (Respondent 4) 
“It’s what you can get. Particularly in today’s market which is really very difficult 
economic market throughout the world, you know the development teams of all 
the major brands are struggling to meet targets and if you can’t get a management 
contract, choose get a franchise.” (8) 
Star Level 
Finally, it was suggested by several of the respondents that the theories are overly 
complicated when it is largely a matter of the star level of the chain. In other words, if it is 
a luxury brand, the organisation will manage the hotel themselves and if it is a budget 
brand then the hotel organisation would franchise, as explained by Respondents (1), (4) 
and (7).  
“Well, certainly a lot of it will be down to which brands they are working with if it’s 
budget sector it’s more likely to be franchised. If it’s top end … and I guess 
InterContinental is a good example of that, bottom end lower budget hotels, a lot 
more franchises. At the top end with InterContinental itself almost no franchises.” 
(Respondent 1) 
“You will see franchising done at the very top level, but it is extremely rare.” 
(Respondent 4) 
“That’s one of the prime reasons it tends to be the upscale and luxury brands 
where they won’t franchise unless there are special circumstances. It tends to be 
the economy and limited service brands that are more prepared to franchise and it 
is just to create consistency.” (Respondent 7) 
3.5 Discussion 
This study highlighted that while none of the theories were inclusive enough to be 
applicable in their entirety, all of the theories have some ability in terms of explaining the 
decision between franchising and management contracts but to differing degrees. The 
findings, as grouped by the theories the research questions were testing, will now be 
summarised and linked to the literature. 
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TCE was found to be an appropriate theoretical lens through which to examine the 
motives of hotel organisations choosing between franchising and management contracts. 
In particular, the assumptions of opportunism and bounded rationality were clearly 
explained by the respondents as prompting the choice of management contracts, 
confirming these underlying assumptions of TCE as central considerations (Dimou, 2003; 
Lamminmaki, 2005). Moreover, the motive to protect and control specific assets was 
suggested by the majority of the respondents as prompting the use of management 
contracts, as suggested by Lamminmaki (2005). In terms of uncertainty and frequency, 
there were mixed results found, with the respondents indicating that frequency does 
favour franchising but others claiming it was not a central consideration and that 
environmental uncertainty can lead to both franchising and management contracts. This is 
not surprising considering, for example, that a point of contention in the literature is the 
effect of host country uncertainty as a determinant of entry mode choice. One stream of 
research posits that when environmental uncertainty is high, firms will choose a less 
resource-intensive mode to be more flexible and allow the firm to exit more easily in case 
the venture fails (Erramilli & Rao, 1993; Fladmoe-Lindquist & Jacque, 1995; W. C. Kim & 
Hwang, 1992; Mutinelli & Piscitello, 1998). Conversely, other studies have suggested that 
when environmental uncertainty is high, stronger control is needed in the form of high 
resource entry modes to manage the effects of this uncertainty (Altinay, 2007; Dev et al., 
2002; Erramilli et al., 2002; Madhok, 1998).  
Agency theory was explored by examining the characteristics that differentiate it from 
TCE, that is, the differing motives of the agent and principal and the ease or difficulty of 
monitoring them. It was highlighted that while the differing goals of the agent and 
principal can lead to problems, it is quite easy to monitor the performance of agents 
through several mechanisms such as sending inspectors, contradicting the findings of 
Dimou (2003). In terms of risk sharing, some respondents indicated that in environments 
that are uncertain hotel organisations tend to sometimes share the risk of entry with the 
local partner through franchising, but only in situations where the organisation has 
trusted partners. This finding is consistent with Cho (2005), Erramili et al. (2002) and Dev 
et al. (2002).  
Internalisation theory was explored, and while there was support found for the underlying 
view of the firm, the market assumption and the management concerns, which are the 
same as TCE, the characteristics that differentiate internalisation theory from TCE were 
not shown to be applicable in this research context. Firstly, support was not found for the 
rationale that firms will always prefer internalisation, as suggested strongly in the 
literature by (Brown et al., 2003; Contractor & Kundu, 1998a; Cunill & Forteza, 2010; Dev 
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et al., 2002; Erramilli et al., 2002; Sanchez-Peinado & Pla-Barber, 2006a, 2006b; Sanchez-
Peinado et al., 2007), who highlight that control can be obtained through non-equity 
modes through de facto control. Secondly, it was suggested unanimously by the 
respondents that the rationale of this theory to gradually internalise their operations was 
not applicable to hotel organisations because they will always manage first and then 
gradually pass on the control later (i.e. do the opposite). This is highlighted clearly in 
Section 2.2, which demonstrates the preference firms have for external modes. 
For OLI founded in TCE, that is, with the same market assumptions and management 
concerns, there was some support found for the theory, particularly for the ownership 
advantage component, which as highlighted throughout the interviews is a vital 
consideration. However, the location advantage variable produced mixed results and was 
not put forward as critical by the respondents, supporting the findings of Villar et al. 
(2012). Moreover, the internalisation advantage factor, as highlighted above, is also not 
appropriate.  
Institutional theory was explored and it was highlighted that institutions, both formal and 
informal, are considered by hotel chains. However, as with most of the theories, there 
were discrepancies in the responses received. The respondents highlighted that strong 
formal institutional regulations are needed for franchising to be considered, but at the 
same time, such strong regulation can become difficult to navigate and therefore may 
prompt hotel organisations to use management contracts. As with environmental 
uncertainty, this split option can also be observed in the literature, with some scholars 
arguing that highly regulated formal institutions lead to trust and a preference for external 
modes (Marinova et al., 2012), while others argue the opposite – that it leads to a 
preference for internalised modes to ensure that the ‘rules of the game’ are followed 
carefully to avoid consequences related to breaking these rules, such as legal 
consequences (Kostova et al., 2008). 
Finally, the RBV was examined, and it was found that resources and capabilities are 
essentially what the brand is selling and therefore the potential of inefficient transfers can 
harm the brand, supporting the findings of Barney (1991), Erramilli et al. (2002) and Dev 
et al. (2002). It was highlighted that services are not easily transferred and that the local 
partners need to be capable to replicate the service as suggested by Madhok (1998). 
Finally, imperfect imitability was probed, and as put forward in the literature, the 
imitability or inimitability of a hotel organisation’s services will dictate the entry mode 
choice, with imperfect imitability prompting the use of management contracts in the 
context of this study, strongly supporting the findings of Erramilli et al. (2002) and Dev et 
al. (2002). 
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3.6 Conclusion 
This study highlighted that while none of the theories were inclusive enough to be 
applicable in their entirety, all of the theories have some ability in terms of explaining the 
decision between franchising and management contracts, but to differing degrees. The 
findings, as grouped by research question, will now be summarised and linked to the 
literature. 
The theories that were found in this study to be the most appropriate in the context of 
choosing between franchising and management contracts in the hotel sector were TCE and 
the RBV, in particular, asset specificity and imperfect imitability. This is for several 
reasons. First and foremost, this is because of the findings of Study 1, that is, the expert 
insights of the respondents. The respondents mostly agreed that the concerns raised by 
these theories are critical considerations in the choice between franchising and 
management contracts. Specifically, this concerns the assumptions of opportunism and 
bounded rationality, the motive for cost minimisation, profit maximisation, the concerns 
for protection and control over assets and resources and their efficient transfer to capable 
individuals in the local market. Moreover, these theories were found to be more 
appropriate in the context of non-equity entry mode research, specifically in examining 
the determining factors for choosing between franchising management contracts, than the 
other theories examined.  
Firstly, agency theory was found to be quite valid in terms of the managerial concerns 
(moral hazard and agency cost); however, this is already a tenant of TCE, that is, 
opportunism. The focus agency theory has on the differing goals of the principal and the 
agent and how to monitor performance was not found to be particularly critical as 
performance evaluation can be done quite easily, according to the respondents. Moreover, 
the concerns of risk sharing, while partly supported, were only proposed in situations 
where organisations have trusted partners with whom they have done business 
successfully in the past.  
In terms of internalisation theory and OLI, these theories would only add explanatory 
power if the characteristics that differentiate them from TCE brought some insights to this 
research. However, this is not the case and that is likely due to the assumption these 
theories have that FDI is the most efficient mode and as such always the goal of MNCs.  
Finally, institutional theory, although clearly a consideration, will also not be explored 
further because, firstly, the responses indicated mixed options on the effect the 
institutions have. Moreover, TCE and the RBV, as part of NIE, view the firm as operating 
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with and within institutions, and therefore, institutional considerations are still explored 
within these theories.  
For these reasons, TCE and the RBV are the theoretical foundation for the quantitative 
study to follow. Besides the use of TCE and the RBV, the insights of the respondents 
brought about some unexpected findings: considerations around the availability of 
capable local partners, the size of the firm and the level of investment into strategic assets. 
Moreover, there were some flaws suggested in the underlying assumptions of the theories, 
such as the hotel organisation having the bargaining power when in fact it is generally the 
investor who holds it, and that organisations generally do not make these ‘decisions’ as 
they are just set up to perform either franchising or management contracts and because 
they can be ad hoc and just see what works best on a case-by-case basis. These points are 
also explored in the following quantitative round, Study 2. 
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CHAPTER 4 STUDY 2 
Non-Equity Entry Mode Choice in the Hotel Sector: An 
Examination Based on Transaction Cost Economics and 
the Resource-Based View 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter outlines Study 2, a quantitative examination, based on TCE and the RBV, on 
the factors that affect the decision between franchising and management contracts in the 
international expansion of large hotel organisations. The chapter is split into three 
sections: Initially, the methods used in this study are explained, then the findings are 
outlined, and finally, the study is concluded. 
4.2 Literature Review 
This section serves as the literature review for Study 2. The theories that were found in 
Study 1 to be the most appropriate in the particular case of deciding between 
management contracts and franchising in the hotel industry are TCE and the RBV, as 
described in the previous chapter. In particular, asset specificity and imperfect imitability 
were explored because these were suggested by the respondents of Study 1 to be the most 
appropriate for choosing between franchising and management contracts in the hotel 
sector. Therefore, as the hypotheses are based on asset specificity and imperfect 
imitability as well as the broader TCE and RBV perspectives respectively, the rationales of 
TCE and asset specificity as well as those of the RBV and imperfect imitability will be 
extensively reviewed before the hypotheses are presented. Initially, a further review of 
asset specificity and imperfect imitability is provided, followed by an exploration of the 
compatibility of TCE and RBV. The modal choice assumptions of TCE and the RBV as well 
as those of asset specificity and imperfect imitability are then reviewed. The other factors 
that emerged from Study 1, which were split into country-specific factors and firm-specific 
factors, are then examined through the TCE–RBV lens. Finally, the hypotheses are 
developed and linked to the direct source literature. 
4.2.1 Asset Specificity and Imperfect Imitability – A Closer Look 
Asset specificity and imperfect imitability, as explained earlier, are central theoretical 
constructs in this thesis. As such, the dimensions of asset specificity and the antecedents of 
imperfect imitability will be briefly reviewed here.  
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4.2.1.1 The Dimensions of Asset Specificity 
Asset specificity, as outlined by Williamson (1985), includes six dimensions: human asset 
specificity, physical asset specificity, site specificity, dedicated assets specificity, brand 
capital and temporal specificity. A plethora of publications have focused primarily on asset 
specificity, using one or a combination of these dimensions, as their theoretical foundation 
(De Vita, Tekaya, & Wang, 2011). However, according to Lamminmaki (2005) and De Vita 
et al. (2011), in different industries, different levels of value are placed on these various 
types of asset specificity. In terms of the hospitality industry, human specificity, site 
specificity and brand specificity were put forward as most important (Lamminmaki, 
2005). Although in most publications these dimensions are not explicitly stated, it is 
instead understood in the context of the publication. In an aim to be clear and 
comprehensive in this review, the different dimensions of asset specificity will now be 
briefly reviewed. 
(i) Human Asset Specificity 
Human asset specificity refers to the unique knowledge or skills that a firm has in its 
employees. This knowledge, which is gained throughout the career of the employee, is 
therefore highly specialised and has limited relevance in any other application. 
Furthermore, the amount of time it takes to amass this type of knowledge and its tacit 
nature render it difficult to transfer (S. Klein, Frazier, & Roth, 1990; Lamminmaki, 2005). 
Human asset specificity was found to be the most important of the dimensions and the 
most widely applied in previous publications (Lohita, Brooks, & Krapfel, 1994). 
(ii) Physical Asset Specificity 
Physical asset specificity refers to the physical assets such as real estate or other high-
value physical assets for which significant investments have been made, or those that are 
specific to the type of business or transaction (De Vita et al., 2011; S. Klein et al., 1990; 
Lohita et al., 1994; Murray & Kotabe, 1999). 
(iii) Site Specificity 
Site specificity refers to the investments made to be located close to specific buyers or 
sellers in order to facilitate a trade relationship. The high relocation costs are an 
important consideration in this dimension. Therefore, it is often a consideration of long-
term strategic alliances (Lamminmaki, 2005; Lohita et al., 1994; Williamson, 1983). 
(iv) Dedicated Asset Specificity 
Dedicated asset specificity refers to assets that have a general purpose as opposed to a 
specialised or specific one. These assets are ones that, although more widely applicable, 
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have been acquired for a specific transactional agreement, which is usually long term in 
nature (Lamminmaki, 2005; Lohita et al., 1994; Williamson, 1983). 
(v) Brand Capital Specificity 
Brand capital refers to the reputation of a firm and the investments that have been made 
to establish that reputation. By giving control of actions under this brand to an unreliable 
contracted agent, it could damage the brand capital and may therefore have an impact on 
the reputation of the entire business (Gatignon & Anderson, 1988; Lamminmaki, 2005; 
Lohita et al., 1994). 
(vi) Temporal Specificity 
Temporal specificity refers to the investments in which timing or coordination is crucial 
(Lamminmaki, 2005; Lohita et al., 1994). The asset will be characterised as time specific, if 
its value is impacted negatively by not being done at a certain time. 
4.2.1.2 The Ascendants of Imperfect Imitability 
Imperfect imitability is explained by Barney (1991) as being the outcome of three factors: 
(1) unique historical conditions, (2) casual ambiguity and (3) social complexity. According 
to Barney (1991), imperfect imitability is achieved in a resource, through either one or a 
combination of these three factors. As with the dimensions of asset specificity, these 
ascendants of imperfect imitability are not often discussed in the literature, and therefore, 
in an aim to provide a complete review of the theory, these three factors will now be 
explored. 
(i) Unique Historical Conditions 
Unique historical conditions will likely lead to imperfect imitability because the 
beginnings and backgrounds of most firms are varied, having happened in the context of 
different industries, at different times and in different places. Unique historical conditions 
may also lead to first mover advantages; otherwise, the competitive advantage of 
imperfect imitability could be a result of resources that have been either developed or 
acquired in the past (Barney, 1991). 
(ii) Casual Ambiguity 
Casual ambiguity is also a source of imperfect imitability as it would be difficult for 
competing firms to imitate the resources of a firm if it is casually ambiguous what the 
relationship between the resource and the competitive advantage actually is. 
Furthermore, the resources may be taken for granted or it may be the case that there are 
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many small resources that on their own may be of little significance but if put together 
create or add to the competitive advantage of a firm (Barney, 1991). 
(iii) Social Complexity 
Finally, social complexity will likely lead to imperfect imitability when the resources of a 
firm are integrated into the social network of managers or the firm culture, or when an 
easy way cannot be found to quantify the resource. Social complexity may also be the 
result of the perception held of the firm by its suppliers and customers. The imitation of 
such a tacit resource is constrained and therefore provides for a sustained competitive 
advantage (Barney, 1991). 
4.2.2 The Compatibility of TCE and the RBV 
TCE and the RBV were found in Study 1 to be the most appropriate and effective theories 
through which to examine the non-equity entry mode decisions of hotel organisations, and 
as such, a further review of these theories and their compatibility is deemed appropriate. 
It is suggested in the literature that TCE and the RBV are similar enough to be evaluated in 
unison but different enough to provide deeper insights than if evaluated independently. 
Brouthers and Hennart (2007) suggest that scholars should consider combining the RBV 
and TCE as well as combinations of other theories, to evaluate entry mode decisions more 
comprehensively. Brown et al. (2003) used TCE and the RBV in unison as the theoretical 
foundation of their research. Arnold (2000) used TCE and the concept of core 
competencies, under the RBV, to examine the relationship between firms and their 
suppliers. Using the assumptions of opportunism and bounded rationality, which 
characterise asset specificity, Madhok (1996, 1997, 1998) investigated the RBV and how 
these theories could work in unison. Madhok (1996) stated that the TCE theory proposed 
by Williamson (1985) is not complete enough to explain the determinants of modal 
decisions or governance structure and that the theory should be combined with the RBV 
to give it more depth. Madhok (1997) pointed out that, although these theories evaluate 
entry mode decisions from different perspectives and although both perspectives are 
valid, perhaps the efficiency-related determinants focused on by the RBV may be more 
critical in determining entry mode decisions. This is a finding that was backed up by 
Conner and Prahalad (1996) and Teece et al. (2008). Madhok (1998) again examined TCE 
and the RBV and reiterated that efficiency-related concerns will be more critical to the 
entry mode decision. Moreover, Kogut and Zander (1993) suggested that when combined 
with TCE, the RBV broadens the focus on transactions by also incorporating the value of 
efficient resource transfers. Furthermore, although not mentioning the theories RBV and 
TCE explicitly, Bouquet et al. (2004) used the concepts of opportunism and the efficient 
transfer of idiosyncratic services to theorise over the transfer of firm-specific assets. 
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Studies that have focused on the non-equity entry mode decisions of hotel organisations 
have used both TCE and the RBV as their theoretical foundations (Cho, 2005; Dev et al., 
2002; Erramilli et al., 2002). However, the authors of these studies used TCE and the RBV 
independently and did not consider these theories together. Espino-Rodriguez et al. 
(2008) combined TCE and the RBV to examine hotel outsourcing decisions; however, 
these authors made asset specificity the central determinant and did not focus on 
imperfect imitability. Furthermore, Espino-Rodriguez et al. (2008) combined TCE with the 
RBV and came to the conclusion that high asset specificity, if examined through the RBV 
lens, will lead firms to internalise as opposed to outsourcing in the hotel sector. These 
authors state that outsourcing something characterised as having high asset specificity 
will likely damage the performance of the firm and impact on its competitive advantage. 
Therefore, outsourcing should happen only when the asset being transferred is not 
specific. 
In a more recent publication, Huang, Han, Roche and Cassidy (2011) aimed to create an 
integrative conceptual framework combining TCE, OLI and institutional theory. Even more 
recently, Villar et al. (2012) used a combination of TCE and the OCP as the theoretical lens 
through which they examined the hospitality industry. According to these scholars, TCE 
and the RBV have emerged as the leading theories to examine entry mode decisions. 
Furthermore, Villar et al. (2012) states that these two theories both evaluate the same 
thing, that is, the transfer of assets/resources across country borders. TCE under the 
assumption of opportunism and bounded rationality identifies the mode with the lowest 
transaction cost and the RBV, focused on ‘embeddedness’, identifies the mode through 
weighing up cost against efficiency. Villar et al. (2012) went on to state that the two 
theories in unison broaden the focus of the research, and although both theories are 
different, they are compatible and may lead to similar managerial implications. 
4.2.3 Comparing Asset Specificity and Imperfect Imitability Modal Choice 
Assumptions 
After an extensive examination of the literature on entry modes, asset specificity and 
imperfect imitability were found to be very effective in explaining the non-equity entry 
mode decision in the hospitality sector. From the RBV, if knowledge is intangible or tacit, 
or highly interconnected and therefore difficult to transfer, an internalised mode would be 
chosen (Barney, 1991; Brown et al., 2003; Lam, 1997; Madhok, 1997). From the TCE 
perspective, it is exactly in these cases that an asset will also be characterised as highly 
specific to the transaction. Opportunism from the economic agent in such cases would 
likely erode the competitive advantage created through the asset also prompting an 
internal mode (Cho, 2005; Erramilli & Rao, 1993; Villar et al., 2012). Although both 
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theories view the entry mode decision from different perspectives and have different 
rationales, they are proposed in this study as having a very close relationship. Asset 
specificity focuses on the control and protection of the asset or resource, while imperfect 
imitability focuses on the efficiency of transferring the asset or resource. It is expected, 
drawing on these assumptions, that those hotel organisations that generate their 
competitive advantage from assets or resources that are specific and imperfectly imitable 
are more likely to choose management contracts over franchising. Conversely, hotel 
organisations that operate chains classified as having assets or resources that are less 
specific and more imitable will likely choose franchising over management contracts. It 
will be determined, if the resources of a hotel chain such as its brand, industry and 
management knowledge and specialised operational routines are highly interconnected or 
embedded and are therefore imperfectly imitable, whether the specificity of the asset or 
resource also increases. Although these constructs have different perspectives, motives or 
rationales, they complement each other and lead to or prompt the same decision from 
hotel organisations. 
4.2.4 Modal Choice Based on Asset Specificity 
A firm entering a foreign market must choose whether or not to transfer its goods or 
services across firm boundaries. If done, there is a risk of eroding the competitive 
advantage owing to the limited amount of control available to a firm in such modes. 
Conversely, the firm can internalise the action, retaining control, but thereby having to 
commit more financial resources to the venture (De Vita et al., 2011; Williamson, 1985). 
Asset specificity suggests that the pursuit of the lowest possible transaction costs will 
drive the decision of governance structure used in the market entry (Anderson & 
Gatignon, 1986; Hennart, 1989; Williamson, 1985). Transaction costs include the ex-ante 
cost of negotiating contracts and the ex-post costs of monitoring the performance and 
behaviour of partners and other contracted parties or economic agents (Anderson & 
Gatignon, 1986; Hennart, 1989; Williamson, 1985). As these transactions costs decrease, 
the firm will prefer external transfers through the use of non-equity modes (Hill et al., 
1990; Madhok, 1997). If these costs rise past the cost of committing the extra resources of 
an internalised mode, a rational firm is likely to favour an internalised mode (Luo, 2001). 
Opportunism and bounded rationality, as outlined previously in this chapter, also factor 
into asset specificity. In particular, opportunism or the potential of opportunism is 
considered under asset specificity. 
According to Williamson (1985), parties in a transaction generally develop safeguards that 
best protect against opportunism that may arise from asset specificity. These safeguards 
can take the following forms: 
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1) incentive realignment through measures such as severance payment or the 
imposing of penalties for premature termination; 
2) private ordering as opposed to court ordering where contract incompleteness is 
more common and different mechanisms are used to resolve disputes such as 
arbitration; 
3) embeddedness of the transaction in a more complex trading network, which 
incorporates the transaction into a broader network of transactions making it 
difficult for either party to act opportunistically in respect of that transaction. 
Asset specificity has been the predominant explanatory variable used in TCE-focused 
entry mode studies (Brouthers & Hennart, 2007; De Vita et al., 2011), and also named as 
the most important variable of the concept (De Vita et al., 2011; Williamson, 1985). In 
studies focused on the hospitality industry, positive results were found by Contractor and 
Kundu (1998a), who came to the conclusion that there was a link between the 
idiosyncratic asset of training in the hospitality industry and the decision of which entry 
mode to use. According to Altinay (2007), a hotel organisation will choose a low control 
mode if asset specificity is low. If the transaction cost resulting from asset specificity 
increases, however, it will prompt the organisation to choose a higher control mode. 
Furthermore, Cho (2005) found in his case study of the Holiday Inn Seoul that service firm 
modified asset specificity, affected the decision between franchising and equity modes in 
the same manner. These authors have adapted and modified the asset specificity theory 
from its original application, as TCE has been in these and other publications mentioned 
earlier. This modification has been to purposely theorise over a specific type of horizontal 
investment that takes into account the tacit nature of the asset and the ability of 
transferring it to the foreign market via a non-equity mode. There have, moreover, been 
some studies examining the outsourcing decisions of hotel chains through the lens of asset 
specificity (Espino-Rodriguez et al., 2008; Espino-Rodriguez & Padron, 2005; Kruesi & 
Zamborsky, in press; Lamminmaki, 2005). These authors came to similar conclusions, that 
is, asset specificity prompts internalisation and the lack of asset specificity prompts 
outsourcing.  
4.2.4.1 Franchising and Asset Specificity 
In terms of franchising, asset specificity takes the form of sharing an intangible asset, that 
is, the trademark or the brand. The brand name is perhaps the most important intangible 
asset hotel firms have and it is therefore vital to protect it against potential problems 
related to post-contractual opportunistic behaviour. Hotel organisations, like all service 
firms, cannot depend on the legal protection of proprietary technology or processes 
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against close substitutes. Therefore, when international hotel organisations decide to 
expand using franchising, they are doing so with the risk of leakage of proprietary 
knowledge (Hennart, 1988). The franchisee will receive guidance such as training and 
operating manuals that will allow the franchisee to operate the hotel at the level of quality 
of the brand. As a result of this, the operator may behave opportunistically when it comes 
to the contract renewal, for example. The franchisee could ask for more advantageous 
contract terms or even refuse the renewal since he or she now has the required 
knowledge to operate a competing hotel. A strong brand name is a safeguard against 
opportunistic behaviour on the part of the franchisee since the franchisee’s interest is to 
stay with the brand. 
4.2.4.2 Management Contracts and Asset Specificity 
In the case of management contracts, conversely, the daily operations of the firm are 
under the control of the parent company, not the owner of the hotel property. It is 
therefore considered that management contracts can be viewed as an ownership 
substitute through operational control keeping the transfer of knowledge from the home 
country to the host country within the parent firm. While in both franchising and 
management contracts the operational staff must be hired in the host country, the 
management positions are held by the parent company, and therefore, the amount of tacit 
knowledge appropriated by the local staff is less than in the case of franchising (Dimou, 
Chen, & Archer, 2003; Lamminmaki, 2005). 
4.2.5 Modal Choice Based on Imperfect Imitability 
A firm entering a foreign market must choose whether or not to transfer its goods or 
services across firm boundaries. If done, there is a risk of eroding the competitive 
advantage owing to the inefficient transfer of firm resources and capabilities in such 
modes. Conversely, the firm can internalise the action, ensuring a more efficient resource 
transfer. From the RBV, it is expected that the host country collaborator will not be able to 
replicate the service as well as the individuals from within the firm. Therefore, the more 
embedded the resource or capability of the firm is, the more value it loses in an external 
transfer as it is expected that the transfer to the host country collaborator would be 
inefficient (Barney, 1991). In such cases, a rational firm would choose an internalised 
mode to preserve the value and increase the transferability of the resources or capability 
(Barney, 1991; Dev et al., 2007; Lam, 1997; Madhok, 1997, 1998).  
Previous research examining the RBV empirically in entry mode research found that if the 
resource transfer proves inefficient owing to the inability of the local agent to absorb and 
replicate the capability as intended, the firm will likely choose an internalised mode to 
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retain their competitive advantage (Barney, 1991; Contractor & Kundu, 1998b; Dev et al., 
2007; Lam, 1997; Madhok, 1997, 1998). Dev et al. (2002), Erramilli et al. (2002) and 
Kruesi and Zamborsky (in press) empirically examined the non-equity entry mode 
decisions of hotel organisations from the RBV and found that imperfect imitability is a 
central determinant of the decision, that is, prompting firms into the use of a management 
contract over franchising. 
4.2.5.1 Franchising and Imperfect Imitability 
In terms of franchising, imperfect imitability takes the form of sharing knowledge about 
services, organisational routines and procedures on how to run a hotel property. These 
procedures represent one of the most important intangible assets hotel firms have. It is 
therefore vital to ensure that these services are efficiently transferred to the host country 
collaborator. Hotel organisations need to ensure a consistent service across their chain. 
Therefore, when international hotel organisations decide to expand using franchising, they 
are doing so with the risk that the host country collaborator will not be able to 
appropriately replicate the service. In such cases, the hotel organisation would be forced 
to invest heavily in ensuring the proper service delivery. If the services are not easily 
replicated or absorbed, this will incur significant cost and may impact negatively on the 
brand (Dev et al., 2002; Erramilli et al., 2002). 
4.2.5.2 Management Contracts and Imperfect Imitability 
In the case of management contracts, conversely, the daily operations of the firm are 
under the control of the parent company, not the owner of the hotel property. The firm is 
therefore able to more easily transfer their resources and capabilities within firm 
boundaries, ensuring the highest level of efficiency (Dev et al., 2002; Erramilli et al., 2002). 
4.2.6 Firm-Level Factors 
The firm-level factors were examined in Study 1 through the TCE questions, specifically, 
the opportunism, bounded rationality and asset specificity questions, as well as both the 
RBV questions. Moreover, the respondents frequently discussed these factors throughout 
the interview and so they have been included in the ‘unexpected findings’ section in the 
previous chapter. The participants highlighted that there are important ‘firm-level’ 
considerations. In particular, two factors were proposed as important: (1) structural or 
strategy factors and (2) firm-specific assets or resources. There is abundant literature that 
is focused on both of these firm-level factors, with some studies arguing that firm-level 
factors are more critical in the entry mode decision than environmental factors (Kruesi & 
Zamborsky, in press; Villar et al., 2012). Structural and strategic factors are suggested in 
several studies as being determinants of entry mode choice (Agarwal & Ramaswami, 
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1992; Contractor & Kundu, 1998b; Erramilli & Rao, 1993; Martorell et al., 2013). The 
structural and strategic factors being tested in this study are the size of the company and 
investment levels, as proposed by the respondents of Study 1. 
4.2.7 The Size of the Company 
The commonly used measure for assessing the size of a company is the volume of sales 
(Campa & Guillén, 1999; Contractor & Kundu, 1998b). Several studies have shown that as 
the size of a company grows, it is more likely to opt for direct investment through 
ownership (Agarwal & Ramaswami, 1992; Campa & Guillén, 1999; Gomes-Casseres, 1989; 
Stopford & Wells, 1972; Trevino & Grosse, 2002), while smaller companies with more 
limited resources or skills in investing in foreign markets will prefer shared modes of 
control (Erramilli & Rao, 1993). However, in the case of the hotel industry, as was found 
during Study 1, it is exactly the opposite. This was also highlighted by Gatignon and 
Anderson (Gatignon & Anderson, 1988) and Martorell et al. (2013), who suggested that 
high control strategies are not as favoured in large-scale foreign investments in the hotel 
industry because hotel organisations prefer and are almost forced to share the investment 
with a partner owing to the scale of international operations in the hotel industry.  
4.2.8 Investment Factors 
In the case of the hotel industry, it is proposed that when hotel organisations place greater 
priority on larger operations and personnel training (Gatignon & Anderson, 1988), they 
tend to invest in strategies that require capital expenditures because the benefits they are 
able to obtain are easier to control. It is also expected that the more importance hotel 
executives place on investments in management controls and quality controls, the more 
likely it is that the organisation will opt for an equity-based entry mode (Martorell et al., 
2013). This was supported by Study 1, where the respondents indicated that investment 
in training would prompt a management contract. From the TCE perspective, if significant 
investment is made into operations or services, these are likely to be specific to the firm 
since they are not sunk costs prompting internalisation (Williamson, 1985). From the RBV, 
significant investment in and specialisation of an organisation’s operations or services 
impairs the replication (imitability) of the service (Barney, 1991; Erramilli et al., 2002).  
4.2.9 Intangible Firm-Specific Assets or Resources 
Firm-specific assets or resources refer to both the tangible and the intangible assets. In 
this thesis, intangible assets are of interest. Specifically, such assets include the brand of 
the hotels ,managerial expertise, organisational routines, training and reservation 
systems, and industry knowledge, as opposed to the hotel property itself or any of its 
furnishings, which are the tangible assets. This approach has also been taken by Brouthers 
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and Brouther (2003) and Erramilli and Rao (1990, 1993). From the perspective of asset 
specificity, the aim is to protect and control the asset; from the perspective of imperfect 
imitability, it is an asset that is not easily transferred from one embedded context to 
another. The firm-level factors tested in this study are brand name or brand standard, 
industry knowledge and the training systems. 
4.2.9.1 Brand Name or Service Standards 
In the hotel industry, an established brand and its associated service standard is a firm’s 
advantage, which the parent company normally owns and controls (Dunning & McQueen, 
1982). This advantage also boosts the possibility of successful alliances (Contractor & 
Kundu, 1998a). Thus, companies with well-known trade names tend to increase the 
number of franchise operations and management contracts they use. From the TCE 
perspective, the brand standards with high specificity will not be eagerly shared with the 
host country collaborator. Contractual problems can arise when one party has control 
over activities that can damage the brand reputation of a second party. For this reason, 
TCE theory holds that an activity will tend not to be outsourced if it results in a 
subcontractor being placed in a position enabling it to (wittingly or otherwise) inflict 
damage on the reputation of the hotel’s business (Kruesi & Zamborsky, in press; 
Lamminmaki, 2005; Lohita et al., 1994; Williamson, 1985). From the RBV, brand 
standards, which are highly integrated into the firm and are categorised by inimitability, 
are not easily transferred to the host country collaborator (Barney, 1986a, 1986b; 
Erramilli et al., 2002; Kruesi & Zamborsky, in press).  
4.2.9.2 Industry Knowledge 
In the case of the hotel industry, the importance of industry knowledge, including but not 
limited to the requirements and tastes of hotel customers, is a key advantage over other 
hotel organisations (Dunning & McQueen, 1982). The unique knowledge or skills that 
employees develop over time represents specialised know-how or experience specific to a 
particular employer–employee relationship; that is, the knowledge or skill is not 
transferable as it has limited relevance to other job situations. Related to this dimension of 
asset specificity, Deegan (1997) found some support for the view that human asset 
specificity can affect remuneration. The industry knowledge with high specificity will not 
be eagerly shared with the host country collaborator (Lamminmaki, 2005). From the RBV, 
similar conclusions can be reached. According to Hu (1995), transferring tacit knowledge 
is difficult because it is complex; acquired through experience, and through trial and error; 
taught and learnt through demonstration, observation, imitation, practice and feedback; 
and continuously evolving. According to Kogut and Zander (Kogut & Zander, 1993), the 
less teachable, more codified and more complex the knowledge is, the more difficult it is to 
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replicate and transfer across firm boundaries. From the RBV, imperfect imitability results 
from embeddedness, that is, when the capability is deeply embedded within 
organisational routines and becomes specific to a firm (Madhok, 1997). Lam (1997) 
explained that embedded knowledge is not owned by any specific individual, but is 
embedded in complex social interactions and team relationships within an organisation. It 
cannot be systematically coded and it can be transferred only through intimate social 
interaction. Furthermore, transfer of embedded knowledge requires the use of established 
routines and organisational processes. For these reasons, the RBV suggests that internal 
modes are more effective than market modes to transfer imperfectly imitable capabilities 
(Madhok, 1997). 
Moreover, proprietary content leads to management contracts, that is, the investment in 
specific assets. According to TCE, international hotel chains usually provide highly 
idiosyncratic services that are characterised by specialised know-how, high levels of 
professional skills and managerial expertise as well as services that require the use of 
codified assets such as central reservation systems; services that require professional skill 
are usually associated with significant human investments. According to Williamson 
(1985), high asset specificity is considered one of the main features of the transaction that 
favours ‘hierarchy’ (internal) over the ‘market’ (external) transactions. Therefore, the 
greater the specialised know-how characterising a service and the required investment in 
human highly specific physical assets, the more likely it is that hierarchy modes will be 
preferred. 
From the RBV, the transfer of specialised knowledge and idiosyncratic knowledge faces 
the additional problem of ‘information impactedness’, which also tends to favour external 
modes over internal ones. According to Williamson (1975), information impactedness 
refers not only to the information asymmetry between the two parties of the transaction 
but also to the high costs of achieving information parity, the proclivity of parties to 
behave opportunistically and the small number of contracting situations developed owing 
to the distribution of information among parties (Williamson, 1975) 
According to TCE, when the same brand name is used jointly by many franchisees, the 
classic externality problem arises: freeloading – if one franchise cheats on the quality of 
the product, he or she will benefit from the full amount of the savings from reduced 
quality, but the cost of decreased customer loyalty will be spread to each one of the 
franchises (Williamson, 1985). TCE suggests that when the value of the brand name is 
high, there is also a high potential for free riding; therefore, higher degrees of control are 
more efficient (B. Klein, 1980). 
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4.2.9.3 Training Systems 
In the hotel industry, training is deemed essential (Dunning & McQueen, 1982). Training is 
even more important for the larger hotel companies (Martorell et al., 2013), and thus 
training is deemed essential in the non-equity entry mode decisions because the largest 
hotel companies focus most on these modes. From the TCE perspective, Lamminmaki 
(2005) suggests that any provider of a service would have to make some human capital 
investment by training personnel in knowledge that is specific to the needs of the hotel. If 
the contract with the hotel were to lapse, the value of this hotel-specific investment would 
be lost. This is supported by other research, as opportunism from the economic agents in 
such cases would also likely erode the competitive advantage created through the asset, 
prompting an internal mode (Cho, 2005; Erramilli & Rao, 1993; Villar et al., 2012). 
Companies that invest heavily in their training procedures tend to choose equity-based 
growth strategies such as ownership, because the profits that can be reaped from staff 
training are put to better use under systems that guarantee stricter control (Gatignon & 
Anderson, 1988). From the RBV, as with industry knowledge, if training procedures are 
not easily codified and are embedded in the organisational routines of the firm, 
transferring these procedures to a host country collaborator becomes difficult to the point 
of prompting the hotel organisation to internalise the action (Barney, 1991).  
4.2.10 Environmental-Level Factors 
The environmental factors were examined in Study 1 through the environmental 
uncertainty questions, the location advantage questions and the institutional theory 
questions. The respondents highlighted that there are important ‘environment-level’ 
considerations. Specifically, these include host country factors, including the level of risk 
and development of the host country as well as the availability of capable local partners. 
4.2.11 Host Country Factors 
The host country environment refers to the nature of the economic, fiscal and political 
conditions as well as the culture of the country that a foreign firm enters (Gatignon & 
Anderson, 1988; K. D. Miller, 1993; Sanchez-Peinado & Pla-Barber, 2006b; Williamson, 
1985, 1991). Several scholars put uncertainty about a host country’s environment forward 
as a central determinant of entry mode decisions (Gatignon & Anderson, 1988; K. D. Miller, 
1993; Sanchez-Peinado & Pla-Barber, 2006b; Williamson, 1985, 1991). The effect of host 
country uncertainty as a determinant of entry mode decision has become a point of 
contention in the literature, however. One stream of research posits that when 
environmental uncertainty is high, firms will choose a less resource-intensive mode to be 
more flexible and allow the firm to exit more easily in case the venture fails (Erramilli & 
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Rao, 1993; Fladmoe-Lindquist & Jacque, 1995; W. C. Kim & Hwang, 1992; Mutinelli & 
Piscitello, 1998). Conversely, other studies have identified that when environmental 
uncertainty is high, stronger control is needed in the form of high resource entry modes to 
manage the effects of this uncertainty (Altinay, 2007; Dev et al., 2002; Erramilli et al., 
2002; Madhok, 1998). 
The hospitality industry, specifically, is characterised as being capital intensive, in regard 
to the ownership of physical assets such as real estate. It is therefore common to separate 
industry knowledge and managerial expertise from the ownership of these physical assets 
(Brown et al., 2003; Contractor & Kundu, 1998a; Cunill & Forteza, 2010; Rodrı́guez, 2002) . 
It is because of this ability to separate ownership of the physical hotel and the managerial 
skills to operate it that environmental factors tend to play a minimal role in determining 
the non-equity entry mode decision of hotel organisations. In their study of the Spanish 
hotel industry, Villar et al. (2012) found that, for service firms, the nature of the service 
being transferred generally plays a more critical role than location-related factors. For 
these reasons, it is expected that environmental factors, while playing a role in choosing 
between equity and non-equity entry modes, have a lesser effect on the decision between 
different non-equity entry modes; this point is supported by Kruesi and Zamborsky 
(2015). However, it was clearly highlighted by the respondents of Study 1 that host 
country factors are a consideration, and as such, they are included in this study. The 
rationale is that host country factors are outside of the firm and often outside of the firm’s 
control; therefore, firms consider these factors in their entry mode choices. The host 
country factors tested in this study are politico-economic risk, legal risk and the level of 
economic development, as is common in the literature (Martorell et al., 2013). 
4.2.11.1 Politico-Economic Risk 
Political risk can include the extent to which governmental policies are favourable or 
unfavourable for the entering firm. Moreover, it arises when the political regime is 
characterised by turmoil, and finally, there may be restrictions concerning ownership and 
control over corporate assets, as well as the repatriation of profits and royalties. Economic 
uncertainty revolves partly around the uncertainties related to currency differences. 
Fluctuating exchange rates (between home and host country) may result in reduced 
income for the parent company and difficulty setting prices. In addition, economic risk 
revolves around local demand variability. 
Considering the TCE rationale, external uncertainty leads to low control modes 
(Williamson, 1975, 1985). This is because, according to TCE reasoning, environmental 
uncertainty by itself does not impede a market mode. It is the introduction of asset 
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specificity that causes the ‘market’ to fail and thus more control is preferred (Williamson, 
1991). In other words, environmental uncertainty itself suggests that market modes are 
more appropriate to give the firm flexibility, as higher investment modes would incur 
higher switching costs (Gatignon & Anderson, 1988).  
Several studies suggest that equity implies limited flexibility and that non-equity modes 
(both franchising and management contracts) have the same flexibility. This is not the 
case in this thesis, however, as franchising is seen as being more flexible. This is because 
there is still non-trivial resource commitment in management contracts, that is, 
investment in transaction-specific staff such as managerial staff and training staff, 
personnel transfer as well as the time spent acquiring local knowledge, the pre-opening 
costs and the costs of redecoration and refurbishment (which is often shared by the owner 
and the hotel organisation in management contracts).  
In franchising, the resource commitment is much lower when compared with 
management contracts because the managerial cost of adding a franchised outlet to the 
chain, including training and the provision of operating manuals and other assistance, is 
quite low (Sandman, 2003). Franchising represents a low asset specificity mode since the 
franchisor is trading assets already at hand (sunk costs) instead of investing in new and 
specific assets. Moreover, franchising lowers the cost of acquiring knowledge about the 
local market since the company does not have to invest in resources to learn about local 
input suppliers, marketing strategies, consumer preferences and the labour market. 
While it is accepted here that the negative impacts arising from politico-economic risk are 
lower in management contracts than in equity modes, clearly, equity modes have higher 
investment levels and it is harder to leave the market when the hotel properties are 
owned. However, it is argued here that although the investment level is lower, it is still 
high enough to discourage the use of management contracts and dictates a low specificity 
mode, that is, franchising. 
4.2.11.2 Legal Risk 
Legal risk is also a major source of environmental uncertainty and refers to the legal, 
intellectual property rights. In this thesis, legal risk refers to both local regulation and 
policies regarding trademark and intellectual property right protection as well as the 
enforcement of this protection. The less developed the legal systems of a host country, the 
weaker the enforcement of laws and contract enforcement. This is critical for hotel chains 
because brand name protection is a major concern. 
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Franchising, therefore, entails the risk of quality debasement, which can negatively affect 
the reputation of the brand in the local market. From the TCE perspective, if franchisees 
behave opportunistically, they can become competitors in the future using the knowledge. 
In management contracts, these risks are largely mitigated since at least senior if not also 
middle management is employed by the operator so it is more difficult for the local 
partner to redeploy these practices or standards. From the RBV, countries categorised 
with high levels of legal risk would have lower and perhaps illicit standards of local 
managers and therefore would increase the bounded rationality of the entry prompt firms 
to prefer the guaranteed efficiency of management contracts. 
4.2.11.3 The Level of Economic Development 
According to Contractor and Kundu (1998a, 1998b), the more developed a nation is in 
economic terms, the higher the hotel organisation’s likelihood of using contractual modes 
as opposed to equity. TCE suggests several reasons why a lack of economic development 
leads to a motivation for seeking control. The first argument refers to the transaction cost 
incurred when tacit knowledge is transferred from the home market to a less developed 
one. International hotel chains usually need to transfer specific knowledge and expertise 
when a new hotel is about to be operating in a new market. The population’s educational 
level in developing countries is considered low; thus, prospective franchises are usually 
characterised by lower absorptive capacity, leading to management contracts. According 
to Williamson (1975), in these cases equity is preferred. It leads to wanting more control 
to ensure the proper use of codified assets such as reservation systems and operating 
procedure. From the RBV, a critical consideration is ‘absorptive capacity’, referring to the 
ability of local collaborators, ‘the receiving firm’, to absorb and replicate the service 
(Cohen & Levinthal, 1990). In countries characterised as being undeveloped, the 
absorptive capacity of the local managers is expected to be lower than in developed 
countries (Contractor & Kundu, 1998a; Erramilli et al., 2002).  
4.2.12 The Availability of Capable Local Partners/Managers  
The availability of capable partners in the host country was put forward by almost all of 
the respondents in the previous study as being a critical consideration. As mentioned 
above, the absorptive capacity of local management is a key consideration in the literature 
(Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; Erramilli et al., 2002). From the TCE, if there is a concern that 
the local manager does not have the ability to provide the service, which would affect the 
brand of the hotel organisation (asset specificity), this would be an example of market 
failure causing firms to internalise the entry mode. From the RBV, the importance of 
supporting infrastructure, both within and outside the firm, that may impede or facilitate 
the transfer of resources and capabilities is a central consideration (Hu, 1995; Madhok, 
 97 
1997). While the resources may be able to be transferred via a market mode, there may 
not be a capable manager in the country to provide the service. Franchising becomes a 
problem when there is a lack of competent managerial staff in the host country. Therefore, 
rather than destroying the value of the capability through franchising, firms will prefer to 
internalise the entry mode. 
4.2.13 Hypotheses Development Study 2 
The literature review above was used to develop the hypotheses of this study. These 
hypotheses are now presented along with a summary of the informative literature used to 
develop them.  
Asset specificity has been the predominant theoretical construct used in TCE-focused 
entry mode studies (Brouthers & Hennart, 2007; De Vita et al., 2011). Transaction costs, 
which include the ex-ante cost of negotiating contracts and the ex-post costs of monitoring 
the performance and behaviour of partners and other contracted parties or economic 
agents, increase in cases where there are specific assets involved in the transactions 
(Anderson & Gatignon, 1986; Hennart, 1989; Williamson, 1985). Asset specificity suggests 
that the pursuit of the lowest possible transaction costs will drive the decision of 
governance structure used in the market entry (Anderson & Gatignon, 1986; Hennart, 
1989; Williamson, 1985). Therefore, as the transaction costs arising from asset specificity 
increase past those of employing an internalised mode, the firm will internalise. In studies 
focused on the hospitality industry, Contractor and Kundu (1998a) came to the conclusion 
that there was a link between asset specificity and the desire for control. Moreover, 
according to Altinay (2007), a hotel organisation will choose a low control mode if asset 
specificity is low. If the transaction cost resulting from asset specificity increases, 
however, it will prompt the organisation to choose a higher control mode. These studies 
looked at the choice between equity and non-equity modes. This thesis attempts to 
establish if this relationship also exists between different non-equity modes. 
H1: The higher the asset specificity, the more likely is a hotel executive’s intention 
to choose a management contract over franchising in the international expansion 
of a hotel chain. 
Imperfect imitability has been the predominant theoretical construct used in RBV-focused 
entry mode studies (Erramilli et al. 2002, Madhok, 1997, 1998). From the RBV, it is 
expected that the contracted parties or economic agents will not be able to replicate the 
resource or capability as well as the individuals from within the firm in cases when the 
resources are imperfectly imitable. Therefore, the more embedded the resource or 
capability of the firm is, the more value it loses in an external transfer as it is expected that 
the transfer to the host country collaborator would be inefficient (Barney, 1991). Studies 
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focused on the entry mode choices of hotel organisations that used imperfect imitability 
partly as their theoretical lens found that it prompts the choice of higher control (Brown et 
al., 2002; Dev et al., 2002; Erramilli et al. 2002). These authors also highlighted that this 
can be achieved through management contracts. While these studies used secondary data 
and a sample consisting of general managers, this thesis attempts to establish if this 
relationship also exists by using a sample of hotel executives who actually make these 
decisions. 
H2: The higher the imperfect imitability, the more likely is a hotel executive’s 
intention to choose a management contract over franchising in the international 
expansion of a hotel chain. 
Several studies have shown that as the size of a company grows, the likelihood to opt for 
direct investment through ownership also increases (Agarwal & Ramaswami, 1992; 
Campa & Guillén, 1999; Gomes-Casseres, 1989; Stopford & Wells, 1972; Trevino & Grosse, 
2002), while smaller companies with more limited resources or skills in investing in 
foreign markets will prefer shared modes of control (Erramilli & Rao, 1993). However, in 
the case of the hotel industry, as was found during Study 1, it is exactly the opposite. This 
was also highlighted by Gatignon and Anderson (1988) and Martorell (2013), who 
suggested that high control strategies are not as favoured in large-scale foreign 
investments in the hotel industry because hotel organisations prefer and are almost forced 
to share the investment with a partner owing to the scale of international operations in 
the hotel industry. This thesis attempts to establish if this relationship also exists by using 
a sample of hotel executives who actually make these decisions. 
H3: The larger the size of the organisation, the more likely is a hotel executive’s 
intention to choose franchising over a management contract in the international 
expansion of a hotel chain. 
In the case of the hotel industry, it is proposed that when hotel organisations place greater 
priority on larger operations and personnel training (Gatignon & Anderson, 1988), they 
will tend to invest in strategies that require capital expenditures because the benefits they 
are able to obtain are easier to control. Moreover, if significant investment is made into 
operations or services, these are likely to be specific to the firm and therefore are not sunk 
costs prompting internalisation (Williamson, 1985). Moreover, investment in and 
specialisation of an organisation’s operations or services impairs the replication 
(imitability) of the service (Barney, 1991; Erramilli et al., 2002), thus prompting 
internalisation. This thesis attempts to establish if this relationship also exists between 
franchising and management contracts. 
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H4: The higher the investment of the organisation, the more likely is a hotel 
executive’s intention to choose a management contract over franchising in the 
international expansion of a hotel chain. 
Because the assets in non-equity entry modes in the hotel sector and the service sector 
more broadly are intangible in nature, imitability becomes a central consideration, as it is 
difficult to transfer to a third party. An example is tacit knowledge, which is constantly 
evolving and has been amassed through experience and learning through trial and error, 
imitation, practice and feedback (Hu, 1995). According to Kogut and Zander (1993), the 
more complex the knowledge and the less codifiable and teachable it is, the more difficult 
it is for it to be replicated across firm boundaries. Therefore, in cases where the resources 
and capabilities are imperfectly imitable in nature, firms will choose internalised modes. 
This thesis attempts to establish if this relationship also exists when choosing between 
franchising management contracts by probing the following intangible assets: brand name 
or brand standard, industry or managerial knowledge and the training systems. 
H5: The higher the importance placed on intangible assets, the more likely is a 
hotel executive’s intention to choose a management contract over franchising in 
the international expansion of a hotel chain. 
Host country factors that were examined are politico-economic risk or legal risk and the 
level of economic development. A vast body of literature focuses on the risk associated 
with entering foreign markets and how it affects modal choice (Anderson & Gatignon, 
1986; Erramilli & Rao, 1990, 1993; Gatignon & Anderson, 1988). Research conducted on 
this topic by Gatignon and Anderson (1988) suggests that country risk prompts firms to 
use equity modes. Conversely, Agarwal and Ramaswami (1992) suggest the opposite, that 
is, that high risk prompts the use of low control modes. In studies focused on the service 
sector, Fladmoe-Lindquist and Jacque (Fladmoe-Lindquist & Jacque, 1995) found no 
relationship between country risk and franchising, and Contractor and Kundu (1998b) 
also found no support for the relationship between country risk and entry mode choice. 
While there is disagreement in the literature, the participants of Study 1 did hint at the fact 
that they are considerations prompting internalisation. This thesis attempts to establish 
the relationship between politico-economic risk or legal risk and low economic 
development inclination to use management contracts over franchising. 
H6: The higher the environmental uncertainty, the more likely is a hotel 
executive’s intention to choose franchising over a management contract in the 
international expansion of a hotel chain. 
The absorptive capacity of local management is a key consideration in deciding how to 
transfer a service internationally and across firm boundaries (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; 
Erramilli et al., 2002). If there is a concern that the local manager does not have the ability 
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to provide the service, which would affect the brand of the hotel organisation (asset 
specificity), this would be an example of market failure causing firms to internalise the 
entry mode (Williamson, 1985). Moreover, the importance of supporting infrastructure, 
both within and outside the firm, that may impede or facilitate the transfer of resources 
and capabilities is a central consideration (Hu, 1995; Madhok, 1997). If there is a lack local 
partners with skilled management personnel, it prompts firms to internalise. This thesis 
attempts to establish if there is a relationship between the availability of local 
management and the choice between franchising and management contracts. 
H7: The higher the availability of partners, the more likely is a hotel executive’s 
intention to choose franchising over a management contract in the international 
expansion of a hotel chain. 
Table 4.1 is a summary of the hypotheses and their expected sign, that is, the effect of the 
variables on the choice between franchising and management contracts. Figure 4.1 is a 
visual representation of this in the form of a theoretical framework. The independent 
variables and their construction will be outlined in the following section.  
Table 4.1: Summary of the Hypotheses/Independent Variables 
Hypotheses Description Independent variables 
H1 Asset specificity  Management 
contract 
AS 
H2 Imperfect imitability  Management 
contract 
II 
H3 Firm size  Franchising SIZE 
H4 Investment factors  Management 
contract 
INVST 
H5 Brand name 
Industry knowledge 
Training systems  Management 
contract 
 
INTANGASR 
H6 Politico-economic risk 
Legal risk 
Economic development  Franchising 
 
HOSTCNTR 
H7 The availability of partners  
Franchising 
AVAILPR 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 101 
 
Figure 4.1: Theoretical Framework of the Hypotheses, Dependent and Independent 
Variables 
 
Independent Variable     Hypotheses           Dependent Variable 
 
 
 
4.2.14 Originality 
In order to evaluate the originality and consequently the gap that this thesis fills, the entry 
mode focused publications included in the literature review that use TCE and the RBV, 
independently, in unison with each other or in unison with an alternate theory, as their 
theoretical foundation have been segmented as shown in Table 4.2. The table segments 
these 51 publications as follows. 
Running along the Y-axis are: 
 the publications that have TCE or the RBV independently as their theoretical 
foundation, 
 the publications that have TCE and the RBV in unison as their theoretical 
foundation, 
 the publications that have TCE or the RBV in combination with an alternate theory 
or alternate theories as their theoretical foundation. 
 
AS 
INVST 
II 
H1 
H4 
H2 
INTANGASR 
AVAILPAR 
HOSTCNTR 
SIZE 
H5 
H3 
H6 
H7 
Management Contract 
Management Contract 
 
Management Contract 
 
Management Contract 
 
Franchising 
 
Franchising 
 
Franchising 
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Running along the X-axis are:  
 the publications that examine manufacturing firms or a combination of 
manufacturing and service firms, 
 the publications that examine only service firms, 
 the publications that examine exclusively the hotel sector. 
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Table 4.2: The Research Foci of the Empirical TCE and RBV Founded Articles 
Theories Manufacturing and service firm oriented 
research 
Service firm oriented research Hospitality industry oriented research 
TCE independently (Brouthers & Brouthers, 2003), (Brouthers, 
Brouthers, & Werner, 2003), (Gatignon & 
Anderson, 1988), (Gomes-Casseres, 1989), 
(Hennart, 1991), (W. C. Kim & Hwang, 1992), 
(Lopez-Duarte & Vidal-Suarez, 2010) 
(Erramilli & Rao, 1993), (Murray & Kotabe, 
1999), (Pla-Barber et al., 2010) 
(Cho, 2005)**** 
TCE combined with one or more 
alternate theories 
(Brouthers, 2002), (Lu, 2002), (Luo, 2001)* (Fladmoe-Lindquist & Jacque, 1995) (Altinay, 2005), (Chen & Dimou, 2005), 
(Contractor & Kundu, 1998a, 1998b)*, (Huang 
et al., 2011), (Cunill et al., 2013), (Quer et al., 
2007), (Martorell et al., 2013) 
RBV independently (Collis, 1991), (Ekeledo & Sivakumar, 2004), 
(Feller, Parhankangas, & Smeds, 2009), (Kogut 
& Zander, 1993), (Luo, 2002), (Trevino & 
Grosse, 2002) 
(Sanchez-Peinado & Pla-Barber, 2006b) (Brown et al., 2003), (Dev et al., 2007), (Espino-
Rodriguez & Padron, 2005)  
RBV combined with one or more 
alternate theories 
(Brouthers et al., 2008), (Luo, 2001)*, (Wang et 
al., 2012) 
(Sanchez-Peinado & Pla-Barber, 2006a), 
(Sanchez-Peinado et al., 2007) 
(Rodrı́guez, 2002), (Contractor & Kundu, 1998a, 
1998b)* 
TCE and RBV combined (Madhok, 1997)  (Kruesi & Zamborsky, in press)***, (Leon-
Darder et al., 2011), (Villar et al., 2012), (Zeng, 
2010) 
Asset specificity independently (Deegan, 1997)  (Espino-Rodriguez et al., 2008), (Lamminmaki, 
2005) 
Imperfect imitability 
independently 
  (Dev et al., 2002)**, (Erramilli et al., 2002) ** 
TCE and/or RBV used 
independently or with an 
alternate theory used to 
examine exclusively non-equity 
modes 
(S. Klein et al., 1990) (Lam, 1997) (Altinay, 2007), (Cho, 2005)****, (Dev et al., 
2002)**, (Erramilli et al., 2002)**, (Kruesi & 
Zamborsky, in press)*** 
Key 
* These articles use TCE and the RBV as well as alternate theories and thus fit into two fields. 
**These articles use imperfect imitability independently and focus exclusively on non-equity modes and thus fit into two fields. 
*** This article uses TCE and the RBV in the hospitality industry and focuses exclusively on non-equity modes and thus fits into two fields. 
**** This article uses exclusively TCE in the hospitality industry and focuses exclusively on non-equity modes and thus fits into two fields. 
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A visual representation of Table 4.2 in the form of a clustered column graph is provided in 
Figure 4.2. 
Figure 4.2: Graph of the Article Segmentation 
 
It can be seen in Table 4.2 and Figure 4.2 that even the publications that focus exclusively 
on non-equity modes in the hospitality industry only constitute one third of the 
publications in this segment; that is, of all the TCE/TBV-focused empirical articles on hotel 
entry modes that were reviewed in this thesis, only 30% (approx.) of the articles focused 
exclusively on non-equity entry modes. This is despite the fact that non-equity modes 
constitute 95% (approx.) of the entry modes used by largest hotel organisations, as 
mentioned in Chapter 1. This clearly highlights the discrepancy between the literature in 
its current stage and the realities of the hotel industry and the significance of this research. 
Table 4.2 and Figure 4.2, moreover, help to visualise that although the publications 
reviewed above are all related to the thesis, there are significant differences between 
these publications and this thesis. Six points can be identified when studying the table and 
graph that highlight the gap in the literature this thesis fills. These are as follows:  
1) Initially, it can be seen that a large number of the studies focus either exclusively 
on manufacturing firms or on a mix of manufacturing and service firms. However, 
as seen in the literature, the findings of manufacturing firm oriented research 
cannot be effectively transferred to studying service firms (Bouquet et al., 2004; 
Brouthers & Brouthers, 2003; Leon-Darder et al., 2011; Pla-Barber et al., 2010). 
Moreover, as mentioned above, service firm oriented research is under-
represented in the literature and authors of recent publications highlight the need 
0
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for expanding this literature (Bouquet et al., 2004; Brouthers & Brouthers, 2003; 
Leon-Darder et al., 2011; Pla-Barber et al., 2010). It is clear that this research 
would address these points and build on underdeveloped service firm entry mode 
literature.  
2) Despite the thorough review of hotel-focused studies conducted in this thesis (see 
Chapter 2), only 22 empirical studies were identified that focus on the hotel sector. 
This is despite the fact that the hotel sector is put forward as being ideal for 
drawing broader conclusions for soft service firms (Blomstermo et al., 2006; 
Brown et al., 2003).  
3) Only five studies used both TCE and the RBV as their theoretical foundation. This is 
despite the fact that these theories are put forward as being the leading theories in 
entry mode research (Villar et al., 2012) and highly compatible with each other 
(Brouthers & Hennart, 2007; Brown et al., 2003; Espino-Rodriguez et al., 2008; 
Madhok, 1996, 1997, 1998; Villar et al., 2012), and they were also put forward as 
important by the respondents of Study 1.  
4) Only four publications used both TCE and the RBV as their theoretical foundation 
to examine the hotel sector with only Kruesi and Zamborsky (in press) examining 
exclusively non-equity modes. This is despite the fact that these theories are 
compatible, as mentioned above, yet have largely been used independently or in 
unison with another theory or other theories to examine the hotel sector.  
5) Only four articles use asset specificity independently from uncertainty and 
frequency, that is, the broader TCE, despite the fact that asset specificity has been 
deemed the most important or critical variable under the broader TCE (Brouthers 
& Hennart, 2007; De Vita et al., 2011; Williamson, 1985).  
6) Only two articles use imperfect imitability independently from the other 
characteristics of sustained competitive advantage under the broader RBV, that is, 
value, rarity and non-substitutability. 
4.2.15 Section Conclusions 
In this section, an in-depth review of TCE and the RBV was presented. These theories were 
suggested by the respondents of Study 1 as being effective in the context of non-equity 
entry mode choice in the hotel sector. The theories were compared and contrasted, and 
the hypotheses development followed this. Finally, the originality of the theoretical 
foundation in the context of this study was highlighted. 
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4.3 Methods 
In this section, the methods used in this study are outlined. Initially, the research design is 
briefly explained. Following this, the dependent and independent variables are presented 
along with an explanation of how the items for the survey were developed. The 
development of the survey design is then explained and justified before the pilot study and 
how it aided in creating the final version of the survey is outlined. The final version of the 
survey that was completed by the respondents is then also presented. 
4.3.1 Research Design 
For this study, a quantitative approach was taken with a scenario-based online survey. 
This approach was adopted for several reasons, including the nature and global 
distribution of the respondents as well as the nature of the research aims. Seven 
independent variables were constructed through the combined lenses of TCE and the RBV 
to identify the variables that are important when hotel executives choose between 
franchising and management contracts when expanding internationally. Accordingly, the 
aim of this study is to gather deductive insights. The advantage of this methodology is that 
it is deterministic in nature and allows for defined hypotheses to be tested (Oppenheim, 
1992). It can be seen in the literature that the majority of entry mode research is 
quantitative in nature (Canabal & White, 2008; Sarkar & Cavusgil, 1996), and as such, 
quantitative research, underpinned by the earlier qualitative study, was deemed 
appropriate for examining the non-equity entry mode choices of international hotel 
organisations after the qualitative methods used in Study 1.  
The aim of this study is to examine the factors proposed in the literature that hotel 
executives consider when choosing between franchising and management contracts. 
According to the literature, entry mode research generally focuses on specific theories, on 
firm-level factors and on environment-level factors (Morschett et al., 2010). It is suggested 
in the literature that environmental factors may have lesser influence on the entry mode 
choice of service firms and hotel organisations, as specifically explained in Chapter 2. 
However, it was found in Study 1 that environmental factors are a consideration in the 
decision between franchising and management contracts in the international hotel 
industry. Therefore, both firm-level factors and environmental factors are tested in this 
survey, in addition to TCE and RBV and their central constructs, asset specificity and 
imperfect imitability respectively. 
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4.3.2 Variables 
4.3.2.1 Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable in this study is a dichotomous variable coded as 1 for franchising 
and 0 for management contracts. The dependent variable was assigned based on which 
scenario in the survey the respondent selected to complete: the franchise scenario survey 
or the management contract scenario survey. 
4.3.2.2 Independent Variables 
Seven independent variables were tested in this study. They are as follows: 
1) AS (Asset specificity) 
2) II (Imperfect imitability) 
3) SIZE (Size of the organisation) 
4) INVST (Investment factors) 
5) INTANGASR (Intangible assets and resources) 
6) HOSTCNTR (Host country factors) 
7) AVAILPAR (Availability of local partners) 
4.3.3 Items and Scales 
The research items used in the online survey to test the independent variables were 
developed based on the literature-derived hypotheses and the findings of Study 1. The 
items themselves are listed below and the sources of the items are summarised in Table 
4.3 below. The items were grouped by their independent variables in the survey, that is, all 
the items were presented in their own section, which was named after the independent 
variable and is presented thus below. The actual items grouped by the independent 
variables were then presented to the respondents.  
AS 
1) It is difficult for an outsider to learn ‘our way of doing things’ at this hotel chain. 
2) To be effective, employees of this hotel chain have to take a lot of time to get to 
know the customers’ expectations. 
3) Employees of this hotel chain need to spend much time and effort learning the 
skills needed to provide the expected service. 
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4) The hotel organisation has spent much time and effort developing the service 
offerings of this hotel chain. 
5) Specialised knowledge is needed to adequately provide the service required at this 
hotel chain. 
6) A large investment and a long time a needed for training employees to adequately 
provide the service expected at this hotel chain. 
7) The hotel organisation has spent much time and effort to learn and perfect the key 
factors for success of this hotel chain. 
8) An employee’s inside information on the procedures employed at this hotel chain 
would be very helpful to the organisation's competitors. 
9) The skill level of the employees working at this hotel chain is significantly 
customised to the organisation’s brand standards. 
10) It is important to retain the inside information on the processes which give this 
hotel chain a competitive advantage. 
11) The hotel organisation has spent much time and effort developing the workflows 
and routines of this hotel chain. 
II 
1) It is difficult for competitors to imitate the service offerings of this chain. 
2) The services offered at this chain are unique and nobody else can offer them. 
3) It took the hotel organisation years to build the brand reputation of this hotel 
chain; nobody can easily copy it. 
4) The competitive advantages of this hotel chain are embodied in the company and 
not in the individuals; i.e. nobody can easily copy the service offerings of this hotel 
chain by stealing away employees. 
5) Nobody can copy the corporate routines, processes and culture of the hotel chain. 
6) The corporate routines, processes and culture of this hotel chain would be difficult 
for other parties to absorb and recreate. 
7) For this hotel chain the services that are offered are unique and it would be 
difficult for other parties to recreate/absorb it. 
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8) The industry knowledge the managers of this hotel chain have would be difficult 
for other parties to absorb and recreate. 
9) The reputation of this hotel chain has been developed over a long time. 
INTANGASR 
1) I chose franchising over a management contract/a management contract over 
franchising to protect the brand standards of the hotel chain. 
2) I chose franchising over a management contract/a management contract over 
franchising to retain control over the organisational routines of the hotel chain. 
3) I chose franchising over a management contract/a management contract over 
franchising to retain control over the training systems of the hotel chain. 
4) I chose franchising over a management contract/a management contract over 
franchising to protect the industry and managerial expertise required to operate 
the hotel chain. 
HOSTCNTR 
1) I chose franchising over a management contract/a management contract over 
franchising to mitigate the risk of political instability in the foreign market. 
2) I chose franchising over a management contract/a management contract over 
franchising because of the favourable business conditions of the foreign market. 
3) I chose franchising over a management contract/a management contract over 
franchising because of the economic development of the foreign market. 
4) I chose franchising over a management contract/a management contract over 
franchising because of the quality infrastructure in the foreign market. 
5) I chose franchising over a management contract/a management contract over 
franchising due to the cultural differences between my hotel organisation’s home 
market and the foreign market. 
SIZE 
1) I chose franchising over a management contract/a management contract over 
franchising because of the large size of this hotel organisation. 
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2) I chose franchising over a management contract/a management contract over 
franchising because of the large scope of this hotel organisation’s global operations 
in terms of the number of regions it operates in. 
3) I chose franchising over a management contract/a management contract over 
franchising because of the high level of international experience of the executives 
of this hotel organisation. 
INVST 
1) I chose franchising over a management contract/a management contract over 
franchising because of the large investment made into training. 
2) I chose franchising over a management contract/a management contract over 
franchising because of the large investment made into management controls. 
3) I chose franchising over a management contract/a management contract over 
franchising because of the large investment made into quality controls. 
AVAILPAR 
1) I chose franchising over a management contract/a management contract over 
franchising because of the large availability of qualified managerial staff in the host 
country. 
2) I chose franchising over a management contract/a management contract over 
franchising because of the large availability of qualified local investment partners 
in the host country. 
3) I chose franchising over a management contract/a management contract over 
franchising because of the large availability of trustworthy local investment 
partners. 
Following the items for the independent variables, a second section was included that was 
not based on the scenario. The question for this section was as follows: 
For these following statements you do not have to imagine the scenario, just 
indicate your level of agreement, from strongly disagree to strongly agree. 
This section commenced by probing the significance of the factors that the respondents of 
Study 1 suggested were not considered by the NIE rationale, that is, the points described 
in Section 3.4.8.4 (NIE reasoning flaws).  
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NIE Reasoning Flaws 
1) For hotel chains that have both franchised and managed hotels in their portfolio, 
the decision to use one or the other is not made by the hotel organisation; the 
decision is made by the investor, because they are the one with the money. 
2) We choose franchising because our business is just set up that way. 
3) We are ad hoc in our decision making; we just see what works best on a case-by-
case basis. 
4) The choice between franchising and management contracts is simply a matter of 
the star level of the chain. 
5) In the instances where a hotel owner wants to operate on management contract 
and the hotel organisation does not, the hotel owner would simply find another 
hotel organisation. 
6) There is no real ‘decision’ as it’s based on the business model of the investor; there 
are some investors who would simply never operate under franchise agreement. 
7) When making this decision I think, “Do I want to run the hotel myself or do I want 
someone to run it for me?” That’s the main consideration. 
Finally, the survey concluded with demographic questions. This section was included 
because the contribution of this thesis is mainly based on the expertise of the respondents. 
Therefore, the questions were designed to elicit information not only on age, gender, sex 
and geographical location, as is commonly done in surveys, but also on the experience of 
the respondents based on their position and industry experience, and the level of 
influence they have in the company. 
Demographic Items 
1) What is your age? 
2) What is your gender? 
3) What country do you work in? 
4) What is your current position? 
5) How many years have you worked in the hotel industry? 
6) How many years have you been employed in your current position? 
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7) Have you made the decision between franchising and management contracts in the 
past? 
8) What is your level of expertise in making this decision? 
9) What level of influence do you have in the decision-making process? 
Table 4.3: The Items and Their Sources 
Variable Sources 
AS Klein et al. (1990), Zaheer and Venkatraman (1994), 
Christiaanse and Venkatraman (2002) 
II Erramilli et al. (2002), Dev et al. (2002), Brown et al. (2002), 
Barney (1997) 
SIZE Gatignon and Anderson (1988), Martorell et al. (2013) 
AND 
Study 1 findings 
INVST Barney (1991), (1991), Erramilli et al. (2002), Martorell et al. 
(2013) 
AND 
Study 1 findings 
INTANGASR Barney (1991), Dev et al. (2002), Erramilli et al. (2002), Hu (1995), 
Kogut and Zander (1993) 
AND 
Study 1 findings 
HOSTCNTR Anderson and Gatignon (1986), Erramilli and Rao (1990, 1993), 
Gatignon and Anderson (1988) 
AND 
Study 1 findings 
AVAILPAR Erramilli et al. (2002), Hu (1995), Madhok (1997), Cohen and 
Levinthal (1990) 
AND 
Study 1 findings 
Specifically, the items were created as follows. For AS, three sources were used: Klein et al. 
(1990), Zaheer and Venkatraman (1994), Christiaanse and Venkatraman (2002). These 
articles deployed empirically tested items for measuring asset specificity. The items in 
these articles were only changed slightly to fit the purpose of the survey, such as changing 
‘firm’ to ‘hotel organisation’. For II, the items used were directly taken from Erramilli et al. 
(2002), who tested imperfect imitability in the same way as proposed in this study. For 
SIZE and INVST, the items were constructed from the responses of Study 1 and by using 
keywords derived from Martorell et al. (2013). For INTANGASR, the items were 
constructed from the responses of Study 1 and from Martorell et al. (2013), Barney (1991) 
and Williamson (1985). The items developed to measure HOSTCNTR were constructed 
from the responses of Study 1 and by using keywords derived from Anderson and 
Gatignon (1986), Erramilli and Rao (1990, 1993), Gatignon and Anderson (1988). Finally, 
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AVAILPAR was included because of the findings of Study 1; it is taken from Erramilli et al. 
(2002) and only changed slightly to fit the style of the other questions. 
In terms of the scale used in the survey, a 7-point Likert scale was chosen, which is the 
most commonly used psychometric scale in surveys and questionnaires (DeCoster, 2000). 
This is because it is recognised in the literature that seven-point scales are more reliable 
than equivalent items with greater or fewer response options (DeCoster, 2000). Moreover, 
it needs to be noted that the scale is conventional and symmetrical with (1) = strongly 
disagree, (2) = disagree, (3) = somewhat disagree, (4) = neither agree nor disagree, (5) = 
somewhat agree, (6) = agree and (7) = strongly agree. It was decided to not ‘force’ 
respondents to commit to one side or the other, by retaining a neutral option (Leung, 
2011). 
4.3.4 Survey Design 
Designing a survey that is capable of accurately testing the hypotheses developed in the 
literature review is critical in reaching the research goals of this study. Accordingly, there 
were several considerations, as suggested by Oppenheim (1992), such as what variables 
should be measured? What kind of samples will be drawn? Who will be questioned, and 
how often should they be questioned? Based on the problem statement in Chapter 1 and 
also the nature of the hypotheses, this study is more descriptive than analytical. As such, 
the survey had to be constructed in way that allowed for the identification of the variables 
that impact on the choice made by executives between franchising and management 
contracts in the hotel industry. Moreover, the in-depth interviews that were conducted in 
Study 1 also influenced the formation of the survey. For example, participants of Study 1 
identified the importance of environment-level factors and the availability of suitable local 
partners, as mentioned above. Moreover, Study 1 highlighted the need to avoid academic 
jargon in favour of direct, practical language. An example is the independent variable 
INTAGAS, which tests the impact of intangible assets. Instead of using the term directly, 
the respondents were asked about specific intangible assets that they would understand, 
examples of these being the brand, training systems and proprietary managerial or 
industry knowledge, as mentioned above. These specific intangible assets were chosen 
based on the literature, as can be seen in Chapter 2. 
A scenario-based online survey consisting of two scenarios was the method used in this 
study. The respondents were asked to imagine a scenario in which they are the head of a 
large hotel organisation (defined by being international, having a corporate headquarters 
and controlling several chains or brands). In this position, they were asked to imagine that 
they have recently internationalised a hotel chain by setting up a new hotel in a foreign 
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market. The respondents were then asked to choose either the franchise scenario or the 
management contract scenario survey, based on the entry mode they would be more 
knowledgeable about. It was deemed appropriate to allow the respondents to choose the 
scenario based on expertise because the contribution of this study lies in their knowledge 
and experience, and consequent credibility. 
The main reason for choosing a scenario-based approach is that, although the sample is 
quite homogeneous, their circumstances, such as their geographic dispersion and the 
structures and strategies of their organisations, are relatively heterogeneous. The scenario 
reduces the likelihood that respondents will focus on the particulars of their own 
organisation when completing the survey and instead focus on a more generalised concept 
of a hotel organisation. Scenario-based surveys have been widely used by researchers for 
this purpose, obtaining some more control over the experimental conditions and the 
manipulated variables while at the same time reducing random ‘noise’ (Bitner, 1990; 
Dabholkar, 1994; Weijters et al., 2007). Moreover, while the scenario is based on a 
fictional non-equity entry mode decision, the respondents, as will be highlighted later in 
this chapter, are or were at some point all high-level hotel executives on the executive 
board of their organisations. In other words, these individuals have experience with this 
type of decision, which means that they are drawing from experience rather than 
abstractly theorising.  
The main reason for choosing to administer the survey via an online platform is twofold. 
Firstly, owing to the relatively small number of high-level hotel executives of large hotel 
organisations, the data collection had to be done on a global scale, making the sending of 
paper-based surveys inefficient. Secondly, another characteristic of the sample is that by 
the nature of their high-level positions, gaining access to these individuals is quite a 
challenge, as observed by Anseel et al. (2010) and Rogelberg and Stanton (2007), who 
note that top-management participants generally yield the lowest response rates in 
organisational research. In this study, the online survey tool used was Qualtrics. 
4.3.5 Pilot Study 
After having designed the survey, a two-stage pilot study was conducted before the main 
survey was initiated. In the first stage of the pilot study, the survey was administered to 
the project supervisors. The researcher was present in order to answer any questions as 
the survey was being completed. This process was repeated two times. In the second 
stage, the survey was administered to 11 respondents, as a paper-based survey to five 
respondents and as an online to survey six respondents. The reason for doing so was, 
firstly, to facilitate feedback from the respondents through the paper-based surveys (these 
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were administered to respondents who were geographically proximate). Secondly, as the 
final survey would be electronic, the respondents who were not geographically proximate 
were asked to complete the online survey. The respondents of the paper-based survey 
included five academics ranging from senior lecturer to associate professor. The 
respondents of the online surveys included four hotel practitioners, three general 
managers and one leasing manager, as well as two academics, a senior lecturer and a 
professor. The respondents were asked to identify anything related to the flow of the 
survey or if the construction of the wording posed any problems or hindered 
understanding. Based on the feedback, several changes were made and the survey was 
rechecked with the respondents. The following item exemplifies the type of wording 
changes that were made:  
Pilot 
“The larger the size of the hotel organisation the more likelihood the preference for 
management contracts over franchising.” 
Final Survey 
“I chose a management contract over franchising because of the large size of the 
hotel organisation.” 
These changes in the wording and flow aided comprehension and also suited the context 
of the scenario. 
4.3.6 The Final Survey Overview 
The final version of the survey will now be discussed. The actual survey can be seen in 
Appendix 8. The survey is structured with 12 sections. The first two sections are used to 
explain the background of the survey. The third and fourth sections serve to explain the 
respondents’ task in the survey and to ask the respondents to choose between the 
franchise scenario survey and the management contract scenario survey. The purpose of 
the fifth and sixth sections is to examine the effect of asset specificity and imperfect 
imitability respectively on the choice of franchising and management contracts. These 
items, unlike the ones used for the other five independent variables, are structured 
differently because they are taken directly from the literature in order to test established 
theoretical constructs. An example is: 
“It is difficult for an outsider of this chain to …” 
“It is important for employees of this chain to …” 
The purpose of the seventh, eighth and ninth sections is to examine the firm-level and 
environment-level factors that affect the choice between franchising and management 
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contracts. Unlike the fifth and sixth sections, these items are more survey specific and are 
worded as follows: 
“I chose a management contract over franchising/franchising over management 
contract [because]” 
The purpose of the 10th section is to examine the flaws of NIE reasoning as based on the 
findings of Study 1. Finally, the purpose of Section 11 is to gather general demographic 
information from the respondents, which includes gender, age, position, geographical 
location, years of experience and level of influence. 
4.3.7 Sample Selection 
The aim of the study was to select a sample of the highest-level international hotel 
executives. There are very few of these individuals, especially compared with the number 
of hotel general managers, which is the population that has generally been used in 
previous studies, as explained in Chapter 1. In order to identify this specific research 
sample, a list of the 300 largest hotel organisations (Hotel-Mule, 2010) was initially 
examined and all the hotel organisations that did not operate any franchises or 
management contracts or that only operated domestically were excluded from the list, 
leaving 145 hotel organisations. In order to identify the executives working in these 
organisations, access was gained to the TOPHOTELCHAINS database 
(TOPHOTELPROJECTS, 2014). The database contains, among other things, the contact 
details of most of the hotel executives working in all of the international hotel 
organisations and chains in the world. The executive positions covered in this database 
contain several positions whose holders would have limited knowledge in areas related to 
the aims of this study, including IT, food and beverage, public relations and construction 
executives. Consequently, these positions were excluded. A list was then created of the 
contact details of the remaining positions, including strategic, operational and franchise or 
management executives as well as all CEOs, chief financial officers (CFOs), chief operating 
officers (COOs), directors, presidents and vice-presidents, which represent the population 
of this study. The final list numbered 1,855.  
4.3.8 Research Recruitment 
The 1,855 individuals identified through the process mentioned above were e-mailed a 
research invitation with a link to the survey (as seen in Appendix 8). From the first round 
of research invitations, 135 people responded to the survey. Two weeks later, a reminder 
e-mail was sent to the population (apart from those individuals who requested not to be 
further contacted, which was approximately 300 individuals, as some CEOs also answered 
on behalf of their company). The reminder e-mail generated a further 64 responses to the 
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survey. That equates to a response rate of 11%, which is relatively high for this type of 
population (Anseel, Lievens, Schollaert, & Choragwicka, 2010; Rogelberg & Stanton, 2007). 
However, of these 199, only 109, or 55%, were usable, as the others were only very 
partially completed responses. For the descriptive statistics, these 109 responses were 
used. For the MANOVA, ANOVAs and the discriminant function analysis, a further 14 
responses had to be excluded because of some missing values (the criterion was no more 
than five items missing). In terms of the split between responses for the two scenarios, the 
management contract scenario proved substantially more popular, with 74 responses, 
than the franchise scenario, with 36 responses. 
4.3.9 Data Analysis 
For the quantitative data analysis, initially, univariate data analysis was conducted to 
present the descriptive statistics and the correlations between the different independent 
variables. This was followed by a MANOVA of all the independent variables together and 
ANOVAs for the independent variables individually to find mean differences. Finally, a 
discriminant function analysis was conducted on the data to predict group membership. 
Discriminant function analysis is very similar to logistic regression and both can be used 
to answer the same research questions (Hair, Black, Babin, Anderson, & Tatham, 2006). 
Unlike logistic regression, however, discriminant analysis can be used with small sample 
sizes; moreover, if the sample sizes are not equal, but homogeneity of variance or 
covariance still holds, discriminant analysis is more accurate (Hair et al., 2006). With all 
this being considered, logistic regression is the common choice nowadays, since the 
assumptions of discriminant analysis are rarely met, as will be explained later, owing to 
the nature of self-selecting groups. The statistical software package used to analyse the 
data was SPSS version 22. 
4.4 Findings 
In this section, the findings of the survey are presented. Initially, independent variables 
are tested through Cronbach’s alpha to establish the internal consistency of the variables. 
Following the validity test, the descriptive statistics, that is, the means and standard 
deviations of the independent variables and their significant correlations, are reported. 
Finally, the results of the MANOVA and the ANOVAs as well as those of the discriminant 
function analysis are reported. 
4.4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
This section will highlight the characteristics of the participants, looking at their 
demographics as explained above. As there were two scenario options for the participants 
to choose from, the demographics will be examined separately for the two groups.  
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4.4.1.1 Age of the Participants 
The demographic section started by inquiring as to the age of the participants with the 
following question: 
“What is your age?” 
When examining Tables 4.4 and 4.5, it can be seen that the age profiles are relatively 
similar. For the management contract scenario, the largest age group was 51–60, at 39%, 
compared with the 41–50 age group for the franchise scenario, at 46%. 
Table 4.4: Age Profile Management Contract Scenario 
Answer  
 
Response % 
18–30   
 
2 3 
31–40   
 
17 23 
41–50   
 
20 27 
51–60   
 
29 39 
61–70   
 
5 7 
71–80   
 
1 1 
Total  74 100 
Table 4.5: Age Profile Franchise Scenario 
Answer  
 
Response % 
18–30   
 
2 6 
31–40   
 
5 14 
41–50   
 
16 46 
51–60   
 
8 23 
61–70   
 
4 11 
71–80  
 
0 0 
Total  35 100 
4.4.1.2 Gender of the Participants 
The gender of the participants was then probed with the following question: 
“What is your gender?” 
In terms of the gender profile of the respondents, a clear majority of males participated. 
For the two scenarios, this trend is fairly similar, with 89% of the management contract 
scenario respondents being male compared with 83% for the franchise scenario as seen in 
Tables 4.6 and 4.7. 
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Table 4.6: Gender Profile Management Contract Scenario 
Answer  
 
Response % 
Male   
 
66 89 
Female   
 
8 11 
Total  74 100 
Table 4.7: Gender Profile Franchise Scenario 
Answer  
 
Response % 
Male   
 
29 83 
Female   
 
6 17 
Total  35 100 
4.4.1.3 Age and Gender of the Participants 
As can be seen in Tables 4.4–4.7, the majority of the respondents are in the middle to late 
middle age range and are predominantly male. To segment the participants further, a 
cross tabulation of the age and gender of the participants is presented in Tables 4.8 and 
4.9.  
Table 4.8: Management Contracts Scenario Age/Gender Cross Tabulation 
Gender Age 
 18–30 31–40 41–50 51–60 61–70 71–80 Total 
Male 1 15 17 27 5 1 66 
Female 1 2 3 2 0 0 8 
Total 2 17 20 29 5 1 74 
Table 4.9: Franchise Scenario Age/Gender Cross Tabulation 
Gender Age 
 18–30 31–40 41–50 51–60 61–70 71–80 Total 
Male 2 5 13 5 4 0 29 
Female 0 0 3 3 0 0 6 
Total 2 5 16 8 4 0 35 
4.4.1.4 Geographic Distribution of the Participants 
Online surveys have the advantage of being easily disseminated across the globe. To 
examine where in the world the respondents are based, the following question was asked: 
“What country do you work in?” 
In terms of the geographic distribution of the participants, it can be seen when examining 
Figures 4.3 and 4.4 that this is truly a global study, with responses from the United 
Kingdom, Continental Europe, Asia, the Middle East, Australasia, Africa, North America 
and South America. For the management contract scenario, the majority of the responses 
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came jointly from Germany and the United Arab Emirates, each with eight respondents. 
For the franchise survey, the majority of the responses came from the United States. 
Figure 4.3: Geographic Distribution of the Management Contract Scenario 
Participants 
 
Figure 4.4: Geographic Distribution of the Franchise Contract Scenario Participants 
  
4.4.1.5 Participant Positions 
The positions of the participants and their expertise are central to gauging the value of this 
research. Therefore, the position of the respondents was probed with the following 
question: 
“What is your current position?” 
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As can be seen when examining Tables 4.10 and 4.11, the largest number of responses 
came from vice-presidents in both the scenarios, accounting for 37% of the management 
contract scenario and 29% for the franchise scenario. Overall, there are no major 
differences between the position profiles of the participants in the two scenarios other 
than the relatively large number of ‘other’ responses for the franchise scenario, at 23%. 
Table 4.10: Position Profile Management Contract Scenario 
Answer   
 
Response % 
CEO   
 
5 7 
CFO   
 
3 4 
COO   
 
5 7 
Vice-president   
 
26 37 
President   
 
2 3 
Director   
 
13 18 
Managing director   
 
7 10 
Head of a division   
 
8 11 
Other   
 
2 3 
Total  71 100 
Table 4.11: Position Profile Management Contract Scenario 
Answer   
 
Response % 
CEO   
 
1 3 
CFO   
 
1 3 
COO   
 
4 11 
Vice-president   
 
10 29 
President   
 
1 3 
Director   
 
6 17 
Managing director   
 
2 6 
Head of a division   
 
2 6 
Other   
 
8 23 
Total  35 100 
4.4.1.6 Tenure in Current Position 
The years the respondents have spent in their current position was then probed through 
the following question: 
“How many years have you been employed in your current position?” 
When examining Figures 4.5 and 4.6, it can be seen that there is a similar trend in the two 
scenarios in regard to tenure of the respondents in their current position, with the 
majority of the responses in both scenarios being the ‘1–5 years’ time frame. When 
calculating the mean tenure of the respondents across the scenarios, moreover, it is 
further highlighted that they are very similar with a mean of 6.84 ‘years’ for the 
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management contract scenario respondents as opposed to 6.97 ‘years’ for the franchise 
scenario. 
Figure 4.5: Tenure in Current Position – Management Contract Scenario 
 
Figure 4.6: Tenure in Current Position – Franchise Scenario 
 
4.4.1.7 Experience in the Hotel Industry 
The overall experience of the participants in the hotel industry was also probed, through 
the following question: 
“How many years have you worked in the hotel industry?” 
When examining Figures 4.7 and 4.8, it can be seen that there is some variance in the 
experience levels of the respondents. For the management contract scenario, the 
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respondents’ experience is averaged at 23.58 ‘years’, and for the franchise scenario, it 
averaged at 18.03 ‘years’. 
Figure 4.7: Experience of the Respondents – Management Contract Scenario 
 
Figure 4.8: Experience of the Respondents – Franchise Scenario 
 
4.4.1.8 Making the Decision between Management Contracts and Franchising 
In order to evaluate what percentage of the participants has made the decision between 
management contracts and franchising in the past, the following question was posed: 
“Have you made the decision between franchising and management contracts in the 
past?” 
As can be seen in Tables 4.12 and 4.13, the majority of the participants have previous 
experience in making the decision between management contracts and franchising. For 
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the management contract scenario, 75% of the participants have at some point in their 
career made the decision, which is just slightly lower than the 78% for the franchise 
scenario participants. 
Table 4.12: Respondents Who Have Made the Decision – Management Contract 
Scenario 
Answer  
 
Response % 
Yes   
 
55 75 
No   
 
18 25 
Total  73 100 
Table 4.13: Respondents Who Have Made the Decision – Franchise Scenario 
Answer  
 
Response % 
Yes   
 
28 78 
No   
 
8 22 
Total  36 100 
4.4.1.9 Level of Expertise Making the Decision between Management Contracts and 
Franchising 
Establishing the proportion of the participants who have made the decision in the past, the 
level of expertise the participants have in making the decision was also evaluated through 
the following question: 
“What is your level of expertise in making this decision?” 
When examining Tables 4.14 and 4.15, it can be seen that the vast majority of the 
participants have a medium to high level of expertise in making the decision. The 
management contract scenario has a slightly higher percentage of respondents with a 
‘high’ level of expertise in the decision, at 73%, than the franchise scenario, at 61%.  
Table 4.14: Decision Expertise of the Respondents – Management Contract Scenario 
Answer  
 
Response % 
Low   
 
5 7 
Medium   
 
14 20 
High   
 
52 73 
Total  71 100 
Table 4.15: Decision Expertise of the Respondents – Franchise Scenario 
Answer  
 
Response % 
Low   
 
1 3 
Medium   
 
13 36 
High   
 
22 61 
Total  36 100 
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4.4.1.10 Level of Influence 
Finally, the level of influence the participants have in making the decision between 
management contracts and franchising was probed through the following question: 
“What level of influence do you have in the decision-making process?” 
In terms of the influence the respondents have in the decision, it can be seen in Tables 
4.16 and 4.17 that the respondents of both scenarios have a high level of influence within 
their organisations in the decision between franchising and management contracts, as was 
expected with the high levels of experience noted by the respondents. For the 
management contract scenario, 68% of the respondents indicated that they have a high 
level of influence in the decision compared with 57% for the franchise scenario.  
Table 4.16: Influence of the Respondents in the Decision – Management Contract 
Scenario 
Answer  
 
Response % 
Low   
 
4 6 
Medium   
 
19 26 
High   
 
49 68 
Total  72 100 
Table 4.17: Influence of the Respondents in the Decision – Franchise Scenario 
Answer  
 
Response % 
Low   
 
5 14 
Medium   
 
10 29 
High   
 
20 57 
Total  35 100 
4.4.1.11 Summary of the Questions and the Predominant Trends 
It can be seen when examining the characteristics of the respondents’ profiles that for the 
two scenarios the responses are relatively similar, with no major differences between 
them for any of the questions, indicating that, although the franchise respondent numbers 
are quite low, they had several similarities, which somewhat validates the statistics on this 
group that follow in the next section. The questions asked of the participants and the 
predominant trends identified in their responses are summarised in Table 4.18. 
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Table 4.18: Summary of the Questions and the Predominant Trends 
 Question Management contract 
scenario participant 
trends 
Franchise scenario 
participant trends 
Age What is your age? The average age of the 
respondents is 51–60 
years 
The average age of the 
respondents is 41–50 
years 
Gender What is your gender? The respondents are 
predominantly male 
participants, at 89%, 
compared with 11% 
females 
The respondents are 
predominantly male 
participants, at 83%, 
compared with 17% 
females 
Geographic  What country do you 
work in? 
The respondents are 
globally distributed 
over: 
6 continents 
19 countries 
The respondents are 
globally distributed 
over: 
5 continents 
15 countries 
Position What is your current 
position? 
The most common 
position of the 
respondents is vice-
president, at 37% 
The most common 
position of the 
respondents is vice-
president, at 29% 
Years in current 
Position 
How many years have 
you been employed in 
your current 
position? 
The average time the 
respondents have been 
employed in their 
current position is 6.84 
years 
The average time the 
respondents have been 
employed in their 
current position is 6.97 
years 
Years of hotel 
experience 
How many years have 
you worked in the 
hotel industry? 
The average time the 
respondents have been 
employed in the hotel 
industry is 23.58 years 
The average time the 
respondents have been 
employed in the hotel 
industry is 18.03 years 
Decision made 
before 
Have you made the 
decision between 
franchising and 
management 
contracts in the past? 
The decision has been 
made before by the 
majority of the 
participants, at 75%, as 
opposed to 25% who 
have not 
The decision has been 
made before by the 
majority of the 
participants, at 78%, as 
opposed to 22% who 
have not 
Expertise in the 
decision making 
What is your level of 
expertise in making 
this decision? 
The expertise of the 
respondents is 
predominantly ‘high’, at 
73%, with the average 
approximately halfway 
between ‘medium’ and 
‘high’, i.e. μ 2.66 
The expertise of the 
respondents is 
predominantly ‘high’, at 
61%, with the average 
approximately halfway 
between ‘medium’ and 
‘high’, i.e. μ 2.58 
Influence in the 
decision making 
What level of 
influence do you have 
in the decision-
making process? 
The respondents 
predominantly have a 
high level of influence 
on the decision, at 68%, 
with the average 
approximately halfway 
between medium (2) 
and high (3), i.e. μ 2.63 
The respondents 
predominantly have a 
high level of influence 
on the decision, at 57%, 
with the average 
approximately halfway 
between ‘medium’ and 
‘high’ i.e. μ 2.43 
4.4.2 NIE Reasoning Flaws 
In Study 1, some of the participants indicated that there were some reasoning flaws in 
some of the rationales and assumptions of the theories that were examined. In order to 
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gain some insight from the quantitative sample of Study 2 on the reasoning flaws 
suggested in Study 1, the following items were included in the survey: 
1) For hotel chains that have both franchised and managed hotels in their portfolio, 
the decision to use one or the other is not made by the hotel organisation; the 
decision is made by the investor, because they are the one with the money. 
2) We choose management contracts/franchising because our business is just set up 
that way. 
3) We are ad hoc in our decision making; we just see what works best on a case-by-
case basis. 
4) The choice between franchising and management contracts is simply a matter of 
the star level of the chain. 
5) In the instances where a hotel owner wants to operate on management contract 
and the hotel organisation does not, the hotel owner would simply find another 
hotel organisation. 
6) There is no real ‘decision’ as it’s based on the business model of the investor; there 
are some investors who would simply never operate under franchise agreement. 
7) When making this decision I think, “Do I want to run the hotel myself or do I want 
someone to run it for me?” That’s the main consideration. 
When examining Tables 4.19 and 4.20, it can be seen that the means are between 3.61 and 
4.87 for all the items but one, indicating no strong trends, with 4.00 representing the 
neutral response in the Likert scale. However, for both the management contract scenario 
and the franchise scenario surveys, the respondents clearly disagreed with item 4; that is, 
both groups of respondents highlighted that the choice between franchising and 
management contracts is not simply a matter of the star level of the chain. 
Table 4.19: NIE Reasoning Flaws – Management Contract Scenario 
Statistic Question 1 Question 2 Question 3 Question 4 Question 5 Question 6 Question 7 
Min value 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Max value 7 7 7 6 7 7 7 
Mean 3.80 4.78 4.05 2.80 4.87 4.58 4.42 
Standard 
deviation 
1.90 1.50 1.99 1.70 1.62 1.89 1.75 
Total 
responses 
75 76 76 76 76 76 76 
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Table 4.20: NIE Reasoning Flaws – Franchise Scenario 
Statistic Question 1 Question 2 Question 3 Question 4 Question 5 Question 6 Question 7 
Min value 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Max value 7 7 7 6 7 7 7 
Mean 4.36 4.36 4.86 2.83 3.61 4.69 4.74 
Standard 
deviation 
1.97 1.78 1.97 1.68 1.78 1.80 1.63 
Total 
responses 
36 36 36 36 36 36 35 
4.4.3 Descriptive Statistics of the Independent Variables  
When examining the differences in the means between the groups in Table 4.21, it can be 
seen that there are clear differences between some variables. Therefore, seeing that they 
are quite different gives us enough motivation to further analyse these differences in the 
variables for determining group membership. In particular, the differences among AS, II, 
INTNAGAS and SIZE highlight the differences between the two groups. It must be noted 
here that the position taken in this study is that we can draw conclusions from both 
groups; that is, although the franchise group is significantly smaller, the similarity of the 
responses to the demographics sections highlighted above suggests that the responses are 
reliable. 
Table 4.21: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable N Minimum Maximum Mean 
Std. 
deviation 
Scenario choice 113 1.00 2.00 1.6814 .46800 
Asset specificity 112 2.73 6.82 5.3203 .76042 
Imperfect imitability 112 2.22 6.67 4.4583 .98472 
Intangible assets 112 1.00 7.00 4.9635 1.58417 
Host country factors 112 1.00 7.00 4.4304 1.24603 
Organisational size 112 1.00 7.00 4.6161 1.39297 
Investment factors 111 1.00 7.00 4.6096 1.35875 
Available partners 110 1.00 7.00 4.5515 1.43314 
4.4.4 Reliability Testing 
Testing the internal consistency of the items that comprise the independent variables was 
done using Cronbach’s alpha. As can be seen in Table 4.22, all of the independent variables 
were above the accepted cut-off point of .7 (Hair et al., 2006). 
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Table 4.22: Cronbach’s Alpha 
 Variable N Minimum Maximum Mean 
Std. 
deviation 
Scenario choice 113 1.00 2.00 1.6814 .46800 
Asset specificity 112 2.73 6.82 5.3203 .76042 
Imperfect imitability 112 2.22 6.67 4.4583 .98472 
Intangible assets 112 1.00 7.00 4.9635 1.58417 
Host country factors 112 1.00 7.00 4.4304 1.24603 
Organisational size 112 1.00 7.00 4.6161 1.39297 
Investment factors 111 1.00 7.00 4.6096 1.35875 
Available partners 110 1.00 7.00 4.5515 1.43314 
4.4.5 Correlation Analysis 
In order to get a better understanding of the relationships between the variables used in 
the analysis, a correlation analysis was conducted. The most commonly used correlations 
are bivariate Pearson correlation coefficients (Hair et al., 2006). The significant 
correlations that were found between the variables are now presented and summarised in 
Table 4.23. The complete set of correlations for all the items in the survey can be seen in 
Appendix 10 – initially, for the whole data set and then separately for the two respondent 
groups, that is, the franchise scenario and the management contract scenario survey.  
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Table 4.23: Correlations of the Independent Variables (N = 109) 
 Variable Scenario 
choice 
Asset 
specificity 
Imperfect 
imitability 
Intangible 
assets 
Host country 
factors 
Organisational 
size 
Investment 
factors 
Available 
partners 
Asset specificity .345**               
112               
Imperfect 
imitability 
.127 .387**             
112              
Intangible 
assets  
.708** .354** .183           
112  
 
          
Host country 
factors 
–.275** –.098 –.003 –.054         
112  
  
        
Organisational 
size 
–.265** –.224* –.065 –.050 .391**       
112  
   
      
Investment 
factors 
.163 .210* .239* .380** .144 .398**     
111  
    
    
Available 
partners 
–.238* –.097 –.091 –.212* .351** .395** .218*   
110  
     
  
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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There were some correlations that are significant, as highlighted by the asterisks in the 
table. The column named ‘scenario choice’ indicates the dependent variable, and as can be 
seen, INTANGASR and AS are positively correlated with the dependent variable. As 
hypothesised, INTANGASR and AS both prompted management contracts, which lends 
support to the hypotheses. Moreover, it can be seen in the table that there are significant 
negative correlations between the dependent variable and HOSTCNTR, SIZE and 
AVAILPAR. This is again encouraging for the hypotheses as these variables were 
hypothesised as prompting franchising. Moreover, there were some correlations between 
the independent variables. Firstly, it can be seen that AS is positively correlated to II as 
well as INTANGASR and INVST. This is promising as the hypotheses these variables are 
testing all move in the same direction, that is, management contracts. This is also seen in 
the positive correlation between INTANGASR and INVST. The correlations also match the 
variables that move in the opposite direction, that is, franchising, as highlighted by the 
positive correlations between HOSTCNTR, SIZE and AVAILPAR. In other words, the 
hypotheses being tested by AS, II, INTANGASR and INVST all suggest that management 
contracts would be chosen over franchising, and the hypotheses being tested by 
HOSTCNTR, SIZE and AVAILPAR all suggest that franchising would be chosen over 
management contracts. Moreover, AS is negatively correlated with SIZE, which was also 
expected as increasing size was hypothesised as prompting franchising while increasing 
asset specificity was hypothesised as prompting management contracts. 
4.4.6 Multivariate Statistics 
4.4.6.1 MANOVA and ANOVAs  
Considering the differences in the means explained above, it was deemed appropriate to 
conduct a MANOVA and separate ANOVAs on the variables of interest. MANOVAs are 
statistical tests for comparing the multivariate means of several variables (Hair et al., 
2006). The test uses the variance-covariance between variables in testing the statistical 
significance differences in the means of the variables. As such the aim of this analysis in 
the context of this study is to see if the independent variables have an effect on the 
dependent variable The ANOVA conversely is not generalised but rather a univariate 
analysis of variance, which tests the significance of group differences based on one 
variable. The difference between MANOVAs and ANOVAs is that in a MANOVA you study 
group differences based on two or more related variables which amounts to controlling 
for the correlation between the other variables.  
In order to meet the requirements of the multivariate normality assumption (critical for 
both the MANOVA and the Discriminant function analysis to follow), normality was 
checked for each variable individually through a visual inspection of the Q-Q plots. 
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Moreover Mardia’s coefficient test was insignificant  (p = 0.2139) further confirming 
approximate multivariate normality. Following this Box’s M test of Equality of Covariance 
Matrices was used to check the assumption of homogeneity of covariance across groups. 
The results of the test were not significant [Box’s M (192.661), p = (0.199)] allowing the 
conclusion that there are not significant differences between the covariance matrices. 
Since the assumption is not violated, Wilk’s Lambda can be used to test model fit (Hair et 
al., 2009). 
Following Box’s M test, Levene's test for homogeneity of variance was conducted, which 
tests the null hypotheses that the error variance is equal across groups. For this test, the 
results should not be significant and as can be seen in Table 4.24 below that INTANGASR 
and SIZE are significant. However, when examining the means of these variables 
presented above, it can be seen that for the INTANGASR and SIZE variables the standard 
deviation is not bigger than two times the standard deviation across the groups, allowing 
for further testing (Hair et al., 2009). To do a final check that the assumptions of the 
MANOVA and discriminant analysis are met, some post hoc tests were conducted using 
Brown-Forsythe F and Welch’s F statistics on the INTANGASR and SIZE variables. The 
results remain unchanged, suggesting that this violation of the homogeneity of variance 
assumption for INTANGASR and SIZE does not pose a threat to the validity of the results. 
Table 4.24: Levene's Test of Equality of Error Variancesa 
Variable F df1 df2 Sig. 
Asset specificity 1.612 1 93 .207 
Imperfect imitability .017 1 93 .896 
Intangible assets 20.027 1 93 .000 
Environment-level factors .511 1 93 .476 
Organisational size 5.058 1 93 .027 
Investment factors .020 1 93 .889 
Available partners .261 1 93 .610 
Having established that the assumptions of MANOVA and discriminant analysis are met, 
the multivariate tests for model fit are now presented. The MANOVA analysis confirmed 
that there was a significant multivariate effect. As can be seen in Table 4.25, the Wilk’s 
lambda, which is the most established test for model fit = 0.299, F(16, 78) = 11.426, p < 
0.001. When examining the partial eta squared, it can be seen that about 70% of the 
variance in group differences can be explained by the two groups (i.e. the two scenarios). 
Pillai’s test also shows model fit = 0.701, F(16, 78) = 11.426, p < 0.001. 
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Table 4.25: Multivariate Testsa 
Effect Value F Hypothesis 
df 
Error 
df 
Sig. Partial 
eta 
squared 
Noncent. 
parameter 
Observed 
powerc 
Scenario Pillai’s 
Trace 
.701 11.426b 16.000 78.000 .000 .701 182.821 1.000 
Wilks' 
lambda 
.299 11.426b 16.000 78.000 .000 .701 182.821 1.000 
Hotelling's 
Trace 
2.344 11.426b 16.000 78.000 .000 .701 182.821 1.000 
Roy’s 
Largest 
Root 
2.344 11.426b 16.000 78.000 .000 .701 182.821 1.000 
Following the MANOVA and establishing univariate independence allows for the 
examination of the individual one-way ANOVAs with confidence that they are valid. In fact, 
all the independent variables show significant main effects for the different groups, as can 
be seen in Table 4.26, in terms of asset specificity F(1, 93) = 11.542, p < 0.001; imperfect 
imitability F(1, 93) = 1.071, p < 0.001; intangible assets F(1, 93) = 87.784, p < 0.001; host 
country factors F(1, 93) = 13.549, p < 0.001; organisational size F(1, 93) = 7.108, p < 
0.001; investment factors F(1, 93) = 3.190, p < 0.001; availability of partners F(1, 93) = 
6.545, p < 0.001. 
Table 4.26: Tests of Between Subjects Effects 
Variable df Mean square F Sig. 
Partial eta 
squared 
Asset specificity 1 5.987 11.542 .001 .110 
Imperfect imitability 1 1.015 1.071 .303 .011 
Intangible assets 1 122.976 87.783 .000 .486 
Host country factors 1 18.788 13.549 .000 .127 
Organisational size 1 11.679 7.108 .009 .071 
Investment factors 1 5.846 3.190 .077 .033 
Available partners 1 12.007 6.545 .012 .066 
4.4.6.2 Discriminant Analysis 
Discriminant function analysis is a statistical analysis designed to predict a categorical 
dependent variable (called a grouping variable) by one or more independent variables 
(Hair et al., 2006). The analysis determines whether a set of variables is effective in 
predicting category membership. Discriminant functions, unlike in cluster analysis, are 
done when the groups are known ‘priori’ (Hair et al., 2006). The logic behind the 
discriminant analysis is to try to identify uncorrelated linear combinations of predictor 
variables (= discriminant function) as doing so allows for the identification of the variables 
that discriminate between group memberships. It is suggested in the literature that 
discriminant analyses are closely linked and complementary tests for MANOVAs (Hair et 
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al., 2006). Therefore, the assumptions for these two statistical tests are the same, and as 
highlighted above, these assumptions have been met. The results will now be presented. 
As can be seen in Table 4.27, the conical correlation coefficient is significant at .837. 
Table 4.27: Eigenvalues 
Function Eigenvalue % of variance Cumulative % Canonical correlation 
1 2.344a 100.0 100.0 .837 
Moreover, Wilk’s Lambda highlights that the discriminant function is statistically 
significant at .299, as seen in Table 4.28. 
Table 4.28: Wilk’s Lambda 
Test of function(s) Wilks’ lambda Chi-square df Sig. 
1 .299 102.606 16 .000 
When examining the standardised conical discriminant function coefficients in Table 4.29, 
it can be seen that there is a clear discriminant function for intangible assets and also 
partly for HOSTCNTR and AS. In other words, these variables discriminate between group 
membership. 
Table 4.29: Standardised Canonical Discriminant Function Coefficients 
Variable 
 
Function 
1 
Asset specificity –.069 
Imperfect imitability .037 
Intangible assets –1.099 
Host country factors .316 
Organisational size .290 
Investment factors –.031 
Available partners .060 
The structure matrix presented in Table 4.30 provides another way of indicating the 
relative importance of the predictors. The structure matrix is generally considered more 
accurate than the standardised canonical discriminant function, and therefore, it is these 
results that are used to test the hypotheses, as presented in the following section. The 
structure matrix shows the correlations of each variable with each discriminant function. 
These Pearson coefficients are structure coefficients or discriminant loadings, serving like 
factor loadings in factor analysis. Generally, just like factor loadings, 0.30 is seen as the 
cut-off between important and less important variables (Hair et al., 2006). In this study, it 
can be seen that INTANGASR is well above this cut-off point at –.635, highlighting that the 
variable is highly loaded on the discriminant function. HOSTCNTR and AS, although 
slightly below the cut-off point at .249 and -2.30 respectively, are still loaded on the 
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discriminant function, that is, they are good predictors and suggest HOSTCNTR and AS are 
associated with the choice between franchising and management contracts. 
Table 4.30: Structure Matrix 
Variable Function 
 
1 
Intangible assets –.635 
Host country factors .249 
Asset specificity –.230 
Organisational size .181 
Available partners .173 
Investment factors –.121 
Imperfect imitability –.070 
In terms of the classification function coefficients (see Table 4.3.1), again we can see a 
clear relationship between the dependent variable (the scenario choice) and the 
independent variable INTANGASR.  
Table 4.31: Classification Function Coefficients 
Variable Scenario choice 
 0 1 
Asset specificity 9.006 9.316 
Imperfect imitability 6.600 6.478 
Intangible assets –.981 2.020 
Host country factors 2.148 1.282 
Organisational size 2.698 1.967 
Investment factors –2.790 –2.717 
Available partners 3.418 3.276 
Table 4.32 presents the classification results, which are the values that the independent 
variables take on the discriminant function for the different groups. As can be seen, group 
1, the management contract group, classified slightly better than group 0, the franchising 
group, for both the original grouped cases and the cross-validated grouped cases. For the 
original grouped cases, group 0 and group 1 were 83.9% and 98.4% correctly classified 
respectively. For the cross-validation, it can be seen that for group 0 and group 1, 74.2% 
and 95.3% of the grouped cases respectively classified correctly. 
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Table 4.32: Classification Results 
  Scenario choice Predicted group membership Total 
   0 1  
Original Count 0 26 5 31 
1 1 63 64 
% 0 83.9 16.1 100.0 
1 1.6 98.4 100.0 
Cross-validatedb Count 0 23 8 31 
1 3 61 64 
% 0 74.2 25.8 100.0 
1 4.7 95.3 100.0 
4.4.6.3 Report of the Hypotheses 
The results of the hypotheses testing indicate that three of the seven hypotheses can be 
considered supported. The details are as follows, and summarised in Table 4.33: 
H1 The higher the asset specificity, the more likely is a hotel executive’s intention to 
choose a management contract over franchising in the international expansion of a hotel 
chain. 
It is shown in Table 4.30 that, although the discriminant function of AS is below the cut-off 
of 0.30, at –230, it is still fairly loaded on the discriminant function, indicating a preference 
for management contracts; thus, H1 is supported by this research. In other words, asset 
specificity could be a good predictor of a hotel executive’s intention to choose a 
management contract over franchising in the international expansion of a hotel chain. 
H2 The higher the imperfect imitability, the more likely is a hotel executive’s intention to 
choose a management contract over franchising in the international expansion of a hotel 
chain. 
This hypothesis is not supported by this research because the function is well below the 
accepted cut-off. In other words, imperfect imitability is not a good predictor of a hotel 
executive’s intention to choose a management contract over franchising in the 
international expansion of a hotel chain. 
H3 The larger the size of the organisation, the more likely is a hotel executive’s intention 
to choose franchising over a management contract in the international expansion of a 
hotel chain. 
This hypothesis is not supported by this research because the function is well below the 
accepted cut-off. In other words, the size of the organisation is not a good predictor of a 
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hotel executive’s intention to choose a management contract over franchising in the 
international expansion of a hotel chain. 
H4 The higher the investment of the organisation, the more likely is a hotel executive’s 
intention to choose a management contract over franchising in the international 
expansion of a hotel chain. 
This hypothesis is not supported by this research because the function is well below the 
accepted cut-off. In other words, the size of the organisation is not a good predictor of a 
hotel executive’s intention to choose a management contract over franchising in the 
international expansion of a hotel chain. 
H5 The higher the importance placed on intangible assets, the more likely is a hotel 
executive’s intention to choose a management contract over franchising in the 
international expansion of a hotel chain. 
It is shown in Table 4.30 that the discriminant function of INTANGASR is well above the 
cut-off at –.635. In other words, intangible assets could be a good predictor of a hotel 
executive’s intention to choose a management contract over franchising in the 
international expansion of a hotel chain. 
H6 The higher the environmental uncertainty, the more likely is a hotel executive’s 
intention to choose franchising over a management contract in the international 
expansion of a hotel chain. 
As seen in Table 4.30, while the discriminant function of HSTCNTR is below the cut-off of 
0.30, at .249, it is still fairly loaded on the discriminant function and indicates a preference 
for franchising; thus, H6 is supported by this research. In other words, host country 
factors could be a good predictor of a hotel executive’s intention to choose a management 
contract over franchising in the international expansion of a hotel chain. 
H7 The higher the availability of partners, the more likely is a hotel executive’s intention 
to choose franchising over a management contract in the international expansion of a 
hotel chain. 
This hypothesis is not supported by this research because the function is well below the 
accepted cut-off. In other words, the availability of partners is not a good predictor of a 
hotel executive’s intention to choose a management contract over franchising in the 
international expansion of a hotel chain. 
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Table 4.33: Summary of Hypotheses with Result  
Hypotheses Result 
H1 The higher the asset specificity, the more likely is a hotel executive’s 
intention to choose a management contract over franchising in the 
international expansion of a hotel chain. 
Supported 
H2 The higher the imperfect imitability, the more likely is a hotel executive’s 
intention to choose a management contract over franchising in the 
international expansion of a hotel chain. 
Not supported 
H3 The larger the size of the organisation, the more likely is a hotel 
executive’s intention to choose franchising over a management contract in 
the international expansion of a hotel chain. 
Not supported 
H4 The higher the investment of the organisation, the more likely is a hotel 
executive’s intention to choose a management contract over franchising in 
the international expansion of a hotel chain. 
Not supported 
H5 The higher the importance placed on intangible assets, the more likely is a 
hotel executive’s intention to choose a management contract over franchising 
in the international expansion of a hotel chain. 
Supported 
H6 The higher the environmental uncertainty, the more likely is a hotel 
executive’s intention to choose franchising over a management contract in 
the international expansion of a hotel chain. 
Supported 
H7 The higher the availability of partners, the more likely is a hotel 
executive’s intention to choose franchising over a management contract in 
the international expansion of a hotel chain. 
Not supported 
4.5 Discussion 
This study highlighted that intangible assets and resources, asset specificity and host 
country factors do have an effect on the preference for choosing between franchising and 
management contracts. The other variables – imperfect imitability, size of the 
organisation, investment factors and availability of local partners – were not found to have 
a central effect on the decision. 
By far the most powerful predictor variable examined in this study is intangible assets and 
resources. Intangible assets and resources in the context of this study include the brand of 
the hotels managerial expertise, organisational routines, training and reservation systems 
and industry knowledge, as opposed to the hotel property itself or any of its furnishings, 
which are the tangible assets (Brouthers & Brouthers, 2003; Erramilli & Rao, 1990, 1993). 
This finding supports the notion that, firstly, from the RBV, if knowledge is intangible or 
tacit, or highly interconnected, and therefore difficult to transfer, an internalised mode 
would be chosen (Barney, 1991; Brown et al., 2003; Lam, 1997; Madhok, 1997). Secondly, 
from the TCE perspective, it is exactly in these cases that an asset will also be 
characterised as highly specific to the transaction. Opportunism from the economic agent 
in such cases would likely erode the competitive advantage created through the asset also 
prompting an internal mode (Cho, 2005; Erramilli & Rao, 1993; Villar et al., 2012). 
Furthermore, this study supported the findings of Contractor and Kundu (1998a), who 
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came to the conclusion that there was a link between the idiosyncratic asset of training in 
the hospitality industry and the decision on which entry mode to use. 
Host country factors had a significant loading in the discriminant function. In the context 
of this study, host country factors are the economic, fiscal and political conditions of a 
market a foreign firm enters (Gatignon & Anderson, 1988; K. D. Miller, 1993; Sanchez-
Peinado & Pla-Barber, 2006b; Williamson, 1985, 1991). It was found in this study that host 
country factors have an impact on entry mode choice, as suggested by Gatignon and 
Anderson (1988); K. D. Miller (1993); Sanchez-Peinado and Pla-Barber (2006b); 
Williamson (1985); (1991). Several studies have identified that when environmental 
uncertainty is high, stronger control is needed in the form of high resource entry modes to 
manage the effects of this uncertainty (Altinay, 2007; Dev et al., 2002; Erramilli et al., 
2002; Madhok, 1998). However, in this study the opposite was found: that when 
environmental uncertainty is high, firms will choose a less resource-intensive mode to be 
more flexible and allow the firm to exit more easily in case the venture fails as suggested 
by Erramilli and Rao (1993), Fladmoe-Lindquist and Jacque (1995), Kim and Hwang 
(1992) and Mutinelli and Piscitello (1998). Fladmore-Linquist and Jacque (1995) found no 
relationship between country risk and the choice of entry mode. Moreover, Contractor and 
Kundu (1998b) also found no support for the relationship between country risk and entry 
mode choice. However, in this study it was shown that environmental uncertainties do 
prompt hotel executives to favour franchising over management contracts.  
Asset specificity is the last variable that had a significant loading in the discriminant 
function. Asset specificity, in this study, refers to the degree to which assets, both physical 
and human, are locked into a particular use and the consequent difficulty of redeploying 
these assets for another use without affecting the productive value of the asset 
(Williamson, 1985). As suggested by Altinay (2007), it was found that a hotel organisation 
will choose a low control mode if asset specificity is low. If the transaction cost resulting 
from asset specificity increases, however, it will prompt the organisation to choose a 
higher control mode. Furthermore, this study supports the findings of Cho (2005) that 
asset specificity affected the decision between franchising and equity modes in the same 
manner and also supports studies examining the outsourcing decisions of hotel chains 
through the lens of asset specificity that found that asset specificity prompts 
internalisation and that lack of asset specificity prompts outsourcing (Espino-Rodriguez et 
al., 2008; Espino-Rodriguez & Padron, 2005; Kruesi & Zamborsky, in press; Lamminmaki, 
2005). Finally, as suggested by Kruesi and Zamborsky (in press); Lamminmaki (2005); 
Lohita et al. (1994); Williamson (1985), it was found in this study that the possibility of a 
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partner inflicting damage on the reputation of the hotel’s business through opportunism 
would prompt the choice of a management contract. 
Imperfect imitability unexpectedly had the lowest loading in the discriminant function of 
all the independent variables. In this study, imperfect imitability tested the importance of 
firm-specific resources that in combination are imperfectly imitable, that is, resources that 
are very difficult to replicate perfectly (Barney, 1991). Dev et al. (2002), Erramilli et al. 
(2002) and Kruesi and Zamborsky (in press) empirically examined the non-equity entry 
mode decisions of hotel organisations and found that imperfect imitability is a central 
determinant prompting hotel organisations to use management contracts over 
franchising. However, in this study, although the factor loading for imperfect imitability is 
negative, that is, leaning towards management contracts, no definitive support was found 
for imperfect imitability prompting the use of management contracts.  
Size of the organisation had slightly higher loadings than imperfect imitability in testing 
the relationship between organisational size in the choice between franchising and 
management contracts in the hotel industry. It is suggested in the literature that as the 
size of a company grows, it is more likely to opt for direct investment through ownership 
(Agarwal & Ramaswami, 1992; Campa & Guillén, 1999; Gomes-Casseres, 1989; Stopford & 
Wells, 1972; Trevino & Grosse, 2002), while smaller companies with more limited 
resources or skills in investing in foreign markets will prefer shared modes of control 
(Erramilli & Rao, 1993). However, this study rather supports the reasoning suggested by 
Gatignon and Anderson (1988) and Martorell et al. (2013) that high control strategies are 
not as favoured in large-scale foreign investments in the hotel industry because hotel 
organisations prefer and are almost forced to share the investment with a partner because 
of the scale of international operations in the hotel industry. 
Investment factors had the second lowest loading in the discriminant function. In the case 
of the hotel industry, investment factors tested whether hotel organisations that place 
greater priority on larger operations, personnel training (Gatignon & Anderson, 1988) and 
on investments in management controls and quality controls are more likely to opt for a 
high control entry mode (Martorell et al., 2013), that is, management contracts. While the 
factor loading was low, the results supported this, suggesting that significant investment 
and specialisation prompts the use of management contracts. 
Finally, availability of local partners had a loading not much lower than size of the 
organisation. Availability of local partners tested the absorptive capacity of local 
management in deciding how to transfer a service internationally and across firm 
boundaries (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; Erramilli et al., 2002). It is suggested in the 
 141 
literature that if there is a concern that the local manager does not have the ability to 
provide the service, which would affect the brand of the hotel organisation, this would 
cause a hotel organisation to internalise the entry mode (Erramilli et al., 2002). Although 
the factor loading is not that high, the findings do suggest that the importance of 
supporting infrastructure both within and outside the firm that may facilitate the transfer 
of resources and capabilities does prompt the use of franchising, as suggested by (Hu, 
1995; Madhok, 1997). 
4.5.1 Revised Theoretical Framework 
Considering the discussion above, a revised version of the theoretical framework 
proposed in Section 4.2.13 is presented below. As can be seen, asset specificity and 
intangible assets and resource, hypotheses one and five respectively, both prompt 
management contracts. Conversely the host country environment, hypothesis six, prompts 
franchising. 
Figure 4.9: Revised Version of the Theoretical Framework  
 
Independent Variable       Hypotheses           Dependent Variable 
 
 
 
4.6 Conclusion 
This study examined the variables that might impact on the choice between franchising 
and management contracts in the hotel industry. Initially, the assumptions of discriminant 
function were checked with a normal distribution of the predictor variables (multivariate 
normality) observed. Following this, a discriminant analysis was conducted to predict 
whether respondents would have a preference for management contracts or for 
franchising. The predictor variables for this analysis were asset specificity, imperfect 
imitability, intangible assets and resources, the size of the organisation, host country 
factors  and the availability of local management. It is seen that there are several 
correlations between the variable, which lends support for the hypotheses. However, for 
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the hypotheses testing only the more rigorous results of the discriminant function were 
considered. Initially the assumption testing for the discriminant analysis was conducted. 
Box’s M indicated that the assumption of equality of covariance matrices was met. In 
addition the assumption of multivariate normality was tested using Mardia’s coefficient 
test also indicating that the assumption was met. The significant of the discriminant 
function as assessed using Wilk’s lambda. This test indicated that the function is highly 
significant. Hence, the discriminate function revealed a good ability to discriminate 
between groups, although closer analysis of the structure matrix revealed that only three 
significant predictors, namely intangible assets and resources, host country and asset 
specificity existed. Moreover the cross-validated classification in particular showed that 
74.2% and 95.3% of group 0 and group 1 respectively, were correctly classified, providing 
further support that the discriminant function created by this analysis can be used to 
predict the choice between management contracts and franchising in the hotel industry. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 143 
CHAPTER 5 CONCLUSION 
5.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, the main findings of the research are summarised followed by an outline of 
the practical implications. After that, the contributions of this research to entry mode 
research will be explained before the limitations are outlined and some recommendations 
for future research are suggested. 
5.2 Summary of Key Findings 
As was highlighted in Chapter 1, there were initially three research questions developed 
based on preliminary literature reviews: (1) How are the predominant theories of entry 
mode literature perceived by high-level hotel executives? (2) Which of the predominant 
theories of entry mode literature is the most effective in explaining the specific decision 
made between franchising and management contracts? and (3) What independent 
variables can be identified to predict the preference of hotel executives when choosing 
between franchising and management contracts in the hotel industry? These questions 
then informed the literature review for this thesis.  
The research questions were based initially on previous empirical research conducted by 
the researcher as well as a literature review. Therefore, the objectives of the research 
were (1) to examine and analyse non-equity entry modes in the hotel sector 
independently from equity entry modes; (2) to identify which of the predominant 
theories, or which combination of theories in the entry mode literature, is the most 
effective in the context of choosing between franchising and management contracts in the 
hotel industry; and (3) to identify, analyse and test the key factors associated with the 
choice between franchising and management contracts.  
Initially, these objectives were explored through qualitative research, in Study 1, and then 
probed in more detail through quantitative research, in Study 2. Based on the research 
objectives, research questions and the findings of Study 1, the hypotheses for the study 
were developed, as summarised in Table 4.33.  
5.2.1 Summary of Key Findings of Study 1 
The main finding to come out of Study 1 is that TCE and the RBV were the most 
appropriate and all-inclusive theories in the context of choosing between franchising and 
management contracts. Asset specificity and imperfect imitability were suggested as 
particularly appropriate theoretical rationales. There were parts of other theories that the 
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respondents indicated were considerations, such as those of agency theory. The principal–
agent problem was seen as important; however, the TCE is more inclusive and also 
considers this ‘problem’ with its underlying assumption of opportunism or opportunistic 
behaviour of the contracted party. 
Furthermore, it was found that all of the theories had flaws in terms of the restrictions 
placed on them. This has highlighted that, firstly, the theorising is overthinking a basic 
problem: establishing a new hotel in a new country; that is, rather than following some set 
parameters, executives are far more ad hoc in their decision making, simply opting for 
whatever strategy works based (in the context of the firm’s ability and strengths). 
Moreover, it was suggested that the theories that focus on the decision of the hotel firm 
are missing the whole picture, especially in the case of non-equity modes. By definition, 
non-equity modes require a partner, and as the partner is the party investing capital, often 
they are the ones with the demands and the bargaining power. 
5.2.2 Summary of Key Findings Study 2 
The main finding of this study is that control over or ownership of intangible assets is an 
important consideration when internationalising a hotel and is empirically shown to affect 
the preference of management contracts over franchising. Although this has already been 
highlighted in the literature, it had not yet been empirically tested on a sample of such 
high-level decision makers and experts. Moreover, host country uncertainty or risk was 
shown in the study to prompt hotel executives to favour franchising in order to reduce this 
risk and asset specificity was shown to prompt hotel executives to favour management 
contracts over franchising. The other independent variables tested in the discriminant 
function, availability of local partners, size of the organisation and investment factors 
were not very strongly supported, indicating that these variables are less important in the 
decision made between franchising and management contracts in the hotel industry. 
5.3 Practical Implications 
Entry mode decisions have become a critical consideration in the hotel sector. While the 
hospitality industry has existed for centuries, the concept of the hotel chain has existed for 
only just over a century. Moreover, the internationalisation of these chains only started in 
the 1950s and 1960s, with non–equity internationalisation only gaining real momentum 
in the past two to three decades. Finally, in their relatively brief history, franchise 
agreements and management contracts in the hotel sector have evolved greatly and 
continue to do so. Considering the developing nature of these agreements, the empirical 
data collected in this research sheds further light on some of the salient considerations in 
the entry mode decision, which may aid better understanding and further improving 
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internationalisation strategies in the hotel sector. Therefore, this research has practical 
implications for hotel owners and operators.  
The implications arising from this research for hotel owners is twofold. Firstly, hotel 
owners must carefully consider not only which brand they would like to represent their 
hotels but also which organisation would be a good fit with the goals and intentions of the 
owners. Secondly, hotel owners must also be aware of how risky or uncertain their home 
country is for hotel organisations when considering which model they would like to 
operate. 
It was highlighted in the findings from Study 1 that owners may have the bargaining 
power of choosing between management contracts and franchising; however, the fit 
between the organisations must be considered in terms of the offerings of the hotel 
organisations and the aims or goals of the hotel owner. Hotel owners may want to operate 
the hotel themselves and prefer franchising, but they must then consider brands that are 
not as fiercely controlled by the hotel organisation and that the staff of the hotel owner 
can replicate appropriately. This is because both micro-management from the hotel 
organisation and inadequate delivery of the brand standards will negatively affect the 
hotel owner. 
Moreover, the owners of hotels in countries characterised by uncertainty or perceived as 
risky by the hotel organisation must be prepared to consider franchising over 
management contracts because such factors may lead hotel organisations to minimise the 
risk through franchising. Consequently, hotel owners in such regions need to focus on the 
quality of their staff and the training systems they employ to increase the chances of 
operating with hotel organisations that control more upscale brands. 
In terms of hotel operators, the research highlights that it is important to retain control 
over the intangible assets a chain controls. If hotel operators own or control intangible 
assets, the research highlights that tight control should be retained over these assets. 
Moreover, this is the case when the specificity of the intangible assets is high. 
In addition, hotel organisations should consider franchising in uncertain markets and 
hand over control of the operations to a local partner in such situations. The uncertainties 
of the local market will make the operation of the hotel more difficult for the foreign hotel 
organisation than for the local partner who will have more knowledge and thus be able to 
more efficiently operate in the market. 
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5.3.1 Executives’ Feedback with Practical literature 
In order to examine the practical implications further, feedback was sought from the 
participants of Study 2 after the completion of the study. A total of 34 of the executives 
that took part in the study where contacted and sent an executive report of the research. 
These 34 individuals where the ones that had indicated, at the point of completing the 
survey, that they would be willing to provide feedback. Of the executives contacted, five 
replied with positive feedback and/or general observations on the industry or their 
organisation as outlined later in this section, and one provided useful critical feedback as 
seen below: 
 “There are some interesting ideas [developed in this study]… [However] your 
findings are somewhat different from the practice at Marriott in terms of 
uncertainty.  For example, for us, an “uncertain operating environment” would 
make us highly unlikely to want to franchise.  There would be very few 
circumstances where new/inexperienced operators under a franchise would be 
able to perform better than Marriott itself under a management contract – hence 
why under management contracts we are generally able to demand much higher 
fees.” 
Clearly this statement highlights the point that the protection and delivery of the brand 
and service offerings of Marriott International, Inc are important, and thus, uncertain 
environments prompt the company to retain control through management contracts. This 
has been suggested in the literature where several authors argue that in cases of high 
environmental uncertainty, stronger control is favoured through a higher resource entry 
mode to manage the effects of the uncertainty (Altinay, 2007; Dev et al., 2002; Erramilli et 
al., 2002; Madhok, 1998).  When examining other examples of Marriott International, Inc.’s 
expansion, two of their new properties in the United States, their home market and 
consequently their most certain market, opened this year under a franchise agreements, 
highlighting that trend further (Resource, 2015). 
This trend is also observed with InterContinental Hotels Group. When examining their 
annual report for 2013, it can be seen that in their home continent of Europe, the 
organisation franchises 84% of its non-equity portfolio as opposed to 16% operated under 
management contracts. In the USA, the same trend is seen, where 94% of hotels are 
franchises and 6% are managed. However, when examining their other main markets, that 
include Asia, the Middle East and Africa, which could be described as more ‘uncertain’, the 
relationship is distinctly different, with 2% of the non-equity portfolio franchised and 98% 
under management contracts. This highlights the fact that IHG also prefers the use of 
management contracts in uncertain environments (InterContinental Hotels Group, 2013). 
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However, the opposite can also be seen in the recent expansion of other large hotel 
organisations (as suggested by the findings of Study 2), where high environmental 
uncertainty prompts some firms to choose a less resource-intensive mode that facilitates 
easier exit from the market should the venture fail, or because local operators are likely to 
know more about the local market as suggested by Erramilli and Rao (1993), Fladmoe-
Lindquist and Jacque (1995), Kim and Hwang (1992) and Mutinelli and Piscitello (1998).  
This was highlighted by the response of one of the five, hotel executives that provided 
feedback: 
“The legal and regulatory environment is an important consideration. Sometimes 
we decide to enter a market with franchise contracts because we feel that the legal 
system is not mature enough to support management agreements and desire to 
lower our own exposure through franchising.” 
An example of this strategy is employed by the Wyndham Hotel Group, that has 
predominantly used franchises in uncertain markets such as across Africa, while a large 
percentage of its management contracts are in the USA, which is the company’s home 
market (Wyndham Worldwide Corporation, 2012). However, very recently, Wyndham 
Hotel Group has started its first management contract in Africa (Wyndham Worldwide 
Corporation, 2014). As suggested by the executive’s feedback above, as the legal and 
regulatory environment matures, management contracts become more favourable. 
This trend is also observed with Hilton Hotels & Resorts. A specific example is Hiltons 
DoubleTree brand’s recent expansion into Colombia. The company has decided to enter 
the Colombian market under a franchise agreement (Hotel News Resource, 2015), while in 
contrast, the rest of their expansion in central and South America through DoubleTree has 
used management contracts (DoubleTree, 2014; PM Hospitality Strategies, n.d.). This is 
relevant due to the fact that in the 7th annual political risk Atlas, released by global risk 
analytics company Verisk Maplecroft, it can be seen that Colombia has the highest political 
risk of all of the Americas. In fact, it is the only country in both North and South America 
defined as ‘high risk’ (Maplecroft, 2015). It must also be noted that Hilton’s local partner is 
a well-established and trusted hotel operator in the Colombian market (Hotel News 
Resource, 2015). This is a critical example to consider due to the fact that in the feedback 
received from the executive of Marriott International Inc., he/she referred to 
“new/inexperienced operators”, which would obviously not be able to perform at the 
same level as the hotel organisation itself. This point is also highlighted by two of the other 
five executives that responded, which stated: 
“In many developing markets the lack of credible franchise partners forces hotel 
companies to focus on management contracts. This changes over time as the 
market matures and owners gain experience.” 
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“A critical condition for franchising is the availability of operators capable of 
running the hotel in-line with the brand standards, if they are not there, 
management contracts are the only option....” 
This is interesting for the AVAILPAR variable, which tested for the importance of the 
availability of capable partners in deciding between franchising and management 
contracts. This hypothesis suggesting that the availability of capable partners leads to 
franchising was not supported in this study. However, this may have occurred due to 
confines of the scenario based survey, as AVAILPAR tested the importance of capable 
partners in all markets regardless of uncertainty. Future research could therefore test the 
impact of AVAILPAR in the context of high environmental uncertainty, where it would 
likely be a much more powerful independent variable. 
5.4 Contribution to the Literature  
This research contributes to the entry mode literature in the following ways. 
There has been much quantitative research done in entry mode research as well as some 
qualitative research that may generate incomplete and less representative results. In this 
thesis, the two methods are combined to better understand the motives of hotel 
executives in deciding between franchising and management contracts. Specifically, Study 
1 reduces the dependency on a researcher-led agenda and adds validity to the measuring 
items used in Study 2.  
As highlighted in Section 4.2.14, this thesis is one of a very few studies to focus exclusively 
on non-equity entry modes and the first to use TCE and the RBV in such an investigation. 
This is a significant contribution, as highlighted in Section 1.3 where it is shown that while 
91.9% of the entry modes used by the 10 largest hotel chains comprise franchising and 
management contracts, the majority of hotel entry mode studies, including recent ones, 
focus largely on choosing between equity and non-equity modes, that is, considering 
franchising and management contracts as equal.  
Moreover, this thesis provides empirical evidence that both TCE and RBV reasoning is 
salient in non-equity entry mode decisions. Specifically, as suggested by the RBV, the 
resources of the hotel chain are the major driver for the entry mode decision. This was 
shown to be valid through the large predictive power of intangible assets and resources in 
choosing management contracts. Moreover, it highlights that, from the TCE perspective, 
the protection and control of these resources is the reason for this. 
Finally, this thesis adds further empirical findings on the effect of host country variables 
on the choice between franchising and management contracts. A vast body of literature 
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presents contradictory findings on the effect of host country uncertainty and risk, with 
some suggesting higher control modes and other suggesting lower control modes. This 
study has shown that in the case of the hotel industry, host country risk and uncertainty is 
more likely to prompt hotel executives to prefer franchising, that is, a lower control mode. 
5.5 Theoretical and Practical Value of the Thesis 
This study is first to conduct quantitative research on entry modes with decision makers 
at the senior executive level in hotel firms. As such this study provides useful information  
on the considerations of the actual corporate level decision makers, as opposed to general 
managers or other operational level hotel practitioners, which has generally been the case 
in previous research. 
Moreover, this thesis holds theoretical value as it confirms the assertions in the literature 
that the aim to protect and control intangible assets and resources and the aim to transfer 
these effectively across markets, leads managers to prefer higher control entry modes. 
This finding is valuable theoretically because these factors have not previously been tested 
quantitatively with senior executive level decision makers. 
Furthermore, this research is of value theoretically as it sheds light on the effect of the 
host country environment. It was shown that in the specific case of choosing between 
franchising and management contracts, host country uncertainty leads managers to be 
risk averse. However, as highlighted in the previous section, there are clearly individuals 
and companies that prefer to retain control of their operation in uncertain environments. 
Practically there is value in this thesis as franchising and management contracts change 
and evolve over time. as does their use in the hotel industry. As such, this research 
provides an overview of the of the current considerations and trends in non-equity/asset 
light expansion, as well as considerations for how these modes will evolve over the 
following decade. 
This thesis is also of value to hotel industry practitioners because the samples for both 
Study 1 and Study 2 were high level hotel executives. These are the individuals at the 
decision making level of the largest hotel organisations in the world. As such, their 
responses are very credible and reliable. Hotel practitioners who are not at the executive 
level can therefore also gain insight from the findings of this study.  
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5.6 Limitations 
There are some limitations in this research, including some of the underlying assumptions 
of the theoretical underpinnings of the thesis, the limited perspective possible in the scope 
of this research and the relatively small number of participants for both Study 1 and Study 
2.  
NIE and specifically TCE and the RBV were shown to be an appropriate theoretical lens to 
understand the way in which hotel executives make the decision between franchising and 
management contracts. However, non-equity internationalisation does not depend only on 
the preferences of the hotel executives but also on the preferences of the local partner, 
that is, the hotel owner.  
Due to the scope of this research project, it was not possible to incorporate the viewpoint 
of the owners into the analysis. This is because the effect of the hotel owner on the entry 
mode decision would require a different research design altogether. Moreover, it would 
require access to data that hotel organisations would be reluctant to reveal for 
confidentiality reasons. 
Moreover, if the aim of the research was to examine both the hotel organisation and the 
hotel owners, that is, both parties of the transaction, a different theoretical approach 
would be required. Perhaps a grounded theory approach would be most suited for such 
analysis. 
A further limitation in this thesis is the implicit assumption that the hotel executives have 
already decided between franchising and management contracts. Accordingly, no analysis 
is possible on the interaction between hotel executives’ decision to expand and the actual 
entry mode used. 
A final limitation revolves around the limited number of high-level hotel executives who 
make these decisions in large organisations. Firstly, it was not possible to include a hotel 
executive in the pilot study for Study 1, as none of the executives approached responded 
to the research invitation. Secondly, it was difficult to obtain a large sample for 
quantitative analysis in such cases. Thirdly, a global sample had to be used to obtain the 
responses for both Study 1 and Study 2. Therefore, the sample comprises several small 
groups of company home countries. This allows only for analysis of how the host country 
affects the entry mode choice but does not allow for any analysis on how a hotel 
organisation’s home country affects the decision. 
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5.7 Future Research 
Considering the growing importance of the service sector and the hotel industry 
specifically, and that this sector favours the use of non-equity modes, it is necessary for 
future researchers to continue on this research stream. Specifically, it is suggested that 
further analysis be conducted on the hotel owners, the interaction between firm-level and 
environmental-level factors and that further empirical research be conducted on hotel 
executives. 
As mentioned in the previous section, this thesis examines the entry mode choice from the 
perspective of the hotel organisation as opposed to the hotel owner. It would therefore be 
of interest to examine the variables that affect the decisions of the hotel owners to 
cooperate with the hotel organisations and under what terms. In order to analyse the 
entry mode decision from both perspectives, a possible approach would be inductive in 
nature, with interviews, a case study or a focus group to see how the hotel owners are 
approached or to approach hotel organisations and the variables that affect their 
negotiation. Conversely, a Delphi analysis with a mixed sample of hotel owners and hotel 
organisations could be used to identify the variables that prompt hotel owners to work 
with a particular hotel organisation. 
The results indicated that the higher the host country risk the more likely hotel firms are 
to use franchising over management contracts. However, the strongest predictor variable, 
based on the effect that intangible assets have on the decision, showed that firm-level 
factors have a strong effect that prompts a preference for management contracts. It would 
be interesting for further research to examine this relationship between various firm-level 
factors and environment-level factors and how they affect the entry mode choice. 
Furthermore, Study 1 and Study 2 are two of the very few research projects that sample 
high-level hotel executives. In fact, to the knowledge of the researcher, Study 2 is the only 
quantitative analysis of high-level hotel executives. Therefore, future research should 
focus further on this sample, although access to the sample may be difficult. Researchers 
aiming to sample high-level executives must create some type of value for the executives 
and include them in the research process. Perhaps by first approaching only the CEOs and 
asking them what they would like to discover and including it in the instrumentation of 
the surveys and interviews to be conducted, the research would be mutually beneficial 
and thus would facilitate access for the researcher. 
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Finally, a theoretical foundation such as the one developed in this thesis could be used in 
the analysis of the expansion of other businesses in the hospitality industry and also the 
service sector more broadly. 
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Appendices  
Appendix 1 Proportion of Equity vs. Non-Equity Entry Modes Used in 
the 10 Largest Hotel Organisations Globally 
 
Appendix 2 Proportion of Equity vs. Non-Equity Oriented Hotel Entry 
Mode Research 
 
0
5000
10000
15000
20000
25000
30000
35000
Equity Entry Modes Non-Equity Entry Modes
N
u
m
b
e
r 
o
f 
H
o
te
ls
Entry Modes
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
Equity vs. Non-Equity Modes Exclusively Non-Equity Modes
N
u
m
b
e
r 
o
f 
S
tu
d
ie
s
Research Focus
 171 
Appendix 3 The Theoretical Paradigm of This Thesis 
 
Adapted from Crotty (1998) 
Appendix 4 Flow Diagram of the PhD Research Process 
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Appendix 5 Hotel Entry Mode Studies over the Past 30 Years 
Year Author/s Purpose  Theory Methodology 
1982 (Dunning & 
McQueen, 1982) 
Analyses the various strategies used by international hotel chains to see 
which of them contributes most to competitive advantage, also 
highlighting the need to distinguish between ownership and control of 
hotels 
- OLI - Empirical – Quant. 
- Statistical tests on existing 
dataset 
1997 (Litteljohn, 1997) Examines internationalisation in the hotel industry and proposes new 
approaches that hotel chains must consider when internationalising and 
provides implications for future research  
- No theory - Theoretical  
- Secondary data 
1998 (Contractor & 
Kundu, 1998a) 
Examines the factors that prompt franchising, for a particular hotel 
property given a choice between a company-run and a franchised 
operation.  
- TCE  
- Agency theory 
- Corporate knowledge 
theory  
- OCP (RBV) 
- Empirical – Quant. 
- Statistical tests on existing 
dataset 
 
(Contractor & 
Kundu, 1998b) 
Examines the determinants of the optimum choice of organisational 
mode (entry mode) 
- TCE  
- Agency theory -
Corporate knowledge 
theory  
- OCP (RBV) 
- Synergetic theory 
- Empirical – Quant. 
- Statistical tests on existing 
dataset 
 
(Wu et al., 1998) Analyses the relationship between environmental scanning activities and 
business expansion strategies of transnational hotel companies 
- No theory - Empirical – Quant 
- Survey 
2000 (Ray Pine, Zhang, & 
Qi, 2000) 
Reviews the recent trends of franchising in the hotel industry and the 
development of the hotel industry in China and discusses the challenges 
and opportunities of franchising in the China context 
- No theory - Theoretical 
- Review 
2002 (Dev et al., 2002) Examines the choice between management contracts and franchising  - OCP (RBV) - Empirical – Quant. 
- Survey 
(Erramilli et al., 
2002) 
Examines the choice between management contracts and franchising - OCP (RBV) - Empirical – Quant 
- Survey 
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Year Author/s Purpose  Theory Methodology 
(Goddard & 
Standish-Wilkinson, 
2002) 
Reviews hotel management contract trends in the Middle East since the 
1970s 
- No theory Theoretical 
Secondary data 
(Rodrı́guez, 2002) Examines the determining factors in entry choice in the Spanish hotel 
industry, aiming to verify whether TCE, agency theory and the strategic 
theories of OCP and knowledge 
- TCE  
- Agency theory 
- OCP (RBV)  
- Knowledge theory 
- Synergetic theory 
- Empirical – Quant. 
- Statistical tests on existing 
dataset 
 
2003 (Altinay & Altinay, 
2003) 
Examines the environmental factors influencing the international 
expansion plans of Bass Hotels and Resorts 
- OLI  - Theoretical  
- Secondary data 
- Case study 
(Brown et al., 2003) Examines the separation ownership and control dimensions in the 
foreign market entry mode choice of hotel organisations 
- RBV - Empirical – Quant. 
- Questionnaire 
(Dimou, Archer, & 
Chen, 2003) 
Develops a theoretical framework to explain the choice between 
franchising and management contracts in the corporate development of 
international hotel firms 
- TCE  
- Agency theory 
 
- Theoretical 
- Proposition development 
(Dimou, Chen, et al., 
2003) 
Develops a theoretical framework to explain the choice between 
franchising and management contracts in the corporate development of 
international hotel firms 
- TCE  
- Agency theory 
 
- Theoretical 
- Proposition development 
2004 (R. Pine & Qi, 2004) Examines the development of hotel chains in China since 1978 and 
recommends policy and operational guidelines for their further 
expansion 
- No theory - Empirical – Qual. 
- Case study 
(Cho, 2004) Examines, from the franchisee perspectives in Korea, if franchising of 
mid-class hotels will achieve success in Korea as it has in North America 
and some other parts of the world 
- No theory - Empirical – Quant. 
- Questionnaire 
2005 (Altinay, 2005) Examines the factors influencing the entry mode choices of an 
international hotel company 
- TCE 
- OLI 
- Empirical – Qual. - Case 
study 
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Year Author/s Purpose  Theory Methodology 
(Chen & Dimou, 
2005) 
Identifies the country- and firm-specific factors that influence the choice 
among franchising, management contracts and company ownership 
- TCE  
- Agency theory 
- Empirical – Quant. 
- Statistical tests on existing 
dataset 
(Cho, 2005) Provides insights into a hotel franchisee’s perspectives in relation to 
transaction costs in Korea 
- TCE - Empirical – Qual. - Case 
study 
(Espino-Rodriguez & 
Padron, 2005) 
Studies, from a strategic perspective, the characteristics that hotel 
activities must possess for them to be outsourced 
- RBV - Empirical – Mixed 
- Interview  
- Questionnaire  
(Johnson & Vanetti, 
2005) 
Examines the expansion strategies of international hotel operators in 
five countries in Eastern Central Europe 
- OLI - Empirical – Quant. 
- Survey 
(Lamminmaki, 2005) Applies Williamson’s six dimensional typology of asset specificity as a 
theoretical framework for appraising the nature of outsourcing activities 
in hotels 
- Asset specificity - Empirical – Qual. - 
Interviews  
2006 (Veerades & Taylor, 
2006) 
Seeks to examine the extent to which management contracts used by 
international hotel firms in Thailand mirror those used in the USA 
- No theory - Empirical – Qual. - 
Interviews 
2007 (Altinay, 2007) Evaluates the factors that influence a multinational hospitality 
organisation’s franchise decision‐making process 
- OLI 
- TCE 
- Empirical – Qual.  
- Case study 
(Bader & Lababedi, 
2007) 
Reviews the main terms, definitions and applications of a typical 
European hotel management contract 
- No theory - Theoretical  
- Review 
(Dev et al., 2007) Examines the marketing-entry strategies surrounding the separation of 
the ownership from managerial control, in particular, control over 
marketing and operations 
- OCP (RBV) - Empirical – Quant. 
- Questionnaire 
(Quer et al., 2007) Examines the impact of country- and firm-specific factors on the foreign 
market entry mode in the hotel industry 
- TCE 
- OLI 
- Hymer’s theory  
- RBV 
- Empirical – Quant. 
- Survey 
2008 (Cunill, Forteza, & 
Miralles, 2008) 
Proposes a method for valuing growth strategies by hotel chains, 
especially when the investment project involves a high degree of 
uncertainty 
- No theory (Real 
options approach) 
- Theoretical 
- Method development 
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Year Author/s Purpose  Theory Methodology 
(Das & De Groote, 
2008) 
Investigates the degree of globalisation in hotel chains in Belgium and 
examines the profile of the business travellers as guests in hotel chains 
- No theory - Theoretical   
- Secondary data 
(Espino-Rodriguez 
et al., 2008) 
Examines asset specificity in ‘make or buy’ decisions in the Scottish hotel 
sector 
- Asset specificity - Empirical – Quant. 
- Survey 
(Heung, Zhang, & 
Jiang, 2008) 
Examines the international franchising opportunities for China’s state-
owned hotels 
- No theory - Empirical – Qual.  
- Interviews 
(S. Y. Kim, 2008) Investigates the influence of hotel management contracts on the 
performance of super-deluxe hotels in Korea and identifies how the 
1996–1997 tourism recessions affected the relationship between 
management contracts and hotel performance 
- No theory - Empirical – Quant. 
- Statistical tests on existing 
dataset 
(S. Lee, 2008) Examines the internationalisation of US multinational hotel companies 
i.e. expansion to Asia versus Europe  
- Internalisation  
- Agency theory 
- Imperfect capital 
market theory  
- Empirical – Quant. 
- Statistical tests on existing 
dataset 
(Panvisavas & 
Taylor, 2008) 
Evaluates how Thai hotel owners seek to control the international hotel 
chains where properties are operated under management contracts 
- Agency theory - Empirical – Qual. - 
Interviews 
(Xiao et al., 2008) Examines the perspective of China’s domestic hotel operators regarding 
franchising and analyses a mix of factors that may affect such a 
perspective 
- No theory - Empirical – Quant. 
- Questionnaire 
2010 (Cunill & Forteza, 
2010) 
Demonstrates that entry modes not based on capital transactions, 
particularly franchise agreements, are the strategies that hotel chains 
prefer when carrying out expansion programs 
- No theory - Empirical – Quant. 
- Delphi analysis 
- Questionnaire 
(Deroos, 2010) Reviews hotel management contracts past and present - No theory - Theoretical  
- Review 
(M. J. Turner & 
Guilding, 2010) 
Reviews the findings of prior empirical research concerning hotel 
management contracts between owners and operators 
- Agency theory - Theoretical  
- Review 
(Zeng, 2010) Studies the expansion strategies and evolution paths of hotel groups in 
China 
- TCE  
- RBV 
- Empirical – Quant. 
- Survey 
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Year Author/s Purpose  Theory Methodology 
2011 (Gross & Huang, 
2011) 
Develops an understanding of the internationalisation prospects of Chinese 
domestic hotel firms 
- Uppsala model - Empirical – Qual. 
- Case study 
(Huang et al., 2011) Combines TCE, Dunning’s OLI paradigm and institutional theory in an 
integrative framework to examine the relationship of firms’ foreign 
market entry mode choice and performance outcomes 
- TCE 
- OLI 
- Institutional theory 
- Theoretical 
- Proposition development 
(Leon-Darder et al., 
2011) 
Investigates the entry mode choice in the hotel industry up to 2009, 
identifying the factors that influence the mode choice of incorporating 
each new hotel within the chain 
- TCE  
- RBV 
- Empirical – Quant. 
- Statistical tests on existing 
dataset 
(van Ginneken, 
2011) 
Examines expert attitudes to management contracts in the Dutch hotel 
industry  
- No theory - Empirical – Qual. 
- Delphi analysis 
2012 (Alon et al., 2012) Proposes and tests an agency-based organisational model of 
internationalisation through franchising in the hotel sector 
- Agency theory - Empirical – Quant. 
- Statistical tests on existing 
dataset 
(Martorell-Cunill et 
al., 2012) 
Explains the main direct and indirect causes of the marked proliferation 
in non-equity growth strategies by the world’s top chains 
- No theory - Empirical – Mixed. 
- Delphi analysis 
(Villar et al., 2012) Examines the importance of the services’ characteristics on the entry 
mode choice in the hotel industry  
- TCE  
- OCP (RBV) 
- Empirical – Quant. 
- Statistical tests on existing 
dataset  
2013 (Martorell et al., 
2013) 
Pinpoints the factors that play a decisive role in the decision process of 
Balearic hotel chains when choosing a growth strategy for expansion into 
the Caribbean 
- TCE  
- Agency theory 
- Synergetic theory 
- Empirical – Quant. 
- Survey 
- Delphi analysis 
 
(Cunill et al., 2013) Examines the factors that play a decisive role in determining growth 
strategies implemented by the hotel chains of the Balearic Islands in the 
Caribbean and Gulf of Mexico 
- TCE  
- Agency theory 
- Synergetic theory  
- Empirical – Quant. 
- Survey 
- Delphi analysis 
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Year Author/s Purpose  Theory Methodology 
2014 (Ivanova & Ivanov, 
2014) 
Identifies the entry modes applied by foreign and domestic hotel chains 
in the Bulgarian hotel market, evaluating any differences between 
foreign and domestic chains in Bulgaria and identifying the most suitable 
type of entry mode from the viewpoints of the chains and the affiliated 
properties 
- No theory - Empirical – Quant. 
- Questionnaire 
2015 (Kruesi & 
Zamborsky, in press) 
Examines the choice between franchising and management contracts of 
international hotel organisations entering New Zealand 
- TCE  
- RBV 
- Empirical – Qual. - 
Interviews 
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Appendix 6 Study 1 Participant Information Sheet 
Participant  
Information Sheet 
 
Date Information Sheet Produced: 12 Nov 2012 
Project Title 
The Determinants of Non-Equity Entry Mode Decisions in the Hospitality Industry: Combining 
Asset Specificity with Imperfect Imitability 
An Invitation 
My Name is Michael Kruesi, I am a confirmed Ph.D. candidate at the Auckland University of 
Technology in New Zealand. I am writing to invite you to participate in this study of the non-equity 
entry modes used by international hotel organisations.  Specifically the research is focused on the 
determining factors for choosing between franchising and management contracts in the hotel 
industry. During the interview I would like to discuss these determining factors with you. 
Participation in this research is voluntary and the participant has the right to withdraw from the 
research at any stage prior to the completion of the data collection. I would like to assure you that 
participation or non-participation will neither advantage nor disadvantage you in any way and that 
participation in the study will be completely confidential. 
What is the purpose of this research? 
This research is conducted as part of a Ph.D. thesis and may also contribute to other academic 
publications and presentations as part of the qualification. I would like to assure you that the data 
collected during the interviews will not be used for any other purpose.  
How was I identified and why am I being invited to participate in this research? 
Your contact details were obtained either through the AUT staff directory or through the delegate 
list of the 16th International Hotel Investment Forum. You were chosen specifically due to the 
expertise and relevant subject knowledge you have on the topic being investigated. 
What will happen in this research? 
During the interview I would like to discuss franchising and management contracts and validate the 
theoretical foundation of the study.  To that end I would require approximately 45 minutes of your 
time.  
What are the benefits? 
As the participant, you will benefit by being presented with the findings of the research upon its 
completion.  The benefits for me include engaging in the academic conversation in my field and the 
potential validation of a conceptual framework I created. The wider community will benefit 
academically by building on the literature. Specifically by building on service firm entry mode 
literature, non-equity entry mode literature as well as the literature on transaction cost economics 
and the resource-based view.  The wider community will further benefit from this research 
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practically.  Specifically by being a guide for practitioners and a reference on the variations as well 
as the pros and cons of franchising and management contracts.  
How will my privacy be protected? 
This research will be completely confidential.  No information that could identify you will be 
included in the thesis or any other publication or presentation resulting from this research.  
What are the costs of participating in this research? 
Participation in this research project does not entail any direct costs. The only cost of participation 
entails approximately 40 minutes of your time.   
What opportunity do I have to consider this invitation? 
The research will involve interviews in Auckland, New Zealand and Berlin, Germany.  The 
interviews in Auckland will take place between the 12th to the 22nd of February 2013.  The 
interviews in Berlin will take place at the International Hotel Investment Forum, from the 4th to the 
7th of March 2013. 
How do I agree to participate in this research? 
To officially agree to participate in this research, you will need to sign a consent form. This consent 
form will be provided to you immediately prior to the commencement of the interview. 
Will I receive feedback on the results of this research? 
Upon completion of the study, you will be provided with an executive report, which outlines the 
findings of the research. 
What do I do if I have concerns about this research? 
Any concerns regarding the nature of this project should be notified in the first instance to the 
Project Supervisor, Prof Nigel Hemmington, nigel.hemmington@aut.ac.nz, +64 9 921 9999 ext. 827. 
Concerns regarding the conduct of the research should be notified to the Executive Secretary, 
AUTEC, Dr Rosemary Godbold, rosemary.godbold@aut.ac.nz, (+64) 921 9999 ext. 6902. 
Whom do I contact for further information about this research? 
Researcher Contact Details: 
Michael Kruesi, Auckland University of Technology, School of Hospitality and Tourism, WH 
Building, 55 Wellesley Street East, Auckland 1142, New Zealand. E-mail: cnv4094@aut.ac.nz 
Project Supervisor Contact Details: 
Primary Supervisor: Prof Nigel Hemmington, Auckland University of Technology, School of 
Hospitality and Tourism, WH Building, 55 Wellesley Street East, Auckland 1142, New Zealand. E-
mail:  nigel.hemmington@aut.ac.nz, telephone: +64 9 921 9999 ext. 827 
Approved by the Auckland University of Technology Ethics Committee on 05/12/12, AUTEC 
Reference number 12/314 
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Appendix 7a Study 2 Survey Research Invitation  
 
[Date] 
Dear Mr./Ms. [Name], 
I would like to invite you to be a key participant in a major research project on 
management and franchise agreements in the hotel industry. Michael Kruesi is conducting 
this research under my supervision, at the Auckland University of Technology in New 
Zealand. I hope that you will agree to complete a survey, which will take approximately 15 
minutes of your time.  
 
I have asked you to participate in this research because of your specific expertise, which 
we feel would make a significant contribution to the research project and advance the 
literature in the field. Your participation in this study is voluntary. If you decide to 
participate, you may withdraw at any time. 
 
Your anonymous responses will be confidential and we do not collect identifying 
information such as your name, email address or IP address. All data is stored in a 
password protected electronic format. The results of this study will be used for academic 
purposes and may be shared with representatives of the Auckland University of 
Technology. Should you be interested in the results of the research, you will receive an 
executive report of the findings upon completion of the project. 
 
If you are willing to support us in this research please click in the following link: 
 
https://nztri.qualtrics.com/SE/?SID=SV_cvSCE8siuMFLcXz  
 
Thank you for your valuable support. 
 
Kind regards,  
 
Professor Nigel Hemmington  
Dean of Culture and Society 
Pro Vice-Chancellor International 
 
Any questions about or concerns regarding the nature of this project should be notified in 
the first instance to the Project Supervisor, Prof Nigel Hemmington, 
nigel.hemmington@aut.ac.nz, +64 9 921 9999 ext. 827. 
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Appendix 7b Study 2 Survey Research Invitation Reminder 
 
[Date] 
Dear Mr./Ms. [Name], 
I am writing to you regarding the research invitation you received from Professor Nigel 
Hemmington. If you have been considering participating in the survey, may I encourage 
you to do so?  Your responses would add valuable insight, which will help in developing 
the literature and furthering the understanding of the hotel industry as well as breaching 
the gap between hotel academics and hotel practitioners. 
 
Please note that the survey has nothing to do with the organization where you are 
currently employed, or the part of the world where you are currently located. The survey 
is actually based on the expertise that you have amassed over your career in the hotel 
industry. 
 
We would very much appreciate your support in this research project. If you are willing to 
support us or know anyone else who is knowledgeable and willing to take part, please use 
the following link: 
 
https://nztri.qualtrics.com/SE/?SID=SV_cvSCE8siuMFLcXz  
 
If you have any reservations about the study please do not hesitate to contact Professor 
Hemmington or myself.  
 
Kind regards,  
Michael Kruesi 
PhD Candidate, Auckland University of Technology 
 
Any questions about or concerns regarding the nature of this project should be notified in 
the first instance to the Project Supervisor, Prof Nigel Hemmington, 
nigel.hemmington@aut.ac.nz, +64 9 921 9999 ext. 827. 
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Appendix 8 Franchise/Management Contract Scenario Survey  
 
Background      
This survey is based on a brief "scenario" that puts you in the position of a hotel executive 
(employed at the corporate or regional headquarters of a large international hotel 
organization), who has just made a specific decision between a franchise agreement and a 
management contract to expand a hotel chain into a foreign market. There are many ways 
to internationalize a hotel chain and while you may not specifically have had to make this 
decision in the past, please answer as if you were in this position. To illustrate this more 
clearly, please see the diagram below.   
 
If you would like some further background information on franchising and management 
contracts and the differences between them that are pertinent to this study, then click on 
'More information'. By completing this survey you give consent for your survey responses 
to be included in this study.    
 Survey (1) 
 More information (2) 
 
Franchising vs. Management Contracts     
Franchising  
- An agreement granting a license for a predetermined financial return (a royalty) by a 
franchising company (franchisor) to its franchisees.   
- Entitles the franchisee to operate the hotel and make use of a complete business package, 
including training, support and the corporate name/brand.   
- The hotel organization does not have operational control. The franchisee operates the 
hotel as their own businesses to exactly the same standards and format as the other units 
in the franchised chain.      
 
Management Contract  
- An agreement between a hotel organization and an owner/owner company (of a hotel 
property), where the hotel organization runs the hotel.   
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- A management team from the hotel organization operates the hotel.   
- The hotel organization has full operational control i.e. the owner of the hotel property 
does not make any operational decisions.      
 
In both the case of franchising and management contracts, while the hotel operates under 
a brand owned by the hotel organization, the building is not owned by the hotel 
organization. The major point of difference between the two options is that in franchising, 
the hotel owner or a third party operates the hotel whereas in a management contract, the 
hotel organization operates the hotel itself. 
 
Task    
Your task is to complete either the franchise scenario survey OR the management contract 
scenario survey based on your preference. Below you are presented with your two 
choices.    
 
Scenario 1 – Franchising   
Imagine you have decided to expand a hotel chain you control by setting up a new hotel in 
a foreign market through franchising over a management contract.. 
 
Scenario 2 – Management Contracts 
Imagine you have decided to expand a hotel chain you control by setting up a new hotel in 
a foreign market through a management contract over franchising. 
 Franchise Scenario Survey (1) 
 Management Contract Scenario Survey (2) 
 
Management Contract Scenario Survey     
As an executive of a hotel organization, you have expanded one of your hotel chains by 
setting up a new hotel in a foreign market through a management contract. Consider the 
characteristics of a hotel chain which you would expand through management contracts 
over franchising it and keep these in mind as you complete the survey. 
 
[OR] 
 
Franchise Scenario Survey     
As an executive of a hotel organization, you have expanded one of your hotel chains by 
setting up a new hotel in a foreign market through franchising. Consider the 
characteristics of a hotel chain which you would expand through management contracts 
over franchising it and keep these in mind as you complete the survey. 
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1A/B Asset Specificity   
Considering the characteristics of a hotel chain you would expand through (management contracts / franchising), indicate your level of agreement to the following 
statements from strongly disagree to strongly agree. 
 Strongly 
Disagree  
Disagree  Somewhat 
Disagree 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree  
Somewhat 
Agree  
Agree Strongly 
Agree  
It is difficult for an outsider to learn ‘our way of doing things’ at this hotel 
chain.  
              
To be effective, employees of this hotel chain have to take a lot of time to 
get to know the customers’ expectations. 
              
Employees of this hotel chain need to spent much time and effort 
learning the skills needed to provide the expected service.  
              
The hotel organization has spent much time and effort developing the 
service offerings of this hotel chain.  
              
Specialized knowledge is needed to adequately provide the service 
required at this hotel chain.  
              
A large investment and a long time is needed for training employees to 
adequately provide the service expected at this hotel chain.  
              
The hotel organization has spent much time and effort to learn and 
perfect the key factors for success of this hotel chain. 
              
An employee’s inside information on the procedures employed at this 
hotel chain would be very helpful to the organization's competitors.  
              
The skill level of the employees working at this hotel chain is 
significantly customized to your hotels’ brand standards. 
              
It is important to retain the inside information on the processes which 
give this hotel chain a competitive advantage.  
              
The hotel organization has spent much time and effort developing the 
workflows and routines of this hotel chain. 
              
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2A/B Imperfect Imitability   
Considering the characteristics of a hotel chain you would expand through (management contracts / franchising), indicate your level of agreement to the following 
statements from strongly disagree to strongly agree. 
 Strongly 
Disagree  
Disagree  Somewhat 
Disagree  
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Agree  
Agree  Strongly 
Agree  
It is difficult for competitors to imitate the service offerings of this chain.                
The services offered at this chain are unique and nobody else can offer 
them.  
              
It took the hotel organization years to build the brand reputation of this 
hotel chain, nobody can easily copy it. 
              
The competitive advantages of this hotel chain are embodied in the 
company and not in the individuals i.e. nobody can easily copy the 
service offerings of this hotel chain by stealing away employees.  
              
Nobody can copy the corporate routines, processes and culture of this 
hotel chain.  
              
The corporate routines, processes and culture of this hotel chain would 
be difficult for other parties to absorb and then re-create.  
              
For this hotel chain the services that are offered are unique and it would 
be difficult for other parties to absorb and then re-create. 
              
The industry knowledge the mangers of this hotel chain have would be 
difficult for other parties to absorb and then re-create.  
              
The reputation of this hotel chain has been developed over a long time.                
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3A/B Intangible Assets/Resources    Considering the characteristics of a hotel chain you would expand through management contracts / franchising, indicate your level 
of agreement to the following statements from strongly disagree to strongly agree. 
 
 Strongly 
Disagree  
Disagree  Somewhat 
Disagree  
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree  
Somewhat 
Agree  
Agree  Strongly 
Agree  
I chose a management contract over franchising to protect the brand 
standards of the hotel chain. 
              
I chose a management contract over franchising to retain control over 
the organizational routines of the hotel chain. 
              
I chose a management contract over franchising to retain control over 
the training systems of the hotel chain. 
              
I chose a management contract over franchising to protect the industry 
and managerial expertise required to operate the hotel chain.  
              
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4A/B Host Country Factors   
Considering the characteristics of a hotel chain you would expand through management contracts / franchising, indicate your level of agreement to the following 
statements from strongly disagree to strongly agree. 
 
 Strongly 
Disagree  
Disagree  Somewhat 
Disagree  
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree  
Somewhat 
Agree 
Agree  Strongly 
Agree  
I chose a management contract over franchising to mitigate the risk of 
political instability in the foreign market. 
              
I chose a management contract over franchising because of the 
favourable business conditions of the foreign market. 
              
I chose a management contract over franchising because of the 
economic development of the foreign market. 
              
I chose a management contract over franchising because of the quality 
infrastructure in the foreign market.  
I chose a management contract over franchising due to the cultural 
differences between my hotel organizations’ home market and the 
foreign market. 
              
 
 
5A/B Size of the Organization      
Considering the characteristics of a hotel chain you would expand through management contracts / franchising, indicate your level of agreement to the following 
statements from strongly disagree to strongly agree. 
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 Strongly 
Disagree  
Disagree  Somewhat 
Disagree  
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree  
Somewhat 
Agree  
Agree  Strongly 
Agree  
I chose a management contract over franchising because of the large 
size of this hotel organization. 
              
I chose a management contract over franchising because of the large 
scope of this hotel organization’s global operations in terms of the 
number of regions it operates in. 
              
I chose a management contract over franchising because of the high 
level of international experience of this hotel organization. 
              
 
6A/B Investment Factors      
Considering the characteristics of a hotel chain you would expand through management contracts / franchising, indicate your level of agreement to the following 
statements from strongly disagree to strongly agree. 
 
 Strongly 
Disagree  
Disagree  Somewhat 
Disagree  
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree  
Somewhat 
Agree  
Agree  Strongly 
Agree  
I chose a management contract over franchising because of the large 
investment this hotel organization made into training. 
              
I chose a management contract over franchising because of the large 
investment this hotel organization made into management controls. 
              
I chose a management contract over franchising because of the large 
investment this hotel organization made into quality controls. 
              
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7A/B Availability of Partners     
Considering the characteristics of a hotel chain you would expand through management contracts / franchising, indicate your level of agreement to the following 
statements from strongly disagree to strongly agree. 
 
 Strongly 
Disagree  
Disagree  Somewhat 
Disagree  
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree  
Somewhat 
Agree  
Agree  Strongly 
Agree  
I chose a management contract over franchising because of the large 
availability of qualified managerial staff in the host country.. 
              
I chose a management contract over franchising because of the large 
availability of qualified local investment partners in the host country. 
              
I chose a management contract over franchising because of the large 
availability of trustworthy local investment partners 
              
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8A/B Criticisms    
For these following statements you do not have to imagine the scenario, just indicate your level of agreement from strongly disagree to strongly agree. 
 
 Strongly 
Disagree  
Disagree  Somewhat 
Disagree  
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Agree  
Agree  Strongly 
Agree  
For hotel chains, which have both franchised and managed hotels in 
their portfolio, the decision to use one or the other is not made by the 
hotel organization, the decision is made by the investor, because they 
are the one with the money 
              
We choose management contracts / franchising because our business 
model is just set up that way.  
              
We are ad hoc in our decision-making, we just see what works best on a 
case by case basis. 
              
The choice between franchising and management contracts is simply a 
matter of the star level of the chain. 
              
There no real ‘decision’ as it’s based on the business model of the 
investor, there are some investors who would simply never operate 
under a management contract. 
              
When making this decision I think, “Do I want to run the hotel myself or 
do I want someone to run it for me?” That's the main consideration. 
              
In the instances where a hotel owner wants to operate on a 
management contract and the hotel organization does not, the hotel 
owner would simply find another hotel organization 
              
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Demographic Section  
 
9A/B Age 
What is your age? 
 18 - 30 (1) 
 31 - 40 (2) 
 41 - 50 (3) 
 51 - 60 (4) 
 61 - 70 (5) 
 71 - 80 (6) 
 
10A/B Gender 
What is your gender? 
 Male (1) 
 Female (2) 
 
11A/B Country 
In which country do you work? 
 Afghanistan (1) (through to) 
 Zimbabwe (193) 
 
12A/B Position 
What is your current position? 
 CEO (1) 
 CFO (2) 
 COO (3) 
 Vice President (4) 
 President (5) 
 Director (6) 
 Managing Director (7) 
 Head of a division (8) 
 Other (9) 
 
11A/B Experience 
How many years have you worked in the hotel industry? 
 1 (1) (through to) 
 50+ (50) 
 
12A/B Employment 
How many years have you been employed in your current position? 
 1 (1) (through to) 
 60 (60) 
 
13A/B Decision  
Have you made the decision between franchising and management contracts in the past? 
 Yes (1) 
 No (2) 
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14A/B Level of influence   
What level of influence do you have in the decision making process? 
 Low (13) 
 Medium (14) 
 High (15) 
 
15A/B Level of experience   
What is your level of expertise in making this decision? 
 Low (1) 
 Medium (2) 
 High (3) 
 
17A/B Additional Comments  
If you have any additional comments about the survey, please state them here (optional) 
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Appendix 9 Means Split by Scenario 
Scenario choice 
Asset 
specificity 
Imperfect 
imitability 
Firm 
level 
factors 
Environment 
level factors 
Organisational 
size 
Investment 
factors 
Available 
partners 
Age 
category Gender 
Region 
of origin 
Position 
category 
Years of 
current 
employment 
Years of 
experience 
Decision 
experience 
Level of 
influence 
Level of 
expertise 
0 Mean 4.93 4.27 3.31 4.94 5.16 4.29 5.05 3.20 1.17 1.86 1.80 6.97 18.03 1.22 2.43 2.58 
N 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 33 36 36 35 36 
Std. 
Deviation 
0.92 0.97 1.51 1.18 1.01 1.36 1.44 1.02 0.38 0.88 0.41 7.61 11.45 0.42 0.74 0.55 
1 Mean 5.50 4.54 5.72 4.20 4.37 4.76 4.32 3.28 1.11 1.94 1.61 6.84 23.58 1.25 2.61 2.66 
N 77 77 77 77 77 76 75 74 74 71 71 69 73 73 72 71 
Std. 
Deviation 
0.61 0.99 0.90 1.21 1.48 1.34 1.38 1.03 0.31 0.92 0.49 5.30 11.35 0.43 0.59 0.61 
Total Mean 5.32 4.46 4.96 4.43 4.62 4.61 4.55 3.26 1.13 1.92 1.67 6.88 21.74 1.24 2.55 2.64 
N 112 112 112 112 112 111 110 109 109 106 106 102 109 109 107 107 
Std. 
Deviation 
0.76 0.98 1.58 1.25 1.39 1.36 1.43 1.02 0.34 0.91 0.47 6.11 11.63 0.43 0.65 0.59 
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Appendix 10 Correlation Tables  
  
Scenario 
choice 
Asset 
specificity 
Imperfect 
imitability 
Firm 
level 
factors 
Environment 
level factors 
Organisational 
size 
Investment 
factors 
Available 
partners 
Age 
category Gender 
Region 
of 
origin 
Position 
category 
Years of 
current 
employment 
Years of 
experience 
Decision 
experience 
Level of 
influence 
Asset specificity .345**                               
112                               
Imperfect 
imitability 
.127 .387**                             
112 112                             
Intangible assets .708** .354** .183                           
112 112 112                           
Host country 
factors 
-.275** -.098 -.003 -.054                         
112 112 112 112                         
Organisational 
size 
-.265** -.224* -.065 -.050 .391**                       
112 112 112 112 112                       
Investment 
factors 
.163 .210* .239* .380** .144 .398**                     
111 111 111 111 111 111                     
Available partners -.238* -.097 -.091 -.212* .351** .395** .218*                   
110 110 110 110 110 110 110                   
Age category .038 .069 -.058 .073 -.052 .051 .186 .207*                 
109 108 108 108 108 108 108 107                 
Gender -.088 .133 .047 -.077 .023 .084 -.026 .043 -.070               
109 108 108 108 108 108 108 107 109               
Region of origin .045 .168 .014 .099 .012 .006 .204* .068 .035 -.087             
106 105 105 105 105 105 105 104 106 106             
Position category -.194* -.199* -.142 -.123 .183 .010 -.110 -.044 -.060 -.141 -.082           
106 105 105 105 105 105 105 104 106 106 105           
Years of current 
employment 
-.010 .203* -.154 .240* .049 .015 .204* .058 .410** -.118 .070 .016         
102 101 101 101 101 101 101 100 102 102 100 101         
Years of 
experience 
.225* .025 -.197* -.016 -.125 .029 .033 .181 .632** -.247** -.044 .081 .117       
109 108 108 108 108 108 108 107 108 108 105 106 102       
Decision 
experience 
.027 -.048 -.028 .127 .036 .113 .047 -.020 .048 .170 .073 .027 -.084 -.028     
109 108 108 108 108 108 108 107 108 108 105 106 102 109     
Level of influence .133 .053 .012 .044 -.105 -.053 .120 -.042 .041 -.336** .007 -.188 -.026 .287** -.472**   
107 106 106 106 106 106 106 105 106 106 103 104 100 107 107   
Level of expertise .063 -.015 -.275** -.010 -.129 -.070 .042 -.031 .096 -.353** -.022 -.108 .143 .250** -.392** .648** 
107 106 106 106 106 106 106 105 106 106 103 104 101 107 107 105 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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Scenario choice 
Asset 
specificity 
Imperfect 
imitability 
Firm 
level 
factors 
Environment 
level factors 
Organisational 
size 
Investment 
factors 
Available 
partners 
Age 
category Gender 
Region of 
origin 
Position 
category 
Years of 
current 
employment 
Years of 
experience 
Decision 
experience 
Level of 
influence 
0 Imperfect 
imitability 
.503**                             
35                             
Intangible 
assets  
.036 .126                           
35 35                           
Host Country 
factors 
.071 -.234 .165                         
35 35 35                         
Organisational 
size 
-.254 -.135 .079 .038                       
35 35 35 35                       
Investment 
factors 
.095 .047 .505** .167 .161                     
35 35 35 35 35                     
Available 
partners 
.184 -.048 -.266 .331 .057 .103                   
35 35 35 35 35 35                   
Age category .201 -.064 .172 -.067 -.010 .122 .232                 
34 34 34 34 34 34 34                 
Gender .086 .029 -.210 -.050 .064 -.104 .213 .135               
34 34 34 34 34 34 34 35               
Region of 
origin 
.259 -.158 .025 .209 -.202 .292 .017 .098 .075             
34 34 34 34 34 34 34 35 35             
Position 
category 
-.209 -.380* -.113 .131 .248 -.262 -.217 -.184 -.152 .000           
34 34 34 34 34 34 34 35 35 35           
Years of 
current 
employment 
.263 -.097 .432* .208 -.111 .113 .011 .520** -.250 .135 .057         
32 32 32 32 32 32 32 33 33 33 33         
Years of 
experience 
.219 -.233 -.251 -.050 .200 -.114 .279 .355* .030 -.013 .147 -.066       
35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 33       
Decision 
experience 
-.014 .066 .321 .146 .048 -.015 -.066 -.108 .113 .168 -.068 -.054 -.244     
35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 33 36     
Level of 
influence 
.047 .039 .039 -.038 .034 .359* -.013 -.160 -.278 -.250 -.247 -.315 .189 -.490**   
34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 32 35 35   
Level of 
expertise 
-.002 -.321 -.005 -.060 .057 .232 .014 .155 -.335* -.189 -.130 .129 .209 -.448** .602** 
35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 33 36 36 35 
1 Imperfect 
imitability 
.292**                             
77                             
Intangible 
Assets 
.313** .145                           
77 77                           
Host country 
factors 
-.051 .148 .254*                         
77 77 77                         
Organisational 
size 
-.112 -.002 .297** .438**                       
77 77 77 77                       
Investment 
factors 
.221 .303** .306** .214 .565**                     
76 76 76 76 76                     
Available -.161 -.072 .096 .289* .460** .347**                   
196 
partners 75 75 75 75 75 75                   
Age category -.045 -.067 -.051 -.023 .097 .204 .228                 
74 74 74 74 74 74 73                 
Gender .253* .076 .168 .021 .063 .044 -.106 -.182               
74 74 74 74 74 74 73 74               
Region of 
origin 
.094 .081 .122 -.046 .093 .153 .121 .003 -.172             
71 71 71 71 71 71 70 71 71             
Position 
category 
-.119 -.027 .092 .140 -.121 -.010 -.036 -.003 -.168 -.102           
71 71 71 71 71 71 70 71 71 70           
Years of 
current 
employment 
.148 -.196 .157 -.003 .083 .252* .109 .340** -.008 .030 -.010         
69 69 69 69 69 69 68 69 69 67 68         
Years of 
experience 
-.245* -.233* -.234* -.081 .053 .050 .227 .775** -.391** -.079 .122 .257*       
73 73 73 73 73 73 72 73 73 70 71 69       
Decision 
experience 
-.092 -.075 .046 -.004 .149 .072 .010 .118 .206 .027 .073 -.107 .064     
73 73 73 73 73 73 72 73 73 70 71 69 73     
Level of 
influence 
-.009 -.024 -.119 -.104 -.053 -.040 -.020 .151 -.366** .143 -.138 .219 .315** -.489**   
72 72 72 72 72 72 71 72 72 69 70 68 72 72   
Level of 
expertise 
-.073 -.278* -.151 -.136 -.087 -.061 -.020 .064 -.363** .044 -.084 .158 .258* -.368** .682** 
71 71 71 71 71 71 70 71 71 68 69 68 71 71 70 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
